Western Cape Government

Western Cape Government: Department of the Premier

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Implementation Evaluation of the Provincial Transversal Management System

REVISED DRAFT EVALUATION REPORT

Revised draft evaluation report

18 February 2018

pdg
Committed to Development

PDG

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Acronyms

APP	Annual Performance Plan
BIU	Behavioural Insights Unit
COAG	Council of Australian Governments
CRDP	Comprehensive Rural Development Programme
DCAS	Department of Cultural Affairs and Sport
DCOG	Department of Co-operative Governance
DEA&DP	Department of Environmental Affairs & Development Planning
DEDAT	Department of Economic Development and Tourism
DHS	Department of Human Settlements
DLG	Department of Local Government
DOA	Department of Agriculture
DOCS	Department of Community Safety
DOH	Department of Health
DOTP	Department of the Premier
DPC	Department of the Premier and Cabinet
DPME	Department of planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
DSD	Department of Social Development
DSU	Delivery Support Unit
DTPW	Department of Transport and Public Works
DWS	Department of Water and Sanitation
EBPM	Evidence Based Policy Management
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EDP	Economic Development Partnership
EOTR	End-of-Term Review
EXCO	Executive Committee
FG	Focus Group
FSAPP	Framework for Strategic and Annual Performance Plans
GC	Game Changer
GPST	Growth Potential Study of Towns
HOD	Head of Department
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IGRFA	Inter-governmental Relations Framework Act
IIP	Integrated Implementation Plan
IWP	Integrated Work Plan
IMS	Integrated Management System
JPI	Joint planning Initiative
KEQ	Key Evaluation Question
KPI	Key Performance Indicators
LG	Local Government
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEC	Member of Executive Council
MGRO	Municipal Governance Review and Outlook
MMC	Middle Management Service
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MTSF	Medium Term Strategic Framework
NDP	National Development Plan
NPM	New Public Management

NSW	New South Wales
NT	National Treasury
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
PIU	Premier's Implementation Unit
PMDU	Prime Minister's Delivery Unit
PRTMCC	Provincial Road Transport Coordinating Committee
PSC	Premier's Strategic Committee
PSDF	Provincial Spatial Development Framework
PSG	Provincial Strategic Goal
PSO	Provincial Strategic Objective
PSP	Provincial Strategic Plan
PT	Provincial Treasury
PTM	Provincial Top Management
PTMS	Provincial Transversal Management System
PWMES	Province-Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System
RAG	Red-Amber-Green
SC	Steering Committee
SO	Strategic Objective
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SMS	Senior Management Service
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
WCED	Western Cape Education Department
WCG	Western Cape Government
WHO	World Health Organisation
WG	Working Group
WoSA	Whole-of-Society Approach

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1 Introduction

PDG, in association with Communication Works, was commissioned by the Western Cape Department of the Premier (DOTP) to undertake the implementation evaluation of the Provincial Transversal Management System (PTMS). The evaluation was undertaken over the period of July 2018-March 2019, covering the period of implementation of the PTMS from 2014-2019. The evaluation was commissioned as one part of a broader End-of-Term Review (EOTR) undertaken by DOTP.

1.1 Background to the evaluation

Following the electoral mandate of 2009, the Western Cape Government (WCG) sought to strike a bold, delivery-oriented approach, prioritising efficiencies in a time of fiscal constraints while demanding greater effectiveness across the province administration. The WCG sought to become more fit for this purpose as part of the *Modernisation Programme*, including more than twenty "blueprints" intended to support the strategic intentions of the 2009-2014 term of government.

This period resulted in considerable organisational redesign and reform, including the consolidation of transversal corporate services in the DOTP. Among the more important reforms of this period was the prioritisation of 11 Provincial Strategic Objectives (PSOs) along with the formal initiation of a system of provincial transversal management. All efforts were made to ensure this was within the parameters of the South African government's overarching legal framework and informed by the long-term policy priorities of the National Development Plan (NDP), as well as those of the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF).

With the experience of the 2009-2014 term of office and building on a comprehensive review of the achievements and challenges of this period, the WCG made changes to its institutional structures and streamlined its approach to achieve benefits through greater collaboration, coordination and cooperation both within and between departments and spheres of government for the 2014-2019 term.

The PTMS of the 2014-2019 term of office, the subject of this evaluation, is understood as the evolution of the 2009-2014 transversal management system that has sought to build upon the lessons of the previous iteration and apply them in relation to managing the implementation of the Provincial Strategic Plan (PSP). As the 2014-2019 term of government nears its conclusion, the evaluation seeks to provide an external assessment of implementation over the term to inform planning and strategy for the next term of government. The evaluation is intended to be one component of a broader EOTR 2014-2019, the scope of which is considerably broader and inclusive of service delivery results outside the purview of this report.

1.2 Purpose of the evaluation

As per the Terms of Reference (ToR), the evaluation is being undertaken to determine the "effectiveness and efficiency of the PTMS in the development, implementation governance and review of the PSP 2014-2019". The evaluation is intended to be used by senior management and elected officials to inform planning and strategy for the 2019-2024 term of government. It was commissioned as a separate, independently assessed component of the EOTR 2014-2019. Ultimately, the evaluation is intended to support lessons learnt and contribute to performance improvement within the WCG.

1.3 Structure of the report

The evaluation report is structured consistent with other formative evaluation reports commissioned within the parameters of the National Evaluation Policy Framework (Department of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation, 2011) and *Standards for evaluation in government* (Department of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation, 2014)*.*

Section one begins with an introduction to the evaluation, providing a background and rationale, purpose and report structure.

Section two provides a brief theoretical and conceptual context for the PTMS as a management intervention in the Western Cape Government (WCG) relying on international and local academic literature and studies in the public sector.

Section three sets out the evaluation approach and methodology, including limitations.

Section four sets out the findings for the evaluation in relation to the three overarching evaluation criteria: effectiveness; collaboration; and efficiency.

Section five sets out the conclusions of the evaluation arising from a distillation of the key findings.

Section six puts forth a series of recommendations to inform improvements to the PTMS going forward, including recommendations for how to revise and improve the PTMS going forward.

2 Literature review and background to the PTMS

The literature review component of the evaluation report is a condensed version of the full literature review, which is available from the Policy and Strategy Unit within the Department of The Premier, as part of the suite of the PTMS evaluation reports. This summarised literature review will briefly describe some of the concepts and principles which have been considered as part of the evaluation of the PTMS, as well as a high-level summary of some of the key internal documents of the Western Cape Government, before providing a brief background to the PTMS.

2.1 Strategic management in the public sector

Lundqvist (2014) emphasises that management is largely a vertical process which occurs through organisational silos, whereas strategy, by its nature, is a holistic 'horizontal phenomenon' which ties together strategic focus areas across organisations and institutions. Transversal management systems have emerged as a response to the implementation of strategy across siloed, hierarchical yet functioning organisations.

Nutt & Backoff (1993: 304) in their seminal paper on strategy in the public sector, state that "…sweeping change calls for a transformation… The transformed organisation develops more flexibility and adaptability… and increases its repertoire of responses…". The "sweeping changes" being referred to at that time were the increasing prevalence of new public management techniques being adopted internationally, and the application of principles and practices of strategic management more commonly associated with the private sector. South Africa's state institutions have sought to learn from these experiences and apply them.

The strategic management process is a complex, non-linear pathway through public sector institutions across multiple levels of actors, and it is helpful to conceptually unpack this. There are three main "management dimensions" (McBain & Smith, 2005) or "levels" (Moseki, 2014) of strategic management in the public sector, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Strategic management processes from the political to operational level (As adapted from Gray & Larson, (2006): pg. 27)

Political: The responsibilities of this dimension are to craft the vision, mission (if not already pre-defined) and the strategic objectives of the organisation. Even when pre-defined, the mission of a public sector institution would be subject to the political interpretation within which it is operating and an understanding of the developmental mandate which has been assigned to it by its constituents.

Tactical/interpretive: The tactical/interpretive dimension of strategic management requires cooperation and understanding between political principals and accounting officers within the public service. This requires discerning a clear line of sight between the goals and objectives and the possible range of implementation options which are available to the institution.

Operational: The operational dimension is the implementation of the strategy through projects and programmes in varying modalities.

2.1.1 Integrated strategic management and systems

Integrated strategic management consists of re-organising and integrating existing plans, strategies and practices intended to systemise the work, boost the efficiency and contribute to positive outcomes (UBC Commission on Environment, n.d.). An Integrated Management System (IMS) is the product of this approach when constituent elements, processes, systems and stakeholders combine within a common, intentional systemic framework of nested and inter-related sub-systems. Such systemic arrangements are managed to greater or lesser degrees of integration, which determine the extent of the organisation's coherence in the pursuit of outcomes.

The institutional complexity of the public sector is evident in the layers of overlapping and inter-related legislation and the prescribed structures, processes and standards making up a constellation of management systems. In this context, employing integrated strategic management in practice comes with its own complications, particularly as it relates to stakeholder involvement. Stakeholder cooperation and collaboration in public sector environments where political power and resource decision-making is coveted poses unique challenges for collaboration.

2.1.2 Collaborative strategic management

Favoreu et al (2016:6) define collaborative strategic management as "the organised and structured process through which inter-organisational and multi-player groups, both public and private, develop, implement and evaluate collective strategies." While conceptually the potential advantages are self-evident, in practice it means sharing and distributing resources, information and skills between different sectors and areas on a partnership basis in pursuit of a common shared goal (2016:5). This collaboration is distinct from that of "coordination," or "the extent to which organisations attempt that their activities take into account those of other organisations" (Hansen, Steen & de Jong, 2013: 32). A collaborative strategic management approach necessitates coordination. In the public sector, this lends itself to interdepartmental and intergovernmental collaboration, whereas the practicalities of how and with whom this occurs with actors outside of the public sector comes with risks and distinct challenges.

Collaborative management practices in the public sector have enjoyed increased legitimacy and relevance over the past few years. Robertson and Choi (2012, in Favoreu, Carassus & Maurel, 2016) attribute this adoption of more collaborative practices to: 1) the reduction of public sector budgets and resources; 2) the increasing complexity of public issues and social problems; 3) the potential benefits of involving civil society in cooperation rather than confrontation; and 4) the distribution of expertise, resources and innovation between various public and private organisations. Thus, the pooling of ideas, resources, knowledge, and experience is increasingly viewed as an opportunity to enhance collaborative benefit. Comparative research conducted in Europe and North America identified four overarching critical success factors for effective collaborative management: leadership, trust, risk management, and communication and coordination. Collaborative management is often associated with the "Whole-of-Society Approach" (WoSA), which was initially promoted by the World Health Organisation (WHO) but has since become relatively widespread.

2.2 Adaptive management

Scholars (Carey & Matthews, 2016; Glicksman, 2011) define adaptive management as an approach that allows for decision-making and making adjustments in response to new information and changes in context. It aims to foster learning in the course of interventions to improve the responsiveness of decision-making. Adaptive management does not aim to change goals during implementation but rather change the path used to achieve the goals in response to changes. For adaptive management to be successful, learning needs to occur at both the technical (or operational) level, as well as institutionally in relation to the broader policy imperatives.

The complexity of change in the public sector requires attention, and adaptive management aims to help the public sector make better decisions by focusing on tools, strategy and structures that support responsiveness and how officials can learn, improve and adapt throughout implementation at all levels (Carey & Matthews, 2016).

2.3 Strategic leadership and organisational culture

Public sector organisations rely on hierarchical structures and the transactional and transformational relationships between leaders and their subordinates in order to further the intentions of the institution (Gronn, 2002; Hiller and Vance, 2006 in Lemay, 2009). However, the reality is that due to the size of the institutions, their complexity and the broader contextual and political situation, the leaders of public sector institutions have little direct control over their employees (Moynihan & Ingraham, 2004) and depend on their leadership style to appeal to individuals within the organisation to perform as is expected of them. The ability of leadership styles to create an organisational culture of performance is particularly relevant in the post-bureaucratic, NPM paradigm many public institutions find themselves in (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014). Organisational culture is an abstract concept, yet the forces that occur in social interactions which are influenced by the culture of the organisation in which these interactions are occurring, are powerful and can shape the interaction and the result thereof (Schein, 2010).

Research has indicated that transformational and strategic leadership can have a positive impact on organisational culture and the performance of an organisation (Avolio, Waldman, Yammarino, Bass, Barling, Slater, Kelloway, Stone, Russell & Patterson, 1991a). A transformational leader is one that stimulates and inspires their followers to achieve outcomes on the upper limit of what they could realistically perform (Robbin & Coulter, 2007).

2.4 Complexity theory, systems thinking and pragmatic complexity theory

A complex system is one which is not mechanical, but rather one which consists of "connected complex systems…that do not obey simple, fixed laws, but instead result from the internal 'sense-making' going on inside them, as experience, conjectures and experiments are used to modify the interpretive frameworks within," (Allen, 2001:39). The concepts of complexity, originally developed in the natural sciences, has been incorporated into social science and filtered into organisation theory and management (Klijin, 2013 in El-Ghalayini, 2017).

Scholars have identified organisations who have applied NPM and Evidence Based Policy Management (EBPM), tend to use disparate evidence-based research findings as a primary or sole informant to policy formulation. This can be problematic and result in sub-optimal policy formulation. Head (2010:80) states that "the new 'realism' emerging from recent research suggests that while evidence-based improvements are both desirable and possible, we cannot expect to construct a policy system that is fuelled primarily by objective research findings." NPM and EBPM assumes a mechanistic model of policy making and

management which does not consider the politicization of knowledge and the inherent biases in the policy formulation process (Ansell & Geyer, 2016).

Complexity theory is a rejection of the traditional modernist world view of order, causality, reductionism, predictability and determinism that marks the foundation of the more extreme versions of NPM and EBPM. Ansell and Geyer (2016) have proposed the ideal of pragmatism and complexity theory as a practical alternative to EBPM, as pragmatism provides a means to integrate science with democratic values, and complexity theory providing a conception for scientific rigour which could be appropriate for policy making.

Because of its transdisciplinary nature, pragmatic complexity theory lends itself to a reflective process which allows policy makers to orient themselves around policy issues and problem solve based on experimentation, learning and context specificity. Thus, pragmatic complexity encourages policy makers in the policy arena to adapt and adjust to continual evolutionary changes (Ansell & Geyer, 2016:10). Mitleton-Kelly (2003:310) explains that the strategies developed using pragmatic complexity theory are seen not as one-sided responses to a changing environment or another agent, but as adaptive moves, affecting both the initiator of the action and others influenced by it. For pragmatic complexity theory to be successful, an enabling environment is required. This requires having good leadership, an organisational culture which supports learning and enabling infrastructure for the policy formulation process.

2.5 Strategic management in the Age of Disruption

For the last twenty years, the understanding of managing transformational change has been radically altered by the notion of disruption. In the 21st century disruptive changes and technologies, such as artificial intelligence, mobile technologies, quantum computing, and blockchain (to name a few), have required businesses and governments alike to continuously rethink operations and keep up with the changing manner in which business is conducted. Disruptive technologies and inventions, which have been referred to as the fourth industrial revolution, can be understood as any innovation that has the potential to alter human lives, market trends, as well as other aspects, including transportation and communications, through creating new markets and value networks, which disrupt existing markets and value networks, eventually replacing them (Rhaman, Hamid & Chin, 2017). Established companies in industries as diverse as hotels, airlines, manufacturing, media and banking are seeing their markets invaded by new and disruptive business models. This has forced established companies to adopt these new business models alongside their established ones (Robles, 2015). Disruption presents both opportunities and challenges for the public sector.

2.5.1 Deliverology as a form of disruption

In the public sector, the focus has more recently turned from policy towards implementation and the mechanisms for creating faster and more effective service delivery. Shotstak, Watkins, Bellver, and John-Abraham (2014: 1) reflect this by stating that the fundamental challenge for government is "to efficiently and effectively turn political ambitions into policy; policy into practice; and the engagement of front line public service professionals into results for and with citizens." With this understanding, many governments have resorted to setting

up delivery units as an innovative mechanism for facilitating better service delivery to citizens, in focused, target interventions. Delivery units, and the "Deliverology" methodology advocated by Michael Barber in his book *Instruction to deliver: Fighting to transform Britain's Public Services* (2007), are considered seminal in this regard.

Delivery units are usually comprised of a small focused team of driven people working in government, who help line ministries and departments achieve a number of objectives and secure outcomes in select priority areas deemed to be critical to the mission of the organisation (Barber, 2007; Shostak *et al.*, 2014). They can operate at a provincial level, local and national levels and address a range of issues. Deliverology intends to break the business-as-usual model with an intense and focused delivery approach, and disrupts the modus operandi by establishing delivery systems in priority areas, which enable governments to better understand the impact of their organisational culture, planning and budgeting, and the effects that has on both their workers and citizens. Delivery units can be seen as an innovation that works on both organisational culture and technical levels through instilling the practice of data-led decision making, whilst introducing new technical approaches to problem solving, unpacking intervention causal relationships and untangling barriers to results (Barber, 2007; Kohli & Moody, 2016). Gold (2017: 6) explains that although delivery units focus on a select set of key policy priorities and vary in different countries, they generally fulfil two functions:

- tracking progress against a select number of top priorities through collecting, analysing and routinely reporting on a constant stream of performance data; and

- investigating and intervening to solve problems where progress appears to be slipping off track (e.g. by conducting in-depth investigations, convening stakeholders or providing technical assistance).

2.6 International case study- Strategic management in New South Wales (NSW), Australia

In the early 1990s, the NSW public sector, like many other public sectors in developed countries, adopted new public management ideas, which included major reforms, adoption of strategic management practices that included a cycle of strategic planning, resource allocation aligned to strategic plans, implementation monitoring and evaluation. Both Labour and Liberal Party governments developed NSW State Plans setting out their vision, goals and priorities for NSW.

There have been several changes in political leadership in NSW between 2009 and the present, which has resulted in a number of new and revised plans and strategies, with a dramatic shift in approach to strategic management in 2015. While there has been disruption, there are common themes that emerge over the period:

1. The Premier plays a central role in providing an enabling environment for the public sector to manage strategically. The political backing provided by Premiers to drive new initiatives is critical.

2. Holding Ministers and Directors-General accountable for achieving results is another theme that emerges. There is an expectation that all departments and agencies align their strategic plans to the state plan, and in turn, Directors-General and Chief Executive Officers reflect state priorities in their performance agreements and report on these.

3. State plans, in their varying forms, search for ways to break down the silos that are endemic in the public sector. There is recognition of the need for, and the desirability of, a whole-of-government approach to deal with complex issues. There is also recognition of the need for collaboration with the non-state sector.

4. Accurate, reliable and timely information is important for driving innovative approaches to solving complex social and economic problems, and for providing an accurate picture of progress with the implementation of the strategic plan.

5. There have been attempts to achieve alignment between the state plan and the state budget, the latest being the introduction of outcome budgeting.

6. There is a desire or intention to consult and keep citizens informed of progress. The format for consultation and feedback has become more interactive with the use of technology.

7. Reports on progress with state plans or priorities is limited to those plans and priorities and sit alongside the plans and reports of individual departments, agencies and other government entities. In this sense, they provide a partial picture of what government does.

2.7 Internal literature (document) review

This section of the literature review focuses upon internal documentation, reporting and literature which assists to provide contextual and clarificatory understanding of the PTMS. In addition to the documentary review with its internal focus, six key stakeholder interviews have been conducted to supplement and assist in the clarification of the internal documentary review.

2.7.1 Background and problem statement

When an electoral mandate was delivered for new provincial leadership in 2009, the newly elected Cabinet sought to strike a bold, delivery-oriented approach, prioritising efficiencies in a time of fiscal constraints while demanding greater effectiveness across the provincial administration. The *Modernisation Programme* was a province-wide restructuring initiative that sought to concurrently shift the systems, organisational culture(s), and procedural practices across the provincial administration in favour of a more strategic, delivery-oriented approach. The existing institutional configuration and management arrangements were judged by the incoming executive to be siloed and inefficient, with overlapping and at times conflicting efforts that delivered questionable value. The *Modernisation Programme* was the vehicle for considerable organisational redesign and reform guided by a transversal emphasis aimed at deriving efficiencies and removing administrative barriers to results.

At Cabinet level, a strategic management model for governance was introduced in 2010 that specifically sought to distinguish between the political-strategic decision-making at Cabinet level, and that of the technical decision-making of Provincial Top Management (PTM) (e.g. Heads of Department). The prioritisation of 12 Provincial Strategic Objectives (PSOs) (later changed to 11 through the amalgamation of PSOs 8 and 9) was central to a reconfigured system of transversal management informed by the strategic management governance model adopted by Cabinet. The model was therefore further developed to ensure that the 12 PSOs were effectively executed in pursuit of "building the best-run regional government in the world" (Racoco, 2012).

An integral component of the initially proposed PTMS was the advent of transversal steering committees, comprising HODs and SMS members from across departments. Work groups were also proposed to inform projects and work streams aligned to PSOs (Department of the Premier, 2010). Later in 2010, the Standard Operating Procedure for the PTMS was adopted, setting out the organisational framework within which the PSOs are managed and providing detail on the structural and functional roles envisioned as reflected in Figure 1 above. This document provided the foundation for the 2015 update.

The End of Term Review of the 2009-2014 term of office reviewed the role of the PTMS in the translation of the provincial strategic intent into tactical and operational implementation. It was found that there was a disconnect between the Annual Performance Plans (APPs) and the PSP, which did not entrench the transversal approach into the operations of the WCG. Although there was this disconnect, the PTMS was credited with changing the way that the WCG drives and implements its policy agenda, and with increased coordination and facilitation between the line departments on transversal issues. Departments had a better working relationship with other departments and had a better understanding of the functions, roles of responsibilities of all of the departments of the WCG. There was also evidence of transversal thinking across policy approaches, with the general view from MECs and chairs of the Steering Groups and Working Groups that the PTMS had broadly delivered on transversal coordination and communication and had achieved significant progress in removing 'siloism' in the WCG (Western Cape Government, 2014).

2.7.2 Provincial strategic planning 2014-2019

Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019

The PSP is the overarching plan setting out the strategic intentions of the WCG for the second term in office of the current political leadership. It provides strategic content to the WCG's vision of an *open opportunity society for all*. The current iteration of the PSP took 18 months to develop through deliberations with the executive and senior management structure of the WCG (Department of the Premier, 2014), and supported via the pre-existing PTMS of the 2009-2014 term (I102).

A major difference between the previous PSP and the current PSP, is that the current PSP has only five goals deliberately crafted to encourage interdepartmental and intergovernmental coordination, cooperation and collaboration (I81, I102, and I120). This was done to build on the foundation and experiences learned from the previous iteration of the PSP and how it is

transmitted for implementation via the PTMS (I117 and I100). Concurrently, efforts were made to ensure the PSP 2014-2019 was within the parameters of the South African government's overarching legal framework and informed by the long-term policy priorities of the NDP, as well as those of the MTSF, so as to ensure that the plan was aligned and conducive to a shifting matrix of government priorities and expectations.

A shift in the collaborative intentions of the PSP 2014-2019 was reflected in that of the WOSA. This approach is reiterated in relation to each PSG and intended to leverage partnerships across and outside of the WCG, crowding in investment, and involving active and involved citizens (Department of the Premier, 2014).

Another important development in the PSP 2014-2019 was its spatial focus and orientation. This is evident in the PSP both in the acknowledgement of the Provincial Spatial Development Framework (PSDF) and its foregrounding in the plan, as well as its positioning and emphasis in relation to *PSG 5- Embed good governance and integrated service delivery through partnerships and spatial alignment* (Department of the Premier, 2014).

Lastly, the PSP also alludes to the tools and platforms, such as the joint planning initiatives (JPIs), the province-wide monitoring & evaluation system (PWMES) and BizProjects. Specifically, BizProjects is identified as one particular tool intended to assist in standardising a project management methodology that facilitates the capture and documentation of project outputs and outcomes for information flow. This is discussed chiefly in relation to the PTMS in the PSP (Department of the Premier, 2014).

PSG formulation

The PSP sets out five PSGs. Each PSG cuts across departments, although some are more transversal in nature than others (e.g. PSG2 focusing on education compared with PS5 focus on good governance and spatial alignment). Figure 2 presents the five PSGs for the 2014-2019 term.

Figure 2: Provincial Strategic Goals 2014-2019

This common formulation of goals, strategic objectives and targets across the WCG, along with the sharing of responsibilities for the achievement of the 2019 targets across accounting officers via the PTMS, is at the heart of how the strategic intentions of government are intended to be achieved. The PSGs each fall under a lead Minister responsible for coordinating Steering Committees to ensure they transversally inform interdepartmental and intergovernmental plans to create conditions for economic growth, provide better education, and achieve better health, safety and social outcomes for WCG residents.

The Game Changers

In order to fast track PSG attainment, in early 2015 the Provincial Cabinet also identified seven specific interventions it deemed "Game Changers" that speak to the heart of the challenges facing both the people and government of the Province. There were originally seven Game Changers, which have since become six.

The decisions of the February 2015 Bosberaad are instructive in terms of both reform to the PTMS, its relation to the Game Changers and the intended role of the Delivery Support Unit (DSU). For the implementation of the Game Changers, the role of the DSU is critical in terms of providing support and interpreting a dynamic delivery environment. Inclusive of this approach has been the development of theories of change- conceptual frameworks underpinned by intervention logic where the service delivery results-chains have been unpacked to inform data collection systems and outcome tracking.

2.8 PTMS development and thinking

The management process flowing from the PSP, PSGs and Game Changers finds its expression in the provincial transversal management model. The model is intended to support collaboration and cooperative governance between the three spheres of government as well as cross functional sector department delivery

(i.e. service delivery that is transversally managed) within the province (Department of the Premier, 2015a). The provincial transversal management model establishes a multi-functional approach that is intended to enable effective and efficient service delivery from the political-strategic level (intent) through to governance at the tactical/interpretive level to governance at the operational implementation level, which sees the management of PSGs, provincial programmes and the alignment of national programmes and national outcomes to the PSGs. In so doing, the PTMS is intended to facilitate collaboration and co-operative governance as a management concept at all three levels (strategic, tactical and operational) among the WCG departments internally, as well as across the three spheres of government.

The PTMS was designed to ensure that strategic policy objectives of the WCG are executed in a focused and integrated manner, across the functional responsibilities of provincial departments, as well as across the various spheres of government and the private sector. In addition, the system was designed to break down the silo-based planning which took place in government departments and work more transversally by establishing a platform for policy analysis and strategic consideration of provincial programmes and outcomes (Western Cape Government, 2014).

2.8.1 Configuration and stakeholders

Figure 3 reflects the structural configuration of the PTMS. Building on the experience of the previous term, but more pronounced in this regard, is the visible indication that form follows from strategic intent. The five PSGs have clear structural support lines that follow across the management levels. Political-strategic responsibility begins with provincial Ministers in the Steering Committees, while senior management is accountable via Executive Committees (Executive Committees) and Working Groups (WGs) at a tactical/interpretive level, while other managerial staff and public servants are responsible for the implementation at the operational level (I81, I101 and I117).

Figure 3: Provincial Transversal Management System (Department of the Premier, 2015a)

The governance structures at each level assign and define specific decision-making authority and accountability for various functions. The provincial transversal management system is concerned with executive level oversight, facilitating rapid decision-making and providing clear, unified direction that ensures that provincial programmes and aligned national programmes, their outcomes and outputs (projects) remain aligned to the strategic intent and policy direction of the WCG (Department of the Premier, 2015a).

2.8.2 Roles & responsibilities

The following provides an overview of these responsibilities from Cabinet down to the public servant at the coal face of service delivery:

- The Provincial Cabinet creates PSGs, approves PSG Strategic Priorities and Game Changers, aligns and assigns related national programmes and outcomes. It also appoints a Steering Committee of Ministers and HODs for each PSG. Cabinet Bosberaad are quarterly engagements inclusive of HODs.

- The Steering Committees determine and establish integrated programmes and/or Working Groups, comprising intra-governmental (e.g. other provincial departments and entities) and intergovernmental actors (e.g. municipalities, national departments, SOEs, etc.). In addition, they may identify private sector, academic, civil society and other relevant stakeholders to participate and contribute to the execution of the PSG outcomes and outputs.

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- The Steering Committees appoint Executive Committee comprising the HODs. The Executive Committees serve as a site of governance of the strategic direction within the provincial administration (tactical/interpretive level) while specifically providing governance and oversight at the operational level.

- At the level of organisational performance, outputs in the form of milestones are tracked via BizProjects, whilst outcomes are measured via the Provincial Wide Monitoring and Evaluation System.

- At the level of individual performance within the WCG, the mandated functions of Senior Management Staff (SMS) and Middle Management Staff (MMS) members as required by the PSGs, are captured in their individual performance agreements and tracked on the Performance Management Information System via the optional quarterly or compulsory semesterly reviews.

- Governance support to the PTMS is provided by staff in the Department of the Premier (DOTP), which interrogates National, Provincial, and Local planning processes, and seeks to align and integrate them within the parameters of the PSP.

2.9 Analysis and discussion

With the global shift towards New Public Management in the public sector, strategic planning, as a key component of strategic management, has become increasingly visible. Making fundamental decisions and taking action that shapes and guides an organisation (Bryson, 1988) resonates with the ambitions of political actors across countries and contexts. In the public sector in South Africa, such decisions and actions are informed by political mandates, as well as legislation, intergovernmental responsibilities, resource constraints, institutional configurations,interpretative complexities and varying stakeholder needs and requirements. The current political leadership of the WCG created their first PSP in 2009, during the phase of 'modernisation', and with it pursued a strategic management governance model. The transversal management system that followed from it was conceived on the basis of the strategic intentions captured in the PSP and organised in relation to achieving those objectives. The PSP for the 2014-2019 term follows a similar approach, albeit with more pronounced configuration of structural form following strategic intent and deliberate collaborative and results foci. Similarly, in New South Wales, Australia, the formulation and prioritisation of goals and objectives expressed in *"NSW 2021"* followed by *"NSW: Making it happen"* has provided a comparable approach to strategic management for decisions on planning, management and resource allocations.

With planning already institutionalised (and to some extent prescriptive) across the South African state in terms of observance of the *Framework for Strategic and Annual Performance Plans* (FSAPP) (National Treasury, 2010), the space for a transformative reconfiguration of the provincial administration was limited. Nevertheless, the executive of the WCG has sought to employ a strategic management approach to planning and translate it into tangible vehicles for service delivery. The WCG has created the PTMS in order to entrench the line of sight from strategic planning at the political level down to implementation at the

operational level, with defined oversight responsibilities along the way. Thus, within the WCG, the different structures of the PTMS roughly fit into and operate across the political-strategic, tactical/interpretative and operational levels of strategic engagement strategy.

The government of New South Wales introduced new structures and processes to support the implementation of NSW 2021, although this was not done under a single integrated strategic management structure, such as the PTMS. The NSW 2021 process also resulted in a consolidation of the government entities into clusters which better reflect the broad policy areas of the government to improve coordination. The PTMS is an integrated strategic management system intended to create the institutional platform whereby the implementation of the PSP, the PSGs and the Game Changers are the primary concern of the WCG, rather than narrow reporting lines and insulated functional mandates. The structural configuration of the PTMS reflects these priorities of the current WCG.

By actively seeking to engage and incorporate other spheres of government, both the PSP 2014-2019 and the NSW 2021 demonstrate an intention towards a collaborative strategic management approach. Across the local and provincial spheres of government, the intention of this engagement extends beyond the co-ordination of activities, towards that of a more genuine collaboration and shared responsibility for the implementation of programmes and projects. This collaboration is a key result area that the PTMS intends to contribute to, primarily interdepartmentally, but also intergovernmentally between local and provincial government, and beyond.

At the core of collaborative management is the shift away from hierarchies to networks which are primarily outcome-focused and not rule-bound. These networks rely on formal and informal relationships and can mutate depending on the stage of a specific project or intervention (Erakovich & Anderson, 2013). The PSP, the Game Changers and the PTMS are the manifestation of a network approach. However, this approach can be a challenge in traditionally-structured public sector organisations and can occasionally lack credibility to provide policy direction and take action. Or they can be comprised of too many disparate stakeholders, without guiding values for collaboration between sectors, develop boundary missions that lead them to constrained views that avoid a larger capacity-building role. For this approach to be most effective, shared values as part of the cross-sector social learning system are necessary. The values to be cultivated foster behaviour to collaborate across boundaries, involvement and commitment to development and increased communication to seek ideas and share solutions (Erakovich & Anderson, 2013).

An important component of collaborative strategic management is ensuring that all parties are aware of progress being made towards achieving the goals and objectives which have been set out. In the NSW approach, in particular the Premier's Implementation Unit, made feedback to NSW residents an important element. The then Premier as well as his successor actively communicated the progress made with the implementation of the Premier's Priorities. The NSW Government website gives residents a good overview of progress against, not only the Premier's Priorities, but also the State Priorities set out in the NSW strategic plan, *NSW: Making it happen*. The WCG PTMS does not make explicit

provision for the regular feedback to residents on the implementation of the PSP, whereas the Game Changers have established a website (www.westerncape.gov.za/game-changers/) to provide updates on progress and showcase achievements. Much of the reporting on the PSP appears to be internally focused (with the exception of the State of the Province Address), that is, reporting to the Cabinet, whereas, in the case of the Game Changers, there is an effort to publish and disseminate progress, particularly in relation to the latter half of the term of government.

Strategic planning tends to be long-term in nature and should anticipate the needs of its key stakeholders over the duration of the plan. However, determining which steps to take in response to the inevitable contextual changes, particularly those relating to risks and uncertainties, is challenged within a fairly rigid legislated public sector environment. By creating a PTMS that seeks to operate between and across the otherwise prescribed institutional structures, budget programmes, conditional grant-linked programmes and accountability reporting, there appears to be an innovative nod to the embedding of adaptive management. This coupled with clear emphasis on data trend monitoring, intensively so in relation to the Game Changers, is geared towards steering, managing and responding to behavioural shifts in the population. Supported by proactive research and learning processes among the intervention managers and drivers, the literature suggests this can prove an effective means of achieving results.

NSW has introduced Outcome Budgeting in the 2018/19 budget in an attempt to make the resource allocation process more transparent. While key stakeholders in the WCG have expressed an interest and intention in pursuing a similar approach in relation to the PSP and PTMS, it has also been with the acknowledgement that considerations of scale and sector legislation may prove prohibitive in this regard.

An adaptive management approach can also assist public sector institutions to better cope with disruption caused by social or technological shifts. Deliverology, based on the thinking of Michael Barber (2007), is a disruptive approach which has been utilised by the WCG to implement strategic interventions such as the Game Changers and facilitate faster project implementation by unblocking bottlenecks without conforming to public sector orthodoxies. Similarly, the Premier's Implementation Unit in NSW was implemented in line with Deliverology thinking. Both of these Delivery Units reported directly to the department of the political head of the province/state and therefore had significant agency for driving policy implementation. They've both maintained a strong data emphasis, giving political leadership "granular detail" on the challenges of implementation and greater clarity on what is needed to be more effective. While it was unclear what management model was employed in NSW in conjunction with their delivery unit, in the WCG it has become clear that there has been a fusing between the integrated and collaborative management approaches informing the PSP, with the disruptive and agile approach employed with respect to the Game Changers creating a hybridised approach.

The appropriate measurement of performance in line with the strategic direction of the institution is also crucial to ascertain whether progress is being made or if

there are challenges being experienced with the implementation of projects. The measurement and management of outputs is largely a vertical process which occurs within the departments of an institution (Lundqvist, 2014), while the strategies themselves are largely transversal in nature, and are thus impacted by factors beyond the control of one organisation by itself. Public sector institutions which subscribe broadly to the principles of new public management tend to focus on efficiency and short-term measurable results; thus a clear set of responsibilities and a monitoring and evaluation framework is necessary for the adequate implementation of strategic plans and policies within organisations (Höglund & Svärdsten, 2015).

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3 Theory of Change

The following provides a concise explanation of the Theory of Change developed retrospectively for the PTMS to represent the 2014-2019 term. It seeks to reflect the design intentions of the PTMS as it was developed and adopted in 2015, noting that the review phase of this evaluation process has already identified some shifts in the design that have occurred in the course of implementation, but are deliberately omitted for the purpose of reflecting the PTMS design as intended for the 2014-2019 term. The Theory of Change is informed by the literature and document review, following preliminary stakeholder interviews and based on initial consultative engagement with WCG key stakeholders via a workshop and meeting with the project steering committee.

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Figure 4: Theory of Change for the PTMS 2014-2019

Inputs	Activities	Outputs	Outcomes	Impact

Political/strategic

- Premier appoints Cabinet on electoral mandate
- Cabinet processes electoral mandate into provincial strategic agenda
- Bosberaad agreed strategic agenda
- An approved PSP reflecting PSGs (1)
- Assumes Cabinet's strategic planning process aligns to national policy, legal mandates and considers WCG departmental input
- PSG derived governance structure (SteerCom) (2)
- Improved political/strategic collaboration
- PSG progress reviewed
- Assumes a conducive political, social and economic environment
- SteerCom establish ExCos and agree to WGs
- Assumes alignment of planning timelines and dept. processes
- Assumes Cabinet and PTM oversight reinforces PSG progress reviews

Tactical/interpretive

- PSG constituted governance structure (ExCo)
- ExCos meet, exercise oversight of planning, budgeting and reporting
- ExCo approved progress reports and strategic direction
- Enhanced transversal oversight and monitoring of PSG implementation
- Realisation of PSGs and supporting outcomes
- Assumes Game Changers find appropriate expression
- Assumes alignment between dept. planning and budgets with transversal programmes and projects
- Learning from transversal implementation (4)
- Assumes WCG internal stakeholders embrace additional transversal accountability
- PSG constituted structure (WG)
- WG stakeholders agree on transversal plans for joint implementation
- WG Implementation Plans & planning outputs
- Plans reviewed and tactics adjusted (3)
- Improved transversal policy implementation

Operational

- Assumes external and intergovernmental stakeholders interface with PTMS via existing structures
- Assumes results-based M&E utilisation
- Branch: PSM Policy & Strategy Unit
- WG programmes & projects
- Transversal programmes and projects are implemented jointly
- Joint monitoring and reporting
- Improved operational collaboration
- Assumes BizProjects is most appropriate tool for feeding project level data into PSG monitoring
- Operational actors establish transversal networks and relations
- Assumes WCG staff have capability (the necessary functional, talent and cultural capacity) to work across levels, departments and with external actors

Legend:
- Inputs
- Activities
- Outputs
- Outcomes
- Assumptions

*Numbering (1) denotes four outputs specified in the ToR

The Theory of Change has three interrelated 'levels' to it. They are illustrated on the vertical axis of the diagram above, and replicate the levels described in the literature review; the political-strategic level, the tactical/imperative level and the operational level.

The Theory of Change of the PTMS in its 2014-2019 iteration begins with and flows directly from the election of a government for the 2014-2019 term of office, with its responsibility to give "political-strategic direction to the public institutions and organisations under its jurisdiction" (Department of the Premier, 2015a).

The Premier is responsible for the appointment of a Cabinet informed by the electoral mandate. The Cabinet in turn processes the electoral mandate into a provincial strategic agenda. However, the processing of that electoral mandate by Cabinet into the strategic agenda occurs within a context that **assumes** the mandate is consistent and adequately aligned with a range of pre-existing or overlapping planning realities and developmental mandates, these include: national policy and planning in the form of the NDP and the MTSF among others; the legal mandates and requirements which prescribe functional roles, responsibilities, processes and regulatory standards for departments (e.g. Education, Health, etc); and that the provincial strategic agenda takes into account considerations advanced by departments themselves. This in itself is an assumption of both top-down and bottom-up influence in the crafting of the strategic agenda by Cabinet, which is ultimately processed and agreed by Cabinet at an annual Bosberaad.

An agreed provincial strategic agenda that reflects in a set of Provincial Strategic Goals (PSGs) which finds expression in the **output of the Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019 (1).** The Provincial Strategic Plan (PSP) unpacks the PSGs into a set of outcomes and objectives with indicators, baselines and medium-term targets. This represents the first of the four priority outputs specified in the evaluation Terms of Reference. It is the PSGs set out in the PSP which then become the organising basis for the governance structures and configuration around which oversight and reporting in relation to results is managed. The establishment of PSG derived Steering Committees (comprising of provincial ministers and heads of department) then reflects as the first among the **output of a cascading series of PSG-derived governance structures (2)**, including the Steering Committee established Executive Committee for each PSG (comprised of heads of department only) or the PSG Working Groups which report to the Executive Committee. These Executive Committees represent the pivot-point between the political/strategic management level and that of the tactical/interpretive management level. Similarly, the working group is the platform for implementation planning, consultation and reporting, as they sit at the interface between the tactical/interpretive management level and that of the operational. It is at this level where the working group implementation plans are actioned and reported through the PTMS.

It is at this stage where another key assumption occurs within the PTMS of 2014-2019. It is **assumed that the Game Changer priority interventions find appropriate expression** within this structural configuration and the intended processes of the PTMS[1] as they are highlighted within the PSP since they "have the potential to be catalysts for substantial improvements in people's lives" in relation to the PSG outcomes (Western Cape Government, 2015). The Standard Operating Procedure for the PTMS conceptualises the Game Changers as working

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[1] Whether as part of the PTMS or in the interface with it.

groups, and subsequent documentation indicates they are conceptually organised within the PTMS as such (Department of the Premier, 2015a) even while Game Changer Roadmaps (Delivery Support Unit, 2016) set out governance arrangements that interface with the PTMS, but confirm different reporting and accountability lines. Nevertheless, it became clear in the course of review phase interviews and the Theory of Change workshop that the Game Changers by design enjoy different oversight, methodological, and managerial conditions to that of the working groups. The implications for the arrangements within the PTMS are however unclear. Thus, this is identified as a key assumption for the intended functioning of the PTMS.

At the tactical/interpretive level there then occurs a parallel process whereby working group stakeholders jointly plan the programmes, projects and activities they will undertake together to realise the intended outcomes of the working group in relation to each PSG. An output of this process is the working group Implementation Plans and planning outputs, including those that support and facilitate better transversal as well as intergovernmental coordination and collaboration, such as the Integrated Work Plan (Integrated Management Work Group, 2018) and the Integrated Implementation Plan for Provincial and Municipal Planning, Budgeting and Implementation in the Western Cape (Provincial Treasury, 2018). Concurrent to this process, heads of department exercise oversight of planning, budgeting and reporting via the Executive Committee. By embarking on working group planning processes and providing oversight at Executive Committee level there is an **assumption that alignment between department planning and budgets with transversal programmes and projects occurs.** This is a key assumption because it assumes that the PSP and PSGs align across departmental strategic plans, annual performance plans and budgets appropriately on the basis of the working group and Executive Committee oversight.

From the tactical/interpretive level of management, the working group implementation plans and planning outputs become a key input into work of the PTMS at an operational level. At this level the Branch: Provincial Strategic Management, Policy & Strategy Directorate in the Department of the Premier serves as the custodian of the PTMS operations and supports the process of working group programmes and projects being implemented jointly, including through integrated management both within and across PSGs and working groups. One of the key support mechanisms for the PTMS is BizProjects, as part of the BizBrain platform, which is intended to provide a programme and project information system for performance management, accountability and transparency (Department of the Premier, 2015a). There is an **assumption that BizProjects is the most appropriate tool for supplying project level data for PSG monitoring into the PTMS** in order to take data from transversal implementation initiatives and use it for joint monitoring and reporting as an output of the operational process. Simultaneously, the process of joint implementation is intended to result in the steady establishment of transversal networks and relationships at the operational level. This is considered an important output because the system is intended to drive lateral engagement that helps to derive operational efficiencies across departments firstly, intergovernmentally secondly, and potentially externally as well. However, the realisation of such networks and relationships is predicated on the **assumption that WCG staff have the capability and capacity to work across levels, departments and with external actors.** This assumption is critical to realisation of the desired **outcome of improved collaboration at the operational level.** This is then reinforced by the planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning iterative cycle which operates across the three levels.

This monitoring and reporting at the operational level is then fed into an iterative cycle of project monitoring and reporting up into the system for information sharing and oversight. Thus, this information is processed via Executive Committee approved progress reports on PSG implementation at the tactical/interpretive level which are in turn fed up into the Steering Committee at the political/strategic management level. It is here that PSG progress is reviewed periodically, and fed into the quarterly Bosberaad where adjustments to the strategic agenda of the province are decided. From these engagements the progress reviews in the political/strategic management level feed into cascading down strategic direction, guidance, resourcing and unblocking of impediments across the tactical/interpretive level of management. This culminates in the point where **programme and project plans are reviewed and tactics are adjusted as a key output (3) of the PTMS.** This entire iterative cycle is underpinned across levels of management by a vertical **assumption that monitoring & evaluation (M&E) is utilised for results-based management**, rather than for compliance checking and auditing of evidence for accountability purposes. If this assumption holds, and the cycle of planning, monitoring, reporting up across management levels and receiving a response back down through these levels which informs a change of plans and tactics for implementation, this cycle will **precipitate learning from transversal implementation (4) as a key output**. It is important that this learning takes place at the tactical/interpretive level with implications for Executive Committees and working groups in particular, as this is where knowledge can be institutionalised within the PTMS.

The Theory of Change then makes the jump from the output level across to the outcome level where the key objectives of the PTMS rest. The first objective, already addressed, is the improvement of operational collaboration. This is where collaboration is understood to be at the end of a spectrum where communication, co-ordination and co-operation all precede collaboration between actors and stakeholders at an operational level as a key outcome over the short-medium term.

Similarly, at a political-strategic level, this process is **intended to generate improved political-strategic coordination** whereby provincial ministers and their heads of department have engaged periodically via Steering Committees and quarterly via the Bosberaad, to agree on adjustments to the strategic direction of the province and to provide feedback into the PTMS that flows down to the operational level. The improved political-strategic collaboration on one level, is intended to be mirrored and mutually reinforced by the improved operational collaboration at the lower level.

The simultaneous and mutually reinforcing achievement of these outcomes is however conditional at the political/strategic management level on the **assumption that Cabinet and Provincial Top Management (a pre-existing structure of all heads of departments institutionally fused to the PTMS) oversight and decision-making reinforces progress reviews of the PSGs and outcomes as transversal objectives.** This is imperative, to ensure these reviews are not disregarded in favour of classic, hierarchical departmental oversight only, and a necessary assumption for the **achievement of enhanced transversal oversight and monitoring of PSG implementation as an outcome,** a result that occurs on at the interface of the political/strategic and tactical/interpretive levels of management.

Flowing from improved operational collaboration at the lowest level and sandwiched between enhanced transversal oversight and monitoring of PSG implementation, the adjustment of planning and tactics coupled with learning

from transversal implementation is understood as **contributing directly to improved transversal policy implementation** as an outcome. This is critical to the underlying programme theory of the PTMS, that if better collaboration and oversight of PSG implementation occurs, then this will lead to improved policy implementation. However, this is also based on an **assumption that in supplying information within the PTMS and responding to strategic directives, that WCG staff and internal stakeholders embrace additional transversal accountability**- that is, staff are willing and prepared to answer laterally (from heads of department to other heads of department) but also diagonally between senior managers in the working groups in one department to other senior managers with transversal programme implementation responsibilities in other departments. This is linked to realisation of true collaboration at both the political/strategic level as well as at the operational level.

Ultimately, if the actions, outputs and outcomes of this Theory of Change occur as intended and the assumptions are reasonably met, particularly in relation to external factors, then this should culminate in the **desired impact of the realisation of the PSGs and their supporting outcomes** over the term of office, which in turn should inform a systemic process of feeding back into the provincial strategic agenda setting process in the future. However, this is also with the assumption that the environment in which the Western Cape Government operates is one which is conducive in political, social and economic terms. That is to say that the functioning of the PTMS is also dependent on broader contextual factors which may have a bearing on how the PTMS functions, particularly in relation to the achievement of the other underpinning assumptions.

4 Methodology and approach

A brief overview of the evaluation design, analytical framework, methodology and limitations is provided.

4.1 Evaluation design and analytical framework

As outlined in the ToR, this assignment is primarily an implementation evaluation that seeks to determine the "effectiveness and efficiency of the PTMS in the development, implementation governance and review of the PSP 2014-2019". Developing the previously implicit Theory of Change for the PTMS as part of the review phase (clarificatory evaluation/design component) was necessary to understand the intentions of the PTMS. On the basis of this first part of the evaluative exercise, the analytical framework was then informed by the Key Evaluation Questions (KEQs) and sub-questions set out in the ToR, aligned to a set of customised evaluative criteria.

The KEQs are structured and informed by a customisation of the OECD-DAC criteria (OECD, 1992) of efficiency and effectiveness, with an additional criterion of collaboration. The table below presents the questions as aligned in terms of a structure of findings. These are also expressed in an evaluation matrix derived from the ToR which sets out the evaluation sub-questions spread across the four KEQs. KEQ4 is covered entirely by the recommendations following the conclusion of the report.

Table 1: KEQs aligned to the evaluation criteria

Evaluation Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions
Effectiveness	KEQ1. Has the PTMS been effective in achieving its objectives?
Collaboration	KEQ2. Has the PTMS contributed to improved collaboration in the Western Cape Government?
Efficiency	KEQ3. Has the Western Cape Government created an enabling environment for the efficient implementation of the PTMS?

Cross-cutting the above criteria and evaluation questions is the conceptual framing of the Theory of Change of the PTMS. Thus, findings in relation to this implementation story find expression across and intersect with multiple sub-questions that are aligned to sub-assessment areas within each criterion.

4.2 Data collection methods

All primary data was collected during the data collection phase running from 16 October 2018 to 3 December 2018. During this time three means of primary data collection were executed: semi-structured and group interviews; focus groups; and electronic surveys. In addition, project reporting data was requested as well as other documentation related to the PTMS.

4.3 Primary data

This section refers to data directly collected from respondents by the evaluation team via interview, focus group or survey. In all instances informed consent was

obtained from respondents prior to participation and good practice ethical protocols were observed.

4.3.1 Semi-structured interviews

There were 54 respondents who participated via semi-structured and group interviews, distinguishing between the Review and Data Collection Phases of the evaluation.

Review phase

As part of the review phase semi-structured interviews were held with key PTMS stakeholders with insight into the development of the Provincial Strategic Plan, as well as the PTMS' design and changes between the 2009-2014 and the 2014-2019 terms of government. Six interviews were conducted with nine key stakeholders, representing key perspectives from the Premier to senior managers with formative input into the PTMS. These interviews assisted to capture the rationale and conceptualisation of the PTMS and design adjustments between terms, central to shaping the Theory of Change.

Data collection phase

An initial target of 32 semi-structured interviews was set for this phase. In the end, 45 respondents participated via 34 semi-structured individual and group interviews during the data collection phase. These interviews included the following groupings of stakeholders:

Table 2. Data collection

Stakeholder group	Planned engagements	Actual engagements
Ministers	10	11 (incl. Premier)
Heads of Departments	13	13
Group interviews	2	3 (11)
External stakeholder interviews	7	7
Total	32	34 (45)

Interviews were undertaken with external stakeholders selected from the following stakeholder groups: national government; local government (2); state-owned enterprise; civil society; private sector; and academia.

Some interviews gave rise to referrals to additional staff that were not available at the time of interview or in the focus groups. In these instances, follow-ups were made by email with targeted questions.

For the full list of the interviewees, please refer to the fieldwork report.

4.3.2 Focus groups

Data collection entailed 17 focus groups with PTMS Working Group participants conducted with 97 respondents in total,[2] in excess of the originally planned 15 focus groups. Focus group participation ranged from 1-11 participants including the Working Group convenors. While participation was highly variable on a focus group by focus group basis, all five of the Working Group clusters aligned to the PSGs were represented by three different Working Groups as intended.

4.3.3 Electronic surveys

After piloting the electronic surveys via the project steering committee who were a subset of the intended respondents, three electronic survey questionnaires were distributed via the Survey Monkey platform and administered between 24 October and 27 November 2018. These were all reinforced with corporate communication from the Department of the Premier, and in the case of the survey of municipal managers/delegated officials, the Department of Local Government, to encourage high response rates.

The surveys were separated into the following three groups for their own respective purposes:

- **Senior Management Service (including. select Middle Management Service members participating in Working Groups):** The survey was designed to collect data on the participation, experience and reflections of the 577 managers[3] who participate in Working Groups as a key implementation structure of the PTMS.

- **Municipal Managers/delegated officials of all municipalities in the Western Cape:** The survey was designed to obtain data on how the 30 local governments interface, participate and work with/without the WCG in relation to the PTMS over the course of this term.

- **External stakeholders participating in Working Groups:** This includes the 35 known stakeholders with available email contact details outside of the WCG's thirteen departments that serve on, or participate in, any of its Working Groups. The survey was designed to obtain their reflections on the functionality and effectiveness of the structures as a platform for collaborative engagement between the WCG and external parties.

Ethical protocols were observed, and informed consent was obtained in relation to all of the participating respondents.

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[2] Due to the multiple roles of some role-players via the Executive Committees, Working Groups/Game Changers and Project Steering Committee, this total includes some role-players who responded in multiple engagements in different capacities. Furthermore, in one instance, the "focus group" was converted to a telephonic interview owing to changes in the way the Working Group functioned over time. Additional focus groups were scheduled with the Provincial Strategic Goals (PSG) Secretariats' Forum and the Project Steering Committee.

[3] Initially this consisted of 387 SMS members, but another 190 MMS members were identified and included in an expanded sample after the survey went live bringing the total to 577 making up the sampling frame. In deriving departmental response rates, not all email addresses could be allocated to departments and so the response rates provided are approximate.

Sampling and response rates

The total available population from each of the three sampling frames was sampled, to be as inclusive as possible and eliminate any source of systematic bias.

A target response rate of 25-40 per cent was sought as agreed with the Project Steering Committee. Responses among SMS and MMS participants included 193 respondents, giving a response rate of 33.4 per cent overall. The 193 respondents were distributed as follows among the 13 WCG departments:

Table 3: SMS+MMS electronic survey responses by department

Department (SMS+ MMS sample)	No. of responses	% of overall response	% of department specific sample
DOH (51+17)	15	8%	22%
DOTP (74+16)	33	17%	37%
DEA&DP (24+28)	23	12%	44%
DTPW (53+15)	23	12%	34%
DEDAT (23+23)	18	9%	39%
DOA (19+5)	13	7%	54%
PT (20+10)	6	3%	20%
WCED (48+12)	19	10%	32%
DCAS (13+11)	10	5%	42%
DSD (24+9)	8	4%	24%
DLG (15+3)	10	5%	56%
DHS (15+6)	5	3%	24%
DOCS (10+31)	10	5%	24%
Total	193	100%	

Based on the SMS data that was supplied and the overall distribution of responses set out above, the survey data obtained is generally reflective of the desired representation across departments, while noting the Department of the Premier is particularly well represented owing to the concentration of SMS in the department which is the most numerous amongst responses but proportionally within the target range (37%).

In the case of the Municipal Managers'/delegated officials survey, although 21 municipalities initiated responses to the survey (70.0 per cent), only 17 of the 30 municipalities completed information beyond an identification of their municipality. The participating municipalities are as follows:

Table 4: Municipalities that completed the electronic survey

Beaufort West	George	Overberg District
Breede Valley	Hessequa	Overstrand
Cape Agulhas	Kannaland	Saldanha Bay
Cape Winelands District	Langeberg	Stellenbosch
Cederberg	Matzikama	West Coast District
Drakenstein	Mossel Bay	

For the electronic survey of the 35 external stakeholders, 11 responded to and undertook the survey (31.4 per cent). This included participants from academia, civil society, local government and industry.

Although the sampling frames were quite small for both the Municipal Managers'/delegated officials and external stakeholders surveys, direct and repeated appeals to individuals contributed to response rates that met (external stakeholders) or exceeded (municipalities) the target sought. In all three electronic surveys, responses were received consistent with the targets set for each and are considered useful to inform the findings and analysis of the evaluation.

4.4 Secondary data and PTMS documentation

In addition to the primary data collected as part of the fieldwork, a number of existing documents, reports and datasets were shared with the evaluation team. These documents were used as sources of data in the evaluation and provide additional sources, corroboration and/or contrast to the historical processes, reflections and perspectives expressed during the primary data collection.

In total, the documentation received from the WCG provided a solid information base from which to triangulate, corroborate and/or contrast the primary data collected over the course of the evaluation in line with the mixed methods approach specified for this evaluation.

4.5 Limitations

4.5.1 Data collection challenges and reflections

Overall there were relatively minor challenges experienced over the course of the data collection phase related to scheduling. Despite these challenges, all of the planned engagements were eventually undertaken, or in the case of external stakeholders, substituted with the next available alternative respondent.

Participation in focus groups and interviews was generally within the expected band of participants, while noting that the evolution of the working groups in this term meant that in some instances there was not a transversal set of stakeholders with which to engage. Nevertheless, this allowed the evaluation team to obtain perspectives from representatives of all of the structures sampled for data collection. The variety of perspectives secured was consistent with what was intended.

Despite requests to ensure representation across participating departments and inclusive of external stakeholders, there was considerable variability in terms of representation in the focus groups themselves. Not less than four focus groups consisted of representatives from only a single department, thereby limiting the transversal perspectives on implementation sought by the evaluation team.

One area of challenge was in the application of the focus group data collection instrument designed for working groups in the case of the Game Changers. Because the methodology, approach and accountability arrangements for Game Changers operated distinct from that of the other working groups (a finding in its own right), some of the questions related to the structural relationships, progress reports and feedback were not entirely appropriate. As a result, this instrument was refined over the course of the data collection process to solicit insights and reflections from the Game Changers in relation to the PTMS, without seeking comment on structures that the Game Changer group did not interface with (e.g. Steering Committees and Executive Committees).

The response rates for the electronic surveys were in line with the targeted response rates in all three cases. However, the late introduction (after more than two weeks) of 190 MMS into the sampling frame for the SMS survey did impair the overall response rate (which was on course to exceed 40 per cent).

Reconciliation of MMS email addresses identified an inconsistency of four respondents (less than 1% of the sample) which was omitted from the department specific proportional response rates. Thus, while the overall response rate was within the target band, departmental response rates varied from 20% up to 56%. Due to the incomplete information shared after the survey had already been initiated, the SMS sample included all SMS (not only those involved in the PTMS) whereas the MMS included *only* MMS involved in the PTMS. While this is a limitation in terms of understanding the proportional representation of PTMS participants per department overall, it is nevertheless a relatively minor gap considering that responses were obtained from all departments and the overall distribution of respondents has been provided.

Another limitation to the survey is that 45 of the 190 respondents did not complete the survey in its entirety. As a result, there was an attrition rate of 23.4 per cent, or roughly 1 in 4 respondents that did not reach the end of the survey, providing only partial information. Despite this limitation, even among the 145 respondents who completed the entire SMS survey, this still provides a completed response rate within the 25-40 per cent target band. This was also an issue for the municipal managers'/delegated officials survey where 4 out of the 21 respondents did not complete the survey. However, this was not an issue for the external stakeholders surveys, where only one respondent among the 11 did not complete the survey.

Furthermore, the abstract nature of various components of the PTMS and its intentions in relation to the PSP, the data analysis has focused on the experiences and interpretations of key stakeholders in whom the roles, processes, actions and responsibilities for the PTMS have found expression. Insofar as possible, these experiences have been triangulated and corroborated among other actors and with regard to the documentary and other evidence available.

Lastly, the assistance provided by the Department of the Premier in scheduling the interviews and facilitating contact with external stakeholders was a great enabler of a relatively smooth data collection process, albeit with some minor changes and adaptations along the way. The availability of venues, projector facilities and staff proved an efficient arrangement with the evaluation team and helped to avoid significant delays to the data collection schedule. Considering the seniority of the participants in this data collection phase and the tight timeframes, exceeding the data collection targets with only a week's extension to this phase is considered a success and bodes well for both the uptake and utility of the final evaluation product.

4.5.2 Limitations of scope and relationship to the EOTR 2014-2019

An important limitation of this evaluation is its scope and relationship to the EOTR 2014-2019. It is considered a component of the EOTR 2014-2019, the other elements of which pertain to progress against the outcomes and targets for each PSG, and have run concurrently to this evaluative process. Therefore, the evaluation stops short of assessing data on transversal policy results and PSG outcome achievement, which is a logical extension of the effectiveness criterion, but nevertheless remains outside the scope of this evaluation as agreed and clarified at the inception stage.

5 Findings and analysis

5.1 Effectiveness

For the purpose of this evaluation, the PTMS is assessed in terms of the extent to which it has achieved the objectives set out for the transversal management system for the 2014-2019 term. Specifically, this criterion is reflected in terms of KEQ1. Has the PTMS been effective in achieving its objectives?

This evaluation question and criterion is then addressed through a group of sub-assessment areas that unpack the criterion. The first sub-assessment area sets out the extent to which the intentions of the PTMS are clear among key stakeholders in relation to its documented intent. The objectives are then assessed in terms of the achievement of specified outputs of the PTMS as a logical pre-requisite to achieving the intended outcomes. As a management system, the extent to which it is responsive to the prevailing strategic, tactical/interpretive and operational imperatives is then determined. The findings then address the extent to which transversal oversight and policy implementation (within the scope of the evaluation) has occurred as part of determining the effectiveness of the PTMS. The effectiveness findings conclude with a synthesis of the findings in relation to KEQ1.

5.1.1 Clarity of intent

The WCG succinctly defined the PTMS as "the institutional organisational framework within which the WCG's PSGs are managed" (Department of the Premier, 2015a). The most comprehensive accounts of the PTMS are set out in the Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019 (Western Cape Government, 2015) and at some length in the Provincial Transversal Management System's Standard Operating Procedure (Department of the Premier, 2015a). The ToR for the evaluation further identifies previously undefined outputs in the PTMS' intended results-chain (Department of the Premier, 2018a) central to the realisation of its objectives. The documents make clear that the PTMS is intended as a platform for policy analysis, strategic thinking and the interpretation of national policies and programmes at the provincial level.

The PTMS SOP for 2014-2019, as approved by the Provincial Cabinet in March 2015, is a revision of the PTMS introduced by the provincial government during its 2009-2014 term of office. The SOP states that the PTMS was introduced to ensure that the provincial strategic policy objectives reflected in the Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019, are executed effectively and efficiently (Department of the Premier, 2015a). The SOP further purports that the PTMS enables political, tactical and operational governance of the PSGs through the roles and functions performed by the various structures within the PTMS (e.g. Steering Committees, Executive Committees, and Working Groups, etc).

The PTMS, according to the SOP, is meant to serve as a vehicle for aligning national service delivery obligations to the province's service delivery imperatives and electoral mandate via the cascading structures which account to Cabinet. Here the PTMS serves as a platform for policy analysis and strategic reflection on national programmes and national outcomes, and development of provincial responses for approval by the Provincial Cabinet. It is intended to enhance transversal oversight and policy implementation of the PSP specifically.

Like its predecessor, the current PTMS seeks to foster a transversal approach to planning and implementation of service delivery through collaboration across departments, and between the provincial government and organs of state in the

national and local spheres of government, and external stakeholders, for example, the business sector and civil society.

SOP as a framework for the PTMS

As an update to the previous iteration of the SOP for 2009-2014, the SOP 2014-2019 follows largely the same structure in describing the PTMS and explaining how the political-strategic direction set by Cabinet is transmitted across the management system via structures, role-players and management tools. While the document reflects a significant elaboration on the preliminary description for the 2014-2019 term set out in the PSP, it has been critiqued by key stakeholders in internal reviews (Department of the Premier, 2017a) and by various respondents (FG78, I52, and I33) as providing insufficient detail as to how the PTMS is intended to operate in practice. While the latest iteration of the SOP has been described as allowing for a degree of flexibility and customised implementation (I81), this may work against common and clear understandings of the PTMS as it allows for variable interpretations and applications.

In the absence of any other explanatory document, the PTMS SOP 2014-2019 serves as the de facto framework for the PTMS. However, it omits key pieces of information such as clear objectives, the scope and parameters of the PTMS itself. Without clarity in documentation, these can only be discerned with the benefit of qualitative inputs from the custodians responsible for the PTMS and opens itself to multiple interpretations as alluded to above.

Critically, the SOP does not explain what a transversal approach actually means and why government adopted a transversal approach – such as is explained in the introduction to the EOTR 2014 – "…a transversal approach is policy-making and implementation that cuts across traditional line functions. The rationale for a transversal approach is that in strategically challenging environments, government needs flexible, innovative, integrated and networked plans and processes to achieve coherence in policy development and implementation." (Western Cape Government, 2014).

The title of the SOP document is therefore something of a misnomer. In reality, it is a high-level framework setting out the structures, roles and responsibilities and tools that collectively constitute the PTMS. It is not a set of standard operating procedures as is understood in the conventional meaning of the term. The December 2017 Internal Audit report (2017a) was highly critical of the lack of detail on procedures (for example, how departments are required to align their APPs with the PSGs).

It is with this contextual understanding that it is useful to determine the extent to which the senior management service (SMS) and middle management service (MMS)[4] in the WCG claim to have an understanding of why the PTMS was established.

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[4] Collectively referred to as "SMS" in graphs unless specified otherwise.

WG: Do you have an understanding of why the PTMS was established? (n=83)

7% 4%

89%

■ Yes ■ No ■ Don't know

Non-WG: Do you have an understanding of why the PTMS was established? (n=75)

12%

20%

68%

■ Yes ■ No ■ Don't know

Figure 5. SMS response on their understanding of why the PTMS was established

Figure 5 surveyed SMS on whether they understand why the PTMS was established. In analysing responses, data was disaggregated between responses from SMS that indicated that they served in working groups and those that do not (Non-WG). This distinction was drawn to highlight differences in understanding between WCG SMS who directly participate in structures of the PTMS, and those who have no direct engagement as part of PTMS structures. It is clear that a larger proportion of surveyed SMS that serve in working groups understand why the PTMS was established (89%) relative to staff who do not serve on working groups (68%). This finding is further elaborated by the number of respondents who indicated that they did not know, which is higher for SMS that do not serve on working groups (12%) relative to those that do (4%). Among the surveyed respondents, those that served on working groups and were therefore directly involved in a PTMS structure claimed to have an understanding of the why the PTMS was established.

How would you describe your understanding of what the PTMS is trying to achieve?

	Excellent	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor
WG (n=81)	10%	31%	33%	23%	4%
Non-WG (n=71)	4%	15%	30%	34%	17%

0%   25%   50%   75%   100%

■ Excellent ■ Very Good ■ Good ■ Fair ■ Poor

Figure 6. SMS response to their understanding of what the PTMS is trying to achieve

SMS were also asked to describe their understanding of what the PTMS is trying to achieve. Of the 81 SMS that indicated that they serve in working groups, 74% indicated that they had an excellent, very good or good understanding of what the PTMS was trying to achieve. Contrasted with those 71 SMS who do not serve in working groups, less than half (49%) indicated they had a good understanding (or better) of what the PTMS is trying to achieve. The graph again reveals that SMS respondents who serve on working groups claim to have an understanding of why the PTMS was established and better understandings of what it is trying to achieve. This finding indicates that participation within PTMS structures may

account for better understandings of the intentions of the system. Nevertheless, while there are differences, it is also telling that even among SMS that do not directly participate in structures of the PTMS, there is a relatively good understanding of its rationale and intentions within the WCG.

One possible explanation for this is that the PTMS was introduced as a means of ensuring the delivery of the PSP, of intentional relevance and importance across all WCG departments. However, when SMS were asked about whether the PSP has informed the work of their department, nearly 1 in 4 respondents did not agree that the PSP 2014-2019 did so.

The PSP 2014-2019 is a meaningful strategic document that has informed the work of my department

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't know
WG (n=85)	24%	52%	16%		4%	5%
Non-WG (n=75)	17%	55%	12%	4%	4%	8%

Figure 7. SMS level of agreement with whether the PSP 2014-2019 serves as a meaningful strategic document that has informed the work in their department

Of the 85 surveyed SMS that indicated that they serve in working groups, 24% and 52% respectively strongly agreed or agreed that the PSP 2014-2019 served as meaningful strategic document that informed work in their department. The graph further reveals that senior management that do not serve in working groups share a similar opinion with a total of 72% of the 76 surveyed staff indicating that they either strongly agree (17%) or agree (55%). These results suggest that the 2014-2019 PSP has influenced and informed the way departments work, this influence has further reached beyond the governance structures of the PTMS as SMS who do not serve in working groups indicate the value of the document in informing their departmental work.

Whereas the PTMS is a technical name for a system that extends beyond the internal workings of the WCG, it was apparent that stakeholders external to the WCG would not be as familiar with this reference. Thus, municipal stakeholders were asked whether they have an understanding of how the PSP is implemented in their municipal area.

Do you have an understanding of how the WCG's Provincial Strategic Plan is implemented in your municipal area? (n=18)

Figure 8. Municipal manager and delegated official's response to whether or not they understand the implementation of the PSP in their municipal area

Of the 18 municipalities surveyed, 16 indicated that they are aware of how the WCG's PSP is being implemented in their municipal jurisdiction.

Similarly, seven of the external stakeholders as shown below in Figure 9 have an understanding of how the PSP is being implemented in their respective area of work.

Do you have an understanding of how the WCG's Provincial Strategic Plan is implemented in your area of work? (n=10)

Figure 9. External stakeholders' response as to whether or not they understand the implementation of the PSP in their line of work

The responses to the electronic surveys sent to municipalities and external stakeholders show that there is generally a high level of awareness of the PSP and what it is intending to implement in the municipality, or the line of work that the external stakeholder is involved in. The level of understanding of the external

stakeholders is generally self-described as good or better among respondents. The implication of this is that the WCG is adequately informing the sampled key stakeholders outside of the institution about its strategic plans and policy imperatives, and are doing a reasonably good job of conveying what the PSP is intending to do. This bodes well for implementation of the PTMS because it exists to support the effective and efficient implementation of the PSP.

Sequencing and consultation of the PSP

The sequencing and consultation process of the PSP has emerged as an important informant to the effectiveness of the PTMS as a means of supporting the PSP's realisation. Respondents reflected on the weaknesses and strengths of the PSP development process, specifically highlighting the sequencing and consultation process as informants of alignment between national, provincial and departmental strategic plans, a key output addressed in the next section of findings. Generally, there is acknowledgement that while the timing of the development of the PSP in relation to national policy was fine, it occurred late in relation to department strategic plans which had already been developed for the term. While consultation processes also support understanding, ownership and buy-in, both timing and approach of the WCG suggests this occurred centrally, at a high-level rather than as a well-coordinated and sequenced process supportive of a clear understanding of the PSP and the changes in approach to how the WCG was intended to work both internally and externally. The following reflects the centrality of decision-making at the political-strategic level driven by the Premier, Cabinet and PTM:

"….The premier played a key role in that alignment. They were called strategic objectives, there were seven and were brought down to five. There were duplications which were compacted to five. There was a workshop but not everyone was involved in it, there was a core group working on it. It was both at the cabinet and PTM level," (FG1).

This was reinforced at the level of SMS, where inputs were reportedly limited to the technical and formulaic:

"In the actual setting of the five goals that was at a very high strategic level. We did get asked at one stage around targets and indicators…. I don't think there was a consultation process, we had to fill in a document by date, we didn't collectively share and develop a goal," (FG65).

There is acknowledgement of some degree of structured consultation and involvement beyond HODs, particularly in light of the preceding review process, but a key limitation highlighted was the centralised nature of the process in light of the collaborative intentions signalled in the PSP by WOSA and theories underpinning the PTMS. Respondents noted that HODs were extensively consulted; however, engagements at SMS level and below were limited. The main critique is that while there was some consultation, the process lacked input from many implementation managers and placed disproportionate responsibilities on lead departments (FG78, I19 and I9) per PSG (Department of the Premier, 2017b). The process was commonly described as narrow and as a result was not sufficiently cross-informed by the nature of participating departments' legislative mandates and core business priorities, many of which had already been prioritised in departmental strategic plans which would then require a retro-fitting to bring in line with the PSP. There is therefore a sense that with relatively limited engagement and consultation within the WCG around the PSP as a whole, that it took a mostly (almost exclusively) transversal support focus and neglected some of the core business of the provincial departments of strategic importance to the

province. This is a view that was commonly expressed among respondents within the WCG (I105, I29, I35, and FG77).

Another limitation that pertains to understanding and implementation of the PSP was with local government and external stakeholders, particularly civil society. The PSP explains that as part of a provincial integrated management approach, interventions would rely upon "the active participation of the whole of society" and within the PTMS structures should establish "integrated programmes/projects and Working Groups, comprising Provincial and National Departments, Municipalities, SOEs, Business, Civil Society and other relevant stakeholders, to execute the PSG outcomes and outputs" (Western Cape Government, 2015). Integrated work with external stakeholders pre-supposes some degree of external consent and buy-in to the process, which external respondents indicated had not occurred with academia, civil society and business at that stage (I59, I42, I61, I48 and FG77). This was especially the case for local government. The quote below encapsulates one respondent's view which reflected a wider sentiment:

"A large part of the PSP landed in the municipal space and the municipalities were not part of their development. We can't [yet] do the co-budgeting, co-planning co-implementation, but if we had included local government to the consultation it would have been better," (I28).

Despite some of the identified shortcomings related to the consultation and sequencing (further addressed in the later findings sub-section on alignment), the electronic survey findings and qualitative interviews also indicate that the intentions of the PSP, and by extension the PTMS as a platform for supporting its achievement, are relatively well understood at a general level both internal and external to the WCG. However, when it came to translating the political-strategic directives in the PSP into action via the structures of the PTMS set-out in the SOP, qualitative data analysis suggests that rather than one coherent and inclusive system of provincial transversal management, structures and existing departmental accountability arrangements have actually given rise to distinct implementation streams.

Three implementation streams

Although the PTMS SOP of 2015 clearly set out the structures and responsibilities of role players for implementing the PSP as a single transversal management system as per the political-strategic direction of Cabinet, in practice there have been three distinct implementation streams that have emerged with distinct planning, implementation, reporting and accountability arrangements.

Firstly, the 'standard' PTMS arrangement between Cabinet, Steering Committees, Executive Committees, and working groups is the first stream of implementation clearly described within the SOP. The SOP envisioned the working groups functioning as a platform where there would be consultation with other departments and stakeholders to implement medium-term implementation plans through project execution[5] (Department of the Premier, 2015a) with oversight and accountability managed via the above structures. The effectiveness and efficiency of this system is the focus of the evaluation.

Secondly, a stream of implementation that does not ascribe or directly account via the PTMS but addresses the core mandates and business functions of many

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[5] In some cases, projects have taken a distinct spatial character or focus.

departments (e.g. quality of provincial health, education, social, recreational, road and transport infrastructure as a common example) exists. These do not find direct expression via the transversal management system, but account mainly in terms of the existing statutory planning, monitoring and reporting provisions prescribed for HODs, civil servants and in sector legislation.[6] This has emerged as a critical source of tension in terms of prioritised effort and budget between the PSGs and core departmental functions. The Mid-Term Review (Department of the Premier, 2017b) specifically found "there appears to be tension/disconnect between PSP outcomes, targets and indicators and legislative mandates/"core business" of departments". Departments have statutory functions and services that they are mandated and required to implement. In addition, these statutory functions are directly linked to budgets and annual performance plans (APPs) (and will be discussed in detail later). The scope of the PSP is in practice confined to transversal, strategic goals (PSGs) and does not provide mechanisms to account for or cover activities of departments that fall outside these PSGs, which covers a range of core departmental activities. The PSP, and by extension, the PTMS, did not intend to provide for a management system that covers everything that WCG departments do, so as to remain focused on transversal priorities. Nevertheless, there is a substantial portion of work done by departments in executing their core mandates, which fall outside the ambit of the PTMS but has an indirect relationship to the goals, objectives or targets set out in the PSP (I46, I105 and I100). In practice, this has meant that departments prioritise their budgets to their statutory services (Department of the Premier, 2017b) which in turn account via classic line functions and executive authorities, and ultimately via the legislature as well. The PSP, and the associated accountability arrangements of the PTMS, have therefore been widely perceived as an add-on to departments' delivering on their core mandates, and in some cases, this creates a tension which is counterintuitive to the objectives of transversalism.

A key factor that reinforces this tension is the traditional and regulated nature of government. Accounting officers operate within a risk averse and compliance driven environment which discourages the innovation required to facilitate collaboration across departments (I101, I52 and I49). The SOP states that the PTMS is intended to facilitate co-operative governance at the strategic, tactical and operational levels both between WCG departments as well as across the three spheres of government. However, there is no acknowledgement of the headwinds and barriers to transversality within the context of the current compliance and regulated nature and system of governance in which departments operate.

Game changers

The third stream of implementation which both the PSP and the PTMS SOP (2015a) intended to be within the scope of the PTMS, but which the evaluation has found lacks clarity in terms of its relationship to the PTMS, is that of the game changers. Game changers were agreed in 2015 by Provincial Cabinet as a catalyst to attaining the PSGs and were initially proposed to account and operate with structures akin to working groups via Executive Committees and Steering Committees. There were originally seven game changers which were identified, but these were later reduced to the current six game changers. The process of

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[6] This stream refers to work in relation to departmental core mandates, but may also be considered inclusive of issue-based project implementation (e.g. disasters) which account outside of the PTMS.

the selection and identification of these game changers was driven by the Premier and agreed with Cabinet (I116, I104, I81 and I105), not unlike the process for selection of the PSGs themselves. However, subsequent refining and development of the game changers occurred via design labs, workshops and "syndicate engagements". The following quote explains:

"The initial discussions [for the game changers] took place around 2015, and the instruction came from Premier and there was consultation that took place at the higher level and to cabinet and tertiary institutions…The nature of the game changer was that nothing was static, and the changes would be revolutionary. It was dynamic and the Steering Committee would look at developing goals, outcomes, targets and interventions and getting together structures at the provincial and area level," (FG79).

However, the intention to integrate the game changers within the PTMS appears short-lived despite the initial indications from Cabinet, the PSP and PTMS SOP. Although the DSU did not appear in the original PTMS diagram presented to Cabinet at the February 2015 Cabinet Bosberaad, it was added in the PTMS SOP completed in March 2015 with a distinct role set for the DSU and game changers presented as working groups equivalents, albeit as special projects (Department of the Premier, 2015a). The Game Changer Roadmaps subsequently clarified a Cabinet approved governance structure which provides for additional arrangements, such as for the DSU to account via the Premier's stocktake reports. However, the Roadmaps also provided for game changer operational delivery teams as accountable to a "Management Committee/ Steering Committee (Transversal)" which "has the oversight over the implementation of the Roadmap" and is in turn, expected to be accountable to Cabinet (Delivery Support Unit, 2016). Despite these intentions, qualitative data confirms that the game changers have operated deliberately outside of the PTMS, even while periodically interfacing and presenting progress to Steering Committees and via Cabinet Bosberaad, a position re-iterated by a number of respondents (I116, I104, FG74 and I35).

Operating outside of the PTMS is not a reflection on implementation of the game changers, but it does create a governance ambiguity in terms of the PTMS which is inconsistent with its initial design and intention. Clarification of the PTMS as functioning distinct from the governance arrangements of the game changers stream of implementation, which is unique in its approach, methodology, use of data and accountability arrangements, did not occur during the course of the term or reflect in PTMS related documentation, even if implicitly understood among some key stakeholders.

Among different respondents the perceived effectiveness of the governance arrangements of PTMS working groups were contrasted with those of the game changers. The following quotes reflect:

"I have one project in the game changers and it is managed super tightly, because you are in front of the Premier every six weeks [for stocktakes]. There is very tight oversight and in-depth analysis on why it has not moved forward. We don't have the same tight regulations and management in the working groups," (FG1).

"…If [game changers] didn't have to report to [the Premier], they wouldn't have worked. It would work like the working group works," (FG4).

The nature of prioritisation and the differing degrees of political-strategic attention given across all of the respective implementation streams means that they can be contrasted in terms of their reach within the WCG. Using the

electronic survey respondents as a sample at SMS level[7], only 33% of 153 surveyed SMS respondents were involved in the implementation of game changers in some way, whereas 53% of SMS respondents participated in the PTMS via working groups. This is to some extent consistent with the focus of the respective streams of implementation, where game changers are the most specific and defined in a small number of interventions (6), whereas the working groups are more dynamic but only directly involve about half of the sampled SMS. This can then be contrasted with the 100% of SMS which ostensibly have some responsibility towards the delivery of the core business and support functions of their respective departments. This reinforces the comparatively narrow focus of the game changers relative to the work of the PTMS and overall WCG. This is partly explained by the prioritised selection, approach and focused role the DSU plays in facilitating the implementation of game changers, as distinct from the custodians of the PTMS.

In light of the developments in relation to the game changers, they have been described and largely perceived as a "parallel system" that runs alongside PTMS structures (I118 and I35). Because the game changers are considered the prerogative and priority of the Premier with a mandate for the 2014-2019 term only, there has not been an effort to institutionalise or find accommodation as part of the PTMS, even while they do reportedly account via the same structures in some instances. "There hasn't been a positive relationship between the game changer structures and PTMS structures. Haven't seen that they are working together…. There is no integration. They do report on Steering Committees on game changers. It's an odd, not comfortable set up," (I47).

Delivery Support Unit

The DSU is conceptualised as part of the PTMS in the PSP and the PTMS SOP sets out the role of the DSU, in the Premier's Office, as that of coordinating the conceptualisation, design and development of the game changers, facilitating their implementation, and providing oversight and evaluation of the performance of the game changers. Regardless of the role fulfilled by the DSU as a supporting unit to implementing game changers, it is clear there was never an explicit intention that the DSU should play any role beyond that of the game changers as it relates to the PTMS. However, a common critique among respondents has been the tension that has emerged in some of the line departments as it relates to institutionalising benefits from the DSU's approach concurrent to the PTMS and the regular work of departments.

"We look at the lessons learnt, we say we need to put in place mechanisms that don't require the DSU. We need to be able to manage things on our own. The backlash is that DSU feels like they are isolated. I would have thought they wanted a department that can take things on their own now, with some initial support," (I106).

So even as the game changers have been implemented by the DSU with departments "outside" of the PTMS governance arrangements, in support of the PSP, the interface with actors and related structures has had implications for the implementation of the PTMS and WCG staff's understanding of transversal co-operation and collaboration. The lack of a clear, common understanding of the PTMS' relationship with the DSU and where the game changers interface with the

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[7] Not a representative sample, this is merely indicative.

PTMS has also affected communication within the WCG (Department of the Premier, 2017b). This also has implications for understandings of the game changers and the uptake of the beneficial elements of the their approach which the PTMS might seek to adopt. The following explains:

"Besides high-level political pressures, the DSU operates in a different way to working groups, and it only has one thing on their plates. It's a totally different methodology. You can't compare the two at all. And that is they are able to deliver, they also have a narrow focus. What hasn't happened is that it was supposed to be deliverology that was supposed to [be] infiltrated into other departments, but it hasn't worked, its temporary and cannot be sustained," (FG2).

Literature on delivery units reveals that an enabling environment plays a salient role in determining the effectiveness of a delivery unit. Key to this is the support and buy in of formal authority and top management, and this is to ensure that the unit is able to work across government. The tension between the implementation of game changers through the DSU and some of the line departments has partly been due to uneven support from top management. This again may be an unintended consequence of a parallel stream of governance that has been developed via the stocktakes and accounting directly to the Premier. Gold (2017:26) explains that "it is all too easy for central delivery units to find themselves operating in isolation – either because there isn't sufficient capacity within government to support the unit's mandate or the unit ends up institutionalising tensions between the centre and departments."

Concerns around the sustainability of the DSU and replicability of the game changer methodology have been raised by some respondents. These concerns have been raised within the context of learning from the game changers and DSU methodology within the PTMS system of governance. There is a prevailing caution within the WCG with regards to the continuation of the game changers into the 2019-2024 term, as the following quote captures:

"I am not sure to what extent how many [game changers] will survive because I am not sure how they are embedded in the system of governance. Once the people are gone, there is a risk that they will fizzle out." (I9)

The 2017 Mid-Term Review further noted that while game changers dealt with the delivery of particular interventions, each of the game changers was managed as a "stand-alone project" unique with its own reporting structures and implementation methodology, which did not easily lend itself to transversal management (Department of the Premier, 2017b), at least in terms of the arrangements of the PTMS at that time.

5.1.2 Key outputs

The WCG identified four key outputs of the PTMS that are central to realisation of its intended outcomes. In determining the extent to which the PTMS achieved its key outputs, each of these are assessed below.

An approved PSP that responds to the political-strategic direction of Provincial Cabinet and is aligned to national service delivery obligations

One of the stated intentions of the PTMS is to enable the alignment of the PSP, as the political-strategic direction of the Provincial Cabinet for the WCG, with national service delivery obligations. The WCG approved the current PSP after nearly 18 months of deliberation on the part of the Executive and senior management (Department of the Premier, 2017b) and nearly a year after the

release of the Medium-Term Strategic Framework 2014-2019. The political-strategic direction of Cabinet was captured through Cabinet meetings and in the various Cabinet Bosberade at which the PSP and its goals were discussed and finally approved. This political-strategic direction was informed by the electoral mandate on which the governing party was elected and reflects in the PSP with its reference to "An open-opportunity society for all" (Western Cape Government, 2014b: 9-10) among others.

The PSP was generally regarded by respondents as having served its purpose of transmitting the political-strategic direction of the newly elected government into a strategic plan around which transversal policy implementation could be managed. However, among some members of Cabinet there was also acknowledgement that, if a WOSA approach is to be employed as envisioned in the PSP, it should have started at the stage of the political manifesto on which an electoral mandate is secured so as to build mobilisation that carries into the work of the WCG. The following quote reflects:

"I would start by writing this manifesto and I would start by taking the manifesto to our caucus and our government because we don't know who is going to be the ministers next time, and to the party, and say what are we going to promise the voters and how do they become whole of government priorities and how do we drive them in the system to make sure that in the five years we deliver? That's what I would do. That would be a good spur to getting transversal management going and getting it owned by everybody," (I23).

Notwithstanding the implications of WOSA for the PTMS, respondents from Cabinet to MMS level acknowledged the sequencing issues the timing of the PSP created for informing the work of departments. The PSP was adopted late in 2014 and disseminated more widely in early 2015, several months after the swearing in of the new provincial government and at a stage where the development of departmental 5-year strategic plans were well-advanced. This is cited as one of the primary reasons for the difficulty in achieving alignment between the PSP and departmental strategic plans – the PSP had limited influence or did not inform the drafting of the departmental strategic plans because it was not agreed until after, or concurrent to, the adoption of the departmental plans. This argument assumes a linear approach to planning. Even though the PSP was approved in late 2014, the senior management structures and various interdepartmental structures involved in the research and discussions would have had the benefit of iterative engagements from the PSP process to inform the development of their departmental strategic plans over the course of the 18 months of informant review work. The following quote captures this and explains how one department sought to manage alignment despite the official issues of timing:

"Whilst the ultimate outcome and structure of PSP and PSGs is solid, the timing where they went into most of years was problematic. The individual departments were required to do the departmental strategic plans and most of the departments focused on their core mandates and therefore had to retrofit transversal aspects in year 2. We were cleverer than some other departments. We took the framework of what was emerging and strategic focus areas and used it as a [*inaudible*] framework to inform our department 5-year plan and how we would assist and facilitate [our PSG] given the transversality, and our role of facilitating the spatial alignment between department and municipal sector," (I50).

Despite the concerns and issues arising from the sequencing expressed in the qualitative engagements, this does not appear to have manifested in terms of perceived alignment issues among SMS respondents to the survey as Figure 10 displays:

How well or poorly have the following been aligned to the Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019:

Figure 10. SMS response to 2014-2019 PSP alignment to WG implementation plan, Medium Term budget, APPs and Strategic plans

In all cases, the majority of SMS respondents that both serve and do not serve on working groups indicated that the PSP aligns adequately or well to the departmental medium-term budget, departmental annual performance plan and departmental strategic plan respectively. Interestingly, the lowest levels of alignment for WG members were perceived to be in relation to the latest medium-term budget. This may be a reflection of the austere financial conditions limiting the extent to which resources are aligned to strategic priorities. This contrasts somewhat with the qualitative data, although a closer reading highlights that the alignment issue arises from the start of the term rather than from subsequent APP cycles. The following quotes reflect:

"The PSP came out after the start of [department] financial years. PSP plays a catch up with the APP which is not the right way to go about it." (FG64)

"The path that they're on, start up and prepare for the next term. There are two aspects of weakness: timing and sequencing and aligning between corporate provincial strategic plan and departmental strategic plan and timing and sequencing," (I50).

Challenges with regards to timing and sequencing were particularly prominent in departments where the relationship between the departments' core mandate function and the PSGs was not obviously apparent.

Thus, whereas the alignment issue may have arisen at the start of the term, the survey responses would suggest that the annual planning processes seem to have since afforded the WCG the opportunity to secure adequate or improved alignment in most instances.

However, the issue of misalignment is not simply one of sequencing, as was acknowledged in the preceding Section and the description of the multiple implementation streams. There is the reality of constitutional mandates that departments must prioritise, and it is rational and a matter of habit for departments to focus their efforts and budgets on their constitutional mandates and core functions. They will do this irrespective of the sequencing of the PSP or the political-strategic direction of Cabinet because they have statutory obligations to do so (I28). This is consistent with what the mid-term review found, that there were programmes that are important for the day-to-day experiences of citizens (for example, health clinics) that do not require transversal initiatives (but may enable or indirectly support the realisation of PSGs), and are not directly expressed in the PSP (Department of the Premier, 2017b). It also found that there were programmes fundamental to achievement of PSP outcomes that were not reflected strongly in the PSGs, for example, the large infrastructure investment and asset base of the province does not feature as a strategic driver in the province's economic strategy (Department of the Premier, 2017b: 12). This finding resonated with views expressed in qualitative engagements.

**PSP alignment to national service delivery obligations**

One of the key outputs of the PTMS is alignment between national service delivery obligations with the WCG's provincial service delivery imperatives and electoral mandate, particularly in relation to national priority programmes and the fourteen outcomes reflected in the MTSF 2014-2019. One relatively minor issue arises from the language in the SOP which talks of alignment of national obligations to provincial programmes, etc., and not alignment of PSP to national obligations as formulated elsewhere. The provincial context is the point of departure for the PSP, and not the NDP or MTSF.

The alignment between the NDP and MTSF national priorities and outcomes and the PSGs as expressed in the PSP is not a simple, linear, one-to-one cascading of the former to the latter. Alignment in the WCG context is understood to be how the NDP and MTSF, and national service delivery obligations find expression in the priorities and outcomes that the Provincial Cabinet has approved. The PSP specifically states that "The Western Cape Government has committed itself to support the implementation of the MTSF over the five-year term. The MTSF does not constitute the sum total of what the Western Cape Government does, but serves as a prioritisation framework, aimed at focusing all government efforts on a set of manageable programmes," (Department of the Premier, 2014: 7). This summary of the WCG's approach is consistent with experiences expressed by respondents in qualitative interviews, including those of national government stakeholders. Furthermore, it is this understanding which informs the WCG's own process of alignment assessment as part of the MTEC process, which is itself an informant to these findings.

Figure 11 presents the SMS level of agreement on whether the PSP aligns with the NDP and MTSF and respondents' departmental specific legislation. The data has been disaggregated to display differences in the responses for SMS that serve in a working group and those that do not. In all instances among the working groups participants, 80% or more of the respondents express an adequate or better alignment with the MTSF faring the best in terms of alignment overall. Even among the Non-WG respondents, the most substantial alignment related issue appears to be with regards to sector-specific legislation where more than a quarter of the respondents either believed there was poor alignment or did not

know. This resonates with the kind of alignment issues highlighted in the MTEC draft APP assessment reports presented in Table 5.

How well or poorly does the Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019 align with the following:

Figure 11. SMS response to PSP 2014-2019 alignment with NDP, MTSF and departmental legislation

The relatively positive levels of agreement of alignment to the NDP and MTSF are a reflection of the intentional efforts made during the PSO to PSG transition to ensure that the PSP 2014-2019 was informed by both policies as part of aligning the province's plans to the shifting matrix of government priorities and expectations (I81, I50, I97 and I120), which give rise to somewhat iterative and contextually-infused processes of alignment and adjustment between spheres of government and their respective plans. Respondents generally reflected on the visible synergies between provincial and national government due to the policy alignment, the following quotes capture respondents' perspectives:

"It was a smoother process in terms of policy, we were all on the same page. One of the advantages was we had the NDP which was the guiding document," (I48).

"We did as a province align to national, where … you will see synergies," (I20).

Although there is evidence that planning document alignment has to some extent been addressed through iterations and adjustments over time, there is also evidence that "full alignment" can be better achieved through on-going and improved communication between staff developing the PSP and departmental APPs (Department of the Premier, 2017b). However, one area that reflects in both the qualitative data and documentation as a key source of concern among WCG stakeholders remains budgeting alignment. Aligning budgets has the benefit of a more efficient allocation of scarce resources, but the implication is also potentially smaller and less fungible resource allocations, and this is a considerable risk for departments (I48). HODs tend to sit with the responsibility in this regard and without the platform or means to address the issue, as the following quote reflects:

"Budgeting to the priorities is difficult because there is no vehicle for departments to budget towards a common goal," (FG2).

However, while budgeting alignment remains an issue, there has been a response to this issue effected within the PTMS, even as it requires further refinement.

"…[the PFMA] is the accounting officer's responsibility, there is no budget system within the PTMS system, there is no compulsion for collaboration because there is no budget contribution for PSG1. Last year was the first time and this year has been different where they have done a PSG MTEC, but budget allocated into individual budgets and it doesn't find itself in the APPs. While they have the system, there is no structure supporting it other than a governance structure," (I12).

Thus, while there are some alignment issues arising from the PSP, these do not appear to be with national policy, but arise more from the sequencing and process of strategic plan and APP development and budgeting processes. One of the means by which the WCG has sought to address the issue of alignment specifically is via the annual budgeting and planning MTEC processes. From 2016, the introduction of the PSG MTEC process represents a tangible means to jointly determine the programmes and projects of the PSGs (and resource allocations) that should be prioritised within a given financial year. The process includes identifying challenges and shifting budgets for greater efficiency and impactful service delivery.

The PSG MTEC process is based on the Integrated Management approach adopted by the WCG and developed by Working Group 4 of PSG5 in support of delivery of the PSP. All departments must make submissions and presentations as part of the PSG MTEC process and submissions specifically cover the following elements:

- Policy alignment
- Monitoring & evaluation
- Integrated planning and budgeting
- Spatial governance and alignment
- Integrated planning between Provincial and Local Government; and
- Partnering and Partnerships.

The PSG MTEC reports aim to provide a consolidated review of these key elements, for each of the PSGs to assist departments in ensuring that their programmes and projects are responsive to the socio-economic environment, policy priorities and fiscal context. The reports include a review of progress and the extent of implementation of the PSGs, game changers and serve as input to the deliberations at the PSG MTEC engagements, (Western Cape Government, 2017).

In advance of engagements, a PSG MTEC report provides an assessment of how the APP of each department aligns to the PSG's respective outcomes and targets, the MTSF and NDP, as well as the game changers within the PSG. It identifies gaps in alignment, possible opportunities for partnerships, and makes recommendations for strengthening policy and planning alignment. This process of reviewing and providing feedback on the APPs as part of the process, appears to have contributed to the improved levels of alignment reported by survey respondents, particularly when considering the qualitative findings that highlighted the issues at the start of the term. The integrated management work group from PSG5 is responsible for overseeing the PSG MTEC process, and

provides written feedback to the PSG regarding their PSG MTEC report and the extent to which the contribution achieves the elements specified above.

Although the PSG MTEC reports follow a common format, there is a great deal of variation in how the assessment of each department within each of the PSGs is presented, and the level of detail provided. This may be, in part, a reflection of the varied content submitted by departments, or a reflection of the different nature of issues covered in the different PSGs. It may also partly reflect the process used to assess the APPs for alignment.

The PSG MTEC reports (2017) do not include an explanation of how the technical assessments were conducted, and in particular, what criteria were used to assess the alignment between the APPs and the PSGs and support inter-rater reliability. The Internal Audit of the PTMS (2017a), identified this as a major deficiency, and the management response to the audit indicated that the PTMS and SOP would be updated to include detailed guidance for conducting technical assessments of APP alignment to the next PSP; detailed recommendations by the Integrated Management working groups on how the APPs could be better aligned to the PSP; a follow-up process to ascertain the extent to which the working group's recommendations have been implemented, and formal sign-off of the technical assessment reports to indicate their completeness and validity. Where guidance has been provided in this regard it would appear broad in light of the range of outputs and detail provided across the MTEC assessment reports.

The table below provides a summary of the assessments reflected in the PSG MTEC reports, on the alignment of APPs to the PSGs, including the Game Changers. There is also commentary on alignment with the NDP, MTSF and MTEF. The following is provided as evidence of how the PSG MTEC process is used to assess and/or advise on ways to improve policy and planning alignment.

Table 5: PSG MTEC draft APP 2018/19 assessment summaries

PSG	Assessment summary
PSG 1	APP of Departments of Economic Development and Tourism, Agriculture, and Transport and Public Works are well aligned with the NDP, OneCape 2040 and PSG 1. There are a few minor recommendations to be considered with regards to content.
PSG 2	PSG 2 departments have clear alignment between the APP, the PSP, NDP, MTEF and game changers.
PSG 3	The DoH should more clearly define its role in priority projects as part of PSG3 and clarity is required regarding the DoH's role in the JPIs.
	There is clear alignment between the DoCS APP and the relevant goal and objectives of the PSP, as well as the NDP and Game Changers particularly the APP highlights the link between 2 specific sub-programmes and PSG 3. It is recommended DoCS incorporate the relevant policy objectives from the Western Cape Government Alcohol Harms Reduction Policy White Paper into its APP.
	The DSD is aligned with PSG 3 and the Department's planning is informed by the analysis of national outcomes and priorities contained

	in the NDP, MTSF outcomes, provincial priorities, PSGs and the relevant provincial game changers.
	DCAS programmes are aligned to its role of promoting social inclusion in the Province, either directly or indirectly, and is reflected in its programmes and strategic goals to a varying extent. The draft 2018 - 2019 APP would benefit from clarifying the links between PSG3 and its departmental strategic goals.
	Some information in the first draft Department of Transport and Public Works APP was missing and should be updated in future drafts.
PSG 4	DEA&DP demonstrates clear alignment between the APP, the PSP, NDP and MTEF. It is recommended that clearer alignment to the Better Living Model Game Changer is required in the APP.
	DHS Strategic Goal 6 - "Enable an increased supply of land for affordable housing and catalytic projects" is well aligned with the
	NDP, Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) and MTSF goals of the provision of housing into the GAP market.
	DTPW APP needs to be updated in future drafts and it is recommended that the Department invest in programmes that specifically respond to the water crisis.
	Opportunities exist for the DLG to align with the Better Spaces project.
	DoA seems to be working well intergovernmentally and externally with municipalities, national departments, public entities, civil society and business. It is recommended that the Department strengthens the coordination of joint implementation i.e. rural development, where the benefit increases without additional costs (existing budget).
PSG 5	The PSG 5 departments demonstrate alignment between the APP, the PSP, NDP, MTEF and Game Changers.
	In DOTP, the co-ordination and information flow between the different PSGSs could be improved, including the strengthening of departmental cooperation and partnership development process.
	With reference to Provincial Treasury, and its focus on integrated service delivery for impact, increased collaboration, enhancing accountability and oversight and creating public value the Department is well aligned with the policy priorities of the Western Cape (PSP and OneCape 2040), the MTSF and the NDP.
	For DLG it is noted that the majority of the departmental initiatives fall within the PSG 5 space, but the initiatives aligning to other PSGs (in particular PSGs 1, 2 and 3) can be strengthened.
	DEA&DP is aligned to all five PSGs, there is however limited mention its role in the Better Living Model Game Changer and linked to the development planning arena.

On the balance of data available, the PTMS has achieved some degree of alignment between national policy priorities, the PSP and departmental strategic plans and APPs. Notwithstanding the noted shortcomings arising from the sequencing of the PSP and statutory plans, and the identified opportunities for further improvement in the quality and extent of alignment, particularly as it relates to budget, this key output is considered largely achieved in line with its intention.

Operational governance structures

Another intended output of the PTMS is operational governance structures that are responsible for effectively and efficiently implementing the PSP. The PTMS SOP is clear in identifying three governance structures at the political-strategic level with governance responsibilities for the PTMS. These structures include: Cabinet, Cabinet Bosberaad (incl. Heads of Department) and the Steering Committees.

In all three instances, these structures were deemed to be operational and observing governance responsibilities related to the PTMS, while noting that there were varying perspectives on their efficiency and effectiveness. These findings are also dealt with at more length in the Section 5.3.1 on system functionality.

At the level of Cabinet, the structure has clearly fulfilled its initial role in providing political-strategic direction to the WCG in setting out the PSGs and agreeing to the PSP as a transversal strategic plan. Building on the findings on the preceding output, the timeframe for formulation and adoption was less than efficient and created alignment challenges, although some of these are a function of planning cycles which inevitably overlap with new electoral terms. Cabinet has been critiqued by some Ministers for not allocating sufficient time for oversight of PSP implementation and the PTMS in Cabinet meetings (I97 and I88). Although most Ministers were reluctant to provide any constructive critique of the WCG or Cabinet's performance in this regard, there was some feedback identifying this as an area of possible improvement.

Cabinet Bosberaad (including HODs and game changer drivers) as a structure has played a more regular and reliable role in terms of PSP implementation and the PTMS. Since 2015, Cabinet Bosberaad has convened 3-5 times annually and regularly discussed PSG implementation with presentations specifically addressing progress reports on the PSG outcome targets, the game changers as strategic interventions, and/or budget priorities across key interventions and departments (Department of the Premier, 2015b, 2016, 2017c, 2018b). Crucially, key decisions related to the PSP and the PTMS have been taken at Cabinet Bosberaads and provide evidence of an operational governance structure in line with the intended output, while noting some of the functionality issues addressed later in the report.

Five Steering Committees aligned to each of the PSGs were established, made up of Ministers and HODs which meet quarterly. These structures were operational across all PSGs, even while some expressed overlap/duplication with the role of Executive Committees (I62 and I77). In terms of their oversight of Executive Committees and working groups, there were some shortcomings in this regard, findings that are addressed at more length in Section 5.3. on Efficiency. Nevertheless, Steering Committees were operational in terms of governance of the PTMS on a PSG by PSG basis.

Although the five Executive Committees aligned to each of the PSGs are not governance structures in terms of the political-strategic direction of the WCG, they sit at a nexus between this level and the tactical interpretive level of implementation as per the PTMS theory of change. The PTMS SOP specifically identifies the Executive Committees as an operational governance structure of PSG implementation (Department of the Premier, 2015a) and sets out a further devolution of responsibilities moving down from the Steering Committees. This includes the appointment of secretarial and logistics duties for the Steering Committees, as well as the appointment of the working group Chairs. Executive Committees have responsibility for overseeing working group implementation planning, reporting and interdepartmental relations via transversal programmes

and projects. Across all five of the PSGs, the Executive Committees were operational and secretariats were in place.

Working Groups are the main implementation structures of the PTMS responsible for developing implementation plans and reporting their work into upper structures. They are identified as operational governance structures in the PTMS SOP (Department of the Premier, 2015a) and positioned as game changer team equivalents, although they represent distinct implementation streams, as addressed earlier. In 2016, there were 32 working groups; in 2018 in contrast, 26 working groups were listed as operating across all of the PSGs, even though there are considerable differences in the nature of their work, focus and implementation responsibilities. Working Groups have been dynamic across the term but are generally functioning, operational components of the PTMS, recognising that working groups have been somewhat customised implementation vehicles. In the October 2017 PSP presentation to Cabinet Bosberaad, all PTMS governance structures are deemed operational, while noting "only a small number of the working groups are not meeting or meeting infrequently". As they form a key implementation structure of the PTMS, they are dealt with in further detail in the subsequent findings.

One specific structure that was operational but lacked a defined governance role in the PTMS was that of PTM. Although the PTM is reflected in the diagrammatic representation of the PTMS (Department of the Premier, 2015: 6), the SOP is silent on the role of PTM in the PTMS. Across multiple qualitative engagements the role and function of the PTM committee was raised as wanting in relation to the PTMS (I51, I34, and I53). This was consistent with the MTR which recommends that PTM should "…interrogate strategic and transversal submissions before they serve before Cabinet and the PTM should play a more prominent role in the transversal management of the implementation of the PSP" (Department of the Premier, 2017: 21). Thus, while PTM was an operational governance structure during the period, findings indicate that clarifying and embedding PTM's role is necessary to achieve a coherent transversal management system that operates efficiently and effectively.

Review and refinement of tactical and operational plans

The "effective review and refinement of the tactical and operational plans on a regular basis to ensure that the intended outcomes of the PSP are achieved" is considered an expected output of the PTMS (Department of the Premier, 2018: 5). In the implementation logic of the PTMS, this output is considered indicative of an adaptive and dynamic implementation process whereby strategic directives, new performance information and changing circumstances may all inform shifts in tactics and operations that lead to improvements in how the WCG works in pursuit of the PSP's policy objectives.

Review of working group implementation plans represent the common planning artefact of the PTMS to which this output refers and refinement may also come as the result of feedback from governance structures in relation to progress reporting and presentations. Figure 12 presents responses of SMS that indicated that less than half of respondents (38% of respondents agreed and 9% strongly agreed) believe that working groups receive meaningful feedback from Executive Committees and Steering Committees, and nearly 1 in 3 respondents was neutral on this. Despite this lack of meaningful feedback, the majority of the respondents (66%) agreed or strongly agreed that working group implementation plans are periodically reviewed.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements:

Figure 12. SMS level of agreement with working group feedback and review

Version updates or changed iterations of these plans are also indicative of the review and refinement of tactics and operations. Documentary review indicates that at the beginning of the term implementation plans were developed across the working groups with key outputs and deliverables identified, and in most instances captured as projects on the BizProjects management system. However, over time the extent to which these plans have served as living, updated tactical and operational guidance documents and reflected on the project management system has declined (Section 5.3.3 will deal with findings on BizProjects in detail). This is of course variable across working groups, but it appears to be in part a reflection of the diversity of the working groups' nature and focus in relation to the strictures of a planning template and project management system. Thus, what constitutes review and refinement of tactics and operations is difficult to compare between a working group that is a narrowly defined project implemented almost exclusively by a single department (e.g. PSG2- ECD Work Group), a working group responsible for a broader strategic programme with multiple sub-components (e.g. PSG1- Project Khulisa), and a working group that has a broader systemic knowledge and information sharing function informing a more coherent policy response across the WCG (e.g. PSG4- Climate Change Response) as examples.

Figure 13 illustrates that while feedback from upper structures and strategic directives is an informant to change in implementation plans, that working groups do not rely solely on this feedback.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements:

Figure 13. SMS level of agreement with working group implementation

Figure 13 shows that of the 79 surveyed SMS, a total of 24% either agreed (20%) or strongly agreed (4%) that working group implementation plans change only when there is a new strategic direction provided by the Executive Committee. Notably, a relatively large (32%) proportion of the respondents were neutral while 30% disagreed and 6% strongly disagreed. In contrast, 47% agreed or strongly agreed that implementation tactics of programmes and projects run by working groups have changed since receiving feedback. Thus, while it is clear there is some review and refinement happening in practice, there is also evidence that the PTMS does not always work as intended, as feedback is either not forthcoming or does not assist in decision making on the implementation tactics. One focus group explained that they do not rely on feedback from governance structures, but find feedback from other actors more helpful in refining their tactics and operations:

"We didn't get feedback [from the governance structures], we used other mechanisms to get in depth feedback. We would have one on one or bilateral engagements or other project level meetings. We would convene meetings to get much richer feedback," (FG65).

Other respondents highlighted the dashboard system with its Red-Amber-Green (RAG) symbols as standing out in terms of providing a useful means for identifying problem areas and how to address them, as the following quote reflects:

"They do prepare the dashboard that comes out of BizProjects and what issues are on the RAG system. It is about performance but actually, it's more about identifying emerging problems and what is there that they can be doing to assist in addressing those," (I32).

Contrasting this feedback was an emerging concern about how the RAG system is used, with the unintended consequence of diluting the value of feedback by reducing it to achievement or not, rather than that of problem-solving. The following quotes explain:

 "There isn't significant stuff that gets discussed. It's on a did you or didn't you do it level," (FG80).

"My experience was that they looked for projects that were in red, and if they were red you would have to explain to the Minister. It was a punitive environment where we reported on projects on the dashboard…," (FG65).

Other respondents expressed a concern that given how working group implementation is captured as a project, that the PTMS has inadvertently elevated project level detail to the level of Executive oversight which risks operational interference:

"Executive shouldn't be constantly checking every step of the project. They shouldn't be worrying about projects deadlines and it is a form of micromanagement that is unnecessary they should ideally say the project has succeeded or not," (I47).

However, across the respondents there was a prevailing sentiment that while all the ingredients of the PTMS are there for meaningful feedback, review and refinement, that the complexity of the system combined with the expectation of good performance proves a challenging one to consistently deliver upon. The following quote captures this:

"All of the elements we have but to apply it is challenging because we don't work in the linear environment, we work in a complex system, because then everything is red and people want to turn red to green," (I99).

Thus, this would appear to reinforce the survey respondent findings that indicate that some review and refinement of tactics and operations does occur across working groups, but that this is generally lacking. Striking the right balance in this regard differs on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, this is an output that is not consistently achieved across all working groups for a variety of differentiated and case-specific reasons.

Learning is achieved through regular review of the PSP

The last output of the PTMS is "Learning is achieved through regular review of the PSP, which informs future planning". This is an output that is encompassing of the entire PTMS system, and the term of government, which is yet to conclude. Nevertheless, even while this evaluation is itself a component of the EOTR 2019, there is evidence that some learning has been achieved through periodic review of the PSP via formal review processes undertaken by the DOTP including the EOTR (2014), the MTR (2017b) and current work on the EOTR 2019. While these documents are themselves indicative of periodic reviews and capture lessons and make recommendations for future planning, they also provide indications of where issues or challenges have persisted, despite acknowledgement of the need for change.

One means of illustrating the learning from review, is by comparison of recommendations between the EOTR 2014 and the MTR 2017. This is indicative of broader learning across the WCG from review and whether the findings informing these recommendations have been internalised, understood and addressed. The EOTR has been described as "good for reflecting on the PSP, but it needed a more frequent reflection" (FG6). It is further noted that a lack of implementation of a recommendation may also be due to broader prevailing conditions that make them unfeasible at the time.

Table 6: Comparison of recommendation implementation from EOTR 2014-MTR 2017–to date

Recommendations from EOTR 2014	Recommendations from MTR 2017	Lessons learnt?
1. Conceptualising an overarching provincial strategic plan before the transversal development of its constituent parts by sectors (economic, human development and governance), not line function Departments.	1. When preparing for the next version of the PSP it will be essential for all departments to interrogate their Constitutional mandates and core business with the express purpose of seeing how best these can contribute to achieving the PSP outcomes and how they can be reflected in the PSP.	The PSP was conceptualised as the apex transversal plan for this term of government. However, the WCG has not yet conceptualised a new PSP with regard to the Constitutional mandate and core business of departments. Line of sight between the PSP and departmental plans is still lacking.
2. Prioritising the transversal goals of (i) creating opportunities for growth and jobs; (ii) promoting social inclusion by addressing the complex and interlocking drivers of social exclusion and dysfunction; and (iii) pursuing clean and effective governance for maximum impact in service delivery. *The current PSOs should be refined and reduced in number to support these overarching goals. In other words, transversal strategic objectives should be linked to these goals, as the key priorities for the WCG, and then driven by the PTMS.*	--	The PSOs were refined and reduced in number, and the three transversal goals find expression in the current PSGs.

Recommendations from EOTR 2014	Recommendations from MTR 2017	Lessons learnt?
--	2. The PSG structures and Departments should deepen the integration between outcomes, outputs, targets and indicators of the PSP and their core business.	There have certainly been efforts to incorporate PSG outcomes, outputs and targets into the work of departments, but this has not been successful in all cases and MTEC assessment reports show there's still room for integration.
3. Ensuring that PSOs are clear, carefully defined, transversal strategic objectives with SMART outcomes and outcome indicators within the provincial government's control.	--	Recommendation was addressed in the setting of outcomes and outcome indicator targets within each of the PSGs. However, these are not consistently SMART.
4. Foregrounding the alignment of the provincial strategic plan with the NDP and OneCape 2040	--	The current PSP has foregrounded the NDP, OneCape 2040 and the MTSF on pages
5. Developing whole-of-society initiatives in priority policy areas, with the objective of achieving impact at scale in addressing the key social and economic challenges in the Western Cape.	3. Develop whole-of-society initiatives in priority policy areas, with the objective of achieving impact at scale in addressing the key social and economic challenges in the Western Cape.	As a repeat recommendation there have been pilot initiatives in this regard, there seems to be enduring lack of clarity on how best to mainstream this approach within the WCG.
--	4. Implement partnering solutions to strengthen collaboration between WCG and external partners and stakeholders.	There have been efforts to implement partnering solutions and strengthen collaboration, particularly through the work of EDP.

Recommendations from EOTR 2014	Recommendations from MTR 2017	Lessons learnt?
--	5. It is thus essential that the effectiveness of the existing partnerships between WCG and other stakeholders be evaluated in order to draw lessons and best practices.	Some partnership diagnostics and maturity assessments have been undertaken. Although this evaluation has considered whether the PTMS has been effective in improving collaboration, it has not assessed the effectiveness of partnerships themselves, but focused on the contribution of the PTMS as a platform through which partnership and collaboration can be coordinated.
6. Improving the public participation, consultation and communications processes with internal and external stakeholders on the provincial strategic plan.	6. Improve public participation, consultation and communications processes with internal and external stakeholders (whole of society) on the implementation of the provincial strategic plan (beyond marketing the provincial role).	Progress has been made on a differentiated basis in this regard, with the IWP being one of the more significant outputs informing consultation and communication processes between local and provincial government. There are some project and initiative specific instance improvements, including communication efforts related to game changers and the WoSA working group, but there is limited evidence that consultation and communication with internal and external stakeholders in relation to PSP processes has shifted across the PTMS.

Recommendations from EOTR 2014	Recommendations from MTR 2017	Lessons learnt?
7. Aligning policy planning to the budget process, possibly through transversal MTECs.	7. More emphasis needed on integrating plans, budgets and projects of departments across WCG, including research, which is done in silos. The WCG should also explore how better to integrate the implementation of the Game Changers with the implementation of the rest of the PSP projects and improve the coordination between the various Game Changers.	Since 2014 the transversal MTECs have been introduced with greater emphasis on integrating plans, budgets and projects across the WCG. However, as the findings highlight, the extent to which integration and coordination of the full suite of PSP initiatives (incl. game changers and working groups) has occurred across and between PSGs, and in relation to planning and budgeting cycles, can still be improved.
--	8. The following critical issues should be elevated as provincial strategic priorities: a. Water security b. Tracking of indicators, data collection, data management and analysis	Water security has been elevated and there has been progress in the development of a data governance framework with implementation plan, even while some concerns regarding indicator tracking, data management and analysis persist.
--	9. Each PSG to produce a progress report on their indicators. 10. Each PSG should select two or three projects that will be subjected to an impact evaluation towards the end of this term of office.	Although progress reports from working groups are processed, regular indicator progress reports do not appear to have been institutionalised, even while these are expected to reflect in the EOTR 2019. Some PSG projects have been subjected to evaluation (e.g. Project Khulisa, VPUU, etc) but this does not appear to have occurred across all PSGs.

Recommendations from EOTR 2014	Recommendations from MTR 2017	Lessons learnt?
--	11. Given the significant IGR challenges and resource constraints, each Steering Committee should identify a shorter list of PSG objectives, targets, indicators and projects which stand the greatest chance of being successfully realised over the remainder of this term of office and make this the main/only focus for the next two financial years.	There does not appear to be a common approach in this regard and if there is such a "shortlist" it does not appear to have been formalised, even while some working groups have ceased to function and fallen away. There is acknowledged re-prioritisation related to WOSA in PSG3 and clear reduction in working groups in PSG4.
--	12. The PTM, as the nexus of the senior officials in the WCG administration should play a more proactive role in the coordination of the PSP, providing strategic direction to the different Executive Committees and acting as a clearing house or sounding board for strategic issues of a transversal nature (not necessarily only in the PSP) before they are submitted to Cabinet, in order to give Cabinet a broad (and nuanced) view which might assist in avoiding unintended consequences).	This recommendation appears not to have been meaningfully actioned, even while it was commonly expressed among respondents that this should be PTM's role and there is provision on the agenda for such issues. Contributing factors include matters of timing, approval/ escalation protocols and technical support capacity, among others.
--	13. Explore options of using Steering Committees and PTM as a clearing-house for strategic Cabinet submissions with implications for more than one department.	As per the above finding, this also does not appear to have been internalised in terms of a meaningful change in behaviour over the term. The timing and sequencing of these meetings is identified as a contributing factor.

The EOTR 2014 also identified several deficiencies in the structure of the previous PSP and its implementation and concluded that these impacted negatively on the effectiveness of the PTMS in delivering on its main objectives. The MTR 2017 of the current PSP and PTMS found that the PTMS was fully institutionalised, with progressive improvements in some areas, while some issues identified in the EOTR 2014 persisted. This is consistent with findings presented in Table 6.

Consistent with the findings on the preceding output, the MTR 2017 also found that all PSGs have strong political and administrative leadership, and that Steering Committees, Executive Committees and working groups were active (if unevenly so at the operational level), in contrast to the EOTR 2014 where structures under some of the Strategic Objectives were not very active. However, evidence obtained for this evaluation has also indicated that not all working groups are in fact transversal and meeting regularly, and some have stopped functioning or been absorbed in the course of this term (at least 6 working groups). Like the findings from the MTR 2017, there was a sense that membership of multiple working groups by the same officials introduced an element of meeting fatigue and dampened enthusiasm.

The system of leads for PSGs has, according to the MTR 2017, also had the unintended consequence of placing a disproportionate load for delivery, projects, activities and resources on lead Ministers, their HODs and their departments. The MTR 2017 indicated insufficient involvement of supporting departments. This finding was corroborated to an extent during qualitative engagements whereby departmental representatives indicated that by avoiding being a lead department they could limit their responsibilities relative to other departments (I46), whereas others indicated that by deciding to lead in a PSG they carried a disproportionate burden (I102). The inclusion of the PSP in the HOD performance agreements was found to have a positive effect of including PSP initiatives in the departmental APPs and budgets.

According to the MTR 2017, departments increasingly use the PSG MTEC process to prioritise the PSP in their APPs and budgets, but PSP resources still constitute a low proportion of departmental budgets and this has been further confirmed by respondents (I54, FG62 and FG113). Budgets are still mostly allocated to constitutionally mandated functions consistent with departmental APPs, although some shifts have been observed to strategic transversal initiatives (see findings in Section 5.3).

The MTR 2017 found the game changers to be a bold way to focus the WCG's attention on problems that require new and innovative solutions, and that the 'Deliverology' methodology and stocktakes assisted the WCG to keep focus on them as strategic initiatives. The hands-on involvement of the executive and senior management in implementation has assisted in ensuring that resources are diverted to the game changers as priority initiatives (I77 and I36). However, this has had the unintended consequence or concern about the allocation of resources relative to other priority initiatives of the working groups and PSP (I100).

The game changers, according to the MTR 2017, are managed in isolation of the PSGs, and of each other. With each game changer structured as a stand-alone project with its own implementation and reporting structures, game changers are not amenable to transversal management. However, the evidence obtained for this assessment did not find this to be the case for all game changers. For instance, game changer presentations via Cabinet Bosberaad and to Steering

Committees were identified as transversal governance, their inclusion in MTEC processes were also identified, and examples of specific game changers (e.g. Better Living Model Conradie) were identified as demonstrating transversal cooperation. Thus, it appears that to an extent, the WCG has taken steps to address this finding.

The MTR 2017 also raised the concern that the emphasis on rapid delivery in the game changer methodology may be at the expense of attention to the systemic changes needed to make government work better, and such systemic changes take place over a longer period of time. This finding resonated with the qualitative engagements from a number of stakeholders (I53, FG78 and FG77).

However, while there is clear evidence that some lessons from the periodic reviews have been learnt, qualitative data from respondents also indicates that the reach of these lessons and their uptake throughout the PTMS has not necessarily spread across departments and stakeholders. Qualitative data suggests that some lessons appear more concentrated among the custodians of the system in DOTP, rather than transversally amongst the stakeholders and role-players themselves (I81, I113 and I33).

Despite some of these shortcomings in terms of lessons learnt through review of the PSP, there is still a clear and concerted effort to ensure that these processes inform not only planning for the next PSP, but that the lessons are incorporated into annual planning processes through incremental reform and shifts towards institutionalising the PTMS. The PSG MTEC process is possibly the best example of this as it was introduced more than a year into this term of government and has incrementally sought to shift how planning occurs between and within departments. That said, the MTEC process is itself not without its criticisms about whether it is sufficiently responsive to the inputs received (FG62 and I33).

5.1.3 Responsiveness

One of the intentions of the PTMS is to ensure that there are effective transversal responses at the political/strategic, tactical interpretive and operational levels of the WCG for the PSP to be realised. Although the PTMS SOP makes reference to governance at the political/strategic, tactical and operational levels (Department of the Premier, 2015a), there is no clarity regarding structures positioned at the tactical level- there are only references to political-strategic governance via Cabinet, Cabinet Bosberaad and Steering Committees. Similarly, operational governance is considered the purview of Executive Committees and working groups. For the purpose of the evaluation, the Executive Committees and working groups are considered as pivoting between the political-strategic and tactical (the former) and the tactical and operational (the latter). Furthermore, because the structures themselves overlap in terms of actors (i.e. Cabinet Bosberaad, Steering Committees, Executive Committees and working groups may all include HODs who serve across all three levels) the actors positioning within the WCG hierarchy are considered proximate of the three governance levels respectively.

The following therefore presents a summary of responsiveness across each of the three respective levels in relation to indications of improved transversality over the term of government.

Political/strategic level

As a transversal management system, one of the logical pre-requisites to an effective transversal response is a better understanding of the work of other departments outside of the immediate line department. Particularly in the case

of Ministers who fulfil a political-strategic role, the implications of their decisions are often transversal, while the existing governance arrangements cater towards a more circumscribed understanding of line departments mainly. The PTMS is itself a response to a lack of adequate transversal understanding within the WCG.

A positive indication that the WCG has proven more responsive at the political-strategic level is that Ministers are now both more aware of how the work of other departments affects achievement of the PSGs, and more likely to work together across ministries compared to the start of the term. Ministers now chair PSG MTEC engagements as a pre-cursor to departmental MTEC engagements and there are now a wider array of strategic interventions that are jointly owned, whether they be game changers or other initiatives like the Berg River Improvement Plan. Figure 14 and Figure 15 below illustrate that, across all PSGs, SMS agreed or agreed strongly that Ministers are now more aware of each other and work better together across ministries, compared to the start of the term.

Figure 14 SMS level of agreement to minister's awareness of how the work of other departments affects achievements of the PSGs compared to the start of the term

In both graphs SMS with views on PSG5 reflected the lowest levels of agreement. This may be partly explained by the close working relationship that departments at the centre of government (e.g. Provincial Treasury, DOTP and DLG in particular) have historically shared, rather than an indication of an understanding and their working together has been inadequate. In PSG1, focusing on economic growth and jobs, there is the strongest indication that there is now better understanding across ministries and more cooperative relationships between ministers. This is indicative of improvements towards more transversal responsiveness.

Ministers work better together across ministries now compared to the start of the term

Figure 15. SMS level of agreement to ministers working together across ministries now compared to the start of the term

One thing that stands out between Figure 14 and Figure 15 is that, across all PSGs, the levels of agreement are lower in terms of Ministers working better together than there is better understanding of other ministries. This may be indicative of a lag between knowledge and behavioural change. Alsoof note across the figures are the higher levels of neutrality and low levels of disagreement.

While the above presents one set of metrics relevant to this sub-assessment area, qualitative data also provides indications of the extent to which there has been effective responses at the political-strategic level. Certainly, in terms of the lessons learnt and strategic directives in response to the EOTR 2014, there is documentary evidence that the PSP has been developed as an apex planning document with a more focused set of PSGs compared to the previous term. However, there are also indications that the responsiveness of the political-strategic governance structures have been less effective in some instances because of how the RAG dashboard has been used for accountability purposes, rather than problem-solving (FG65 and FG80). Furthermore, there have also been indications that, for the degree of information that flows up into the PTMS system from departments, there has not been commensurate feedback, guidance and resource allocations in response. While the resource allocations may also be influenced by a more austere financial environment, focus group respondents provided indications that both the volume of information captured via BizProjects and presented to the governance structures did not continue to elicit meaningful feedback and responses.

Tactical/interpretive level

At the tactical/interpretive level, perspectives on HOD understanding and cooperation across departments have similarly been obtained as indicative of the transversal responsiveness of the PTMS. The logic also follows that, if Ministers are more aware and work better together, in a functional public service, this should cascade to departments and reflect in the behaviour of accounting officers. It is the political-strategic directives at the point of HOD engagement, often in consultation with SMS, that result in tactical/interpretive responses that shape implementation and operations on the ground.

Heads of Department are more aware of how the work of other departments affects achievement of the PSGs compared to the start of the term

Figure 16. SMS level of agreement of whether HODs are more aware of how the work of other departments affects achievement of the PSGs compared to the start of the term

SMS staff were further surveyed on whether HODs are more aware of how the work of other departments affects achievement of the PSGs compared to the start of the term. In all the PSGs, over half of the respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that the HODs are more aware of how the work of other departments affects the achievement of the PSGs compared to the start of the term. Of note here are the relatively low percentage of neutral responses, even while there are a small percentage of disagreeing respondents (5-17%) across all PSGs.

Heads of Department work better together across departments now compared to the start of the term

Figure 17. SMS level of agreement to HODs working better together across departments now compared to the start of the term

Figure 17 compares the level of SMS agreement on whether HODs work better together across departments now compared to the start of the current PSP term across the PSGs. The graph reveals that respondents that serve in PSG 3 reflect the highest level of agreement (79%) with no disagreement to the statement. Notably, PSG1 reflects the highest levels of disagreement in terms of both awareness (17%) and working together (22%) even while it enjoyed the highest levels of agreement at Ministerial level.

The Executive Committee governance structures have certainly contributed to improved cooperation at HOD level allowing for transversal responses to political-strategic directives, albeit differentially across PSGs owing to different scheduling approaches. Nevertheless, HODs meet through the executive committees and have acknowledged the benefits of conversations and relationship building that

occurs outside of the meeting space on a more informal level, which further contributes to understanding how the work of other departments affects transversal implementation. The structure has further been a key factor in institutionalising the "spirit of transversality". HODs are aware and have generally embraced the transversal view and the value of working together, both of their own initiative, and in response to Cabinet.

"There are also HODs seeing value of collaborating with HODs and greater value in working together and that realisation is coming from them," (FG81).

The biggest value that has been derived from this has been the reduction of the silo mentality between departments, as exemplified by the functional structures across the management levels that now serve as lateral platforms for transversal planning, implementation management and reporting. However, the Executive Committee has not been fully successful in completely reducing this mentality. While there is a general acceptance and acknowledgement of a transversal view, this has only manifested in the form of building relationships. The extent to which the Executive Committee has directly contributed to facilitating collaboration between the HODs is limited and this is largely due to the lack of PSG and APP alignment. In the absence of this, and as it has been noted throughout the report, HODs in their capacities as accounting officers are inclined to prioritise their departmental mandates and line functions. The 2017 presentation to the Bosberaad on the lessons learnt from implementing the PSP reiterates this by noting the tension between the role of HODs as accounting officers responsible for Departmental APPs and budgets (management role) and the role of HODs participating in cross-cutting transversal programmes, which is more of an influencing role (Department of the Premier, 2017d).

Of interest in terms of transversal responsiveness at the tactical/interpretive level is the role of the DSU in conjunction with the game changer teams, even as it operates outside of the conventions of the PTMS. The game changers are prioritised by the Premier and regularly operate at the tactical/interpretive level owing to the unique interface with departmental implementers. Further, the governance and accountability arrangements are unique as stocktake reports occur every six weeks and result in more continuous feedback and directives to unblock, address challenges and overcome barriers to performance. There have been over 100 stocktake meetings of the game changers since 2015, all chaired by the Premier (with one exception). The comparatively intense oversight of these initiatives, combined with their focus and dedicated tactical and technical support from the DSU, particularly as it relates to the collection and processing of data, has clearly facilitated a degree of responsiveness that is acknowledged across the qualitative engagements, MTR 2017 and in the independent review of the DSU (Uncredited, 2018).

However, one qualifier in this regard is the extent to which this responsiveness has been driven by lead-departments compared to transversal platforms (e.g. Steering Committees, etc), where there is certainly an impression among respondents that some game changers have worked more transversally (e.g. Better Living Model Conradie, After-school) compared to others (e.g. Alcohol-harms reduction, e-Learning), a finding that also reflected in the independent review where "cross-government ownership of the results agenda" was still lacking (Uncredited, 2018: 19). The DSU report states that it had to go beyond its functions and support role, to coordinating transversal relations (by default), a function of the lead department for particular game changers. The reason it gives for going beyond its mandate is the complexity of transversal/cross-cutting delivery. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the finding that the game

changers in particular have proven effective in processing political-strategic directives into responses at the tactical/interpretive level.

In understanding what has supported this responsiveness at the tactical/interpretive level, some of the strengths and weaknesses captured in the independent review of the DSU are instructive in this regard.

**Table 7: Summarised strengths and weakness of the DSU** (Uncredited, 2018: 31-32)

Strengths	Weaknesses
Dedicated team members responsible for a big picture/transversal View	Data systems are inadequate
Solutions focused	Understaffed and therefore response often not fast enough
Executive level engagement and support	Role clarification not well communicated
Extensive monitoring and measurement	Receptiveness weak
High level of expertise and skills among team members facilitates good insights	Existing organisational culture is not solution-oriented, but accountability driven
Emphasis on data analytics and utilising information	Insufficient sectoral/contextual understanding
Demonstrated success and what *can be done* within government	Interpersonal relationship management
Able to work across departments and cut across silos	Underfunding and resource conflicts
Emphasised the value of detailed planning and measurement	Insufficient lateral engagement within the team itself

Part of what has distinguished the DSU and its ability to effect tactical/interpretive responses towards the realisation of the game changers is because it has sourced, collected and analysed more and relevant data from which to inform its course of action. However, this has been done largely independent of established departmental reporting systems. While the data obtained has proved valuable for informing tactical responsiveness, the extent to which these new data systems can be sustained by departments given the resource intensity of generating this information and the accountability demands placed upon formal WCG performance information is questionable (I118). To this end, an appraisal of the data utilised by the DSU is reportedly underway.

Operational level

Whether the PTMS is producing the appropriate transversal responses at the operational level is a logical extension of whether understanding and working together at Ministerial and HOD level then cascades into the actions of operational

staff in WCG. In this case, the working groups are the main structures through which the tactical/interpretive responses translate into operational action, and so, much of the work of the PTMS occurs at the level of the working groups.

Staff in my department have a better understanding of how to implement transversal programmes and projects since the introduction of Working Groups


Figure 18: SMS level of agreement that staff have a better understanding of how to implement transversally since introduction of WGs

Figure 18 reveals the varying perspectives of SMS who serve in working groups, versus those who do not on their perspectives on whether staff in their departments have an understanding on how to implement transversal projects since the introduction of working groups. Of the 94 SMS that serve in working groups surveyed on this, 3% strongly agreed and 35% agreed with the statement. Considering the relatively lower number (66) of SMS who do not serve in working groups, 19% agreed with the statement. While noting the slightly higher levels of agreement for management staff serving in working groups, in both cases over half of the respondents were either neutral, disagreed or strongly disagreed or indicated that they do not know. The graph suggests that the PTMS' landing at an operational level has not had the desired effect in entrenching the understanding of how to implement transversal programmes and projects among SMS. Notably, 21% of SMS serving on working groups disagreed with the statement, while 18% were neutral or indicated that they did not know.

The feedback received from transversal progress reports for Working Groups has improved my understanding of what works and what doesn't

Figure 19: SMS level of agreement that feedback to WGs has improved understanding of what works and what doesn't

As feedback to working groups on transversal progress reports is one form of response, it also follows that this should be informing understanding of what works and what doesn't work among SMS. Figure 19's indication that feedback from progress reports has had limited contribution to enhancing their understanding and learnings on what works and what doesn't complements the data from Figure 18 that there is a limited understanding of how to implement transversal projects and programmes.

The transversal programmes and projects currently implemented by my department are benefitting from lessons learnt due to course-correction in this term

Figure 20: SMS level of agreement that transversal programmes and projects are benefitting from lessons learnt due to course correction

Figure 20 further confirms this position, while noting the slightly higher level of agreement among SMS that transversal programmes and projects are benefitting from course correction in this term. The implication of this is that while the levels of agreement are not as high among staff with more direct operational responsibilities, particularly in relation to Ministers and HODs, those that agree represent a plurality among SMS respondents. Only 14% of those serving in working groups, and 11% of those that do not, disagree with the belief that departments are benefitting from course-correction. From this, it is understood that while the PTMS appears more effective in securing transversal understanding and cooperation at the political/strategic and tactical interpretive levels, this is not translating into commensurate responses at the operational level. Particularly when considering the differences between working group and non-working group participants, it is clear that the lateral and cascading benefit intended by the PTMS has not been fully realised. Thus, the point of emphasis in managing and improving responses should be addressed more so at the level of the working group.

The experience of working groups over time is also indicative in this regard. The table below reveals that, over the 2014-2019 PSP term, the number and formulation of working groups have shifted in each of the PSGs, decreasing from an initially listed 32 working groups at the start of the term to 26 working groups as of 2018, inclusive of the game changers as equivalent to working groups.

Table 8. PTMS working groups[8] (adapted from Department of the Premier, 2015a; Western Cape Government, 2015; 2016; and 2018)

	PSP 2014 – 2019/ PTMS SOP V2	PTMS Working Group database (2016)	PTMS Working Group database (2018)
PSG 1	• Project Khulisa • Tourism • Rig repair • Agri-processing • Green economy • Skills for growth (artisan skills) GC • Ease of doing business (Red Tape) • Innovation • Optimised land use (land reform) • Energy security GC • Transport economics	• Green Economy • Broadband for Business • Transport Economics • Project Khulisa: • Tourism • Rig Repair • Agri-processing • Energy Security GC • Skills for Growth GC	• Project Khulisa • Tourism • Rig Repair • Agri-processing • Transport Economics • Broadband • Green Economy • Ease of Doing Business • Innovation
PSG 2	• Early Childhood Development • Youth Development • After-school GC • E-learning GC	• Early Childhood Development • Youth Development • After-school GC • E-learning GC	• Early Childhood Development • Youth Development • After-school GC • E-learning GC
PSG 3	• First 1000 Days • Healthy Lifestyles • Engaged and healthy Youth • Safely Home (PRTMCC) • Community Safety Improvement Plan • Alcohol harms reduction GC • Integrated Service Delivery Model: Drakenstein	• Integrated Service Delivery Model: Drakenstein • Disability • Provincial Road Transport Coordinating Committee (PRTMCC) • Community Safety Improvement Plan • Healthy Lifestyles • Parent and Infant Child Health – Wellness • Alcohol harms reduction GC	• PRTMCC/Road Safety • Injury Prevention • Healthy Lifestyles • Substance Abuse • Food Security • Disability • WoSA Transversal Design Team • Alcohol harms GC

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[8] Note this list amalgamates at times contradictory and overlapping accounts of the working groups at different periods, it is nevertheless indicative of shifts in the conceptualisation and thinking around the working groups over time.

	PSP 2014 – 2019/ PTMS SOP V2	PTMS Working Group database (2016)	PTMS Working Group database (2018)
PSG 4	• Integrated Planning and Spatial Targeting • Better Living Model • Conradie GC • Sustainable sanitation GC • Sustainable ecological and agricultural resource base • Climate Change Response	• Sustainable ecological and agricultural resource base • Climate Change Response • Better Living • Integrated Planning and Spatial Targeting • Better Living Model (Conradie) GC	• Sustainable ecological & agricultural resource-base • Climate Change Response • Better Living (Conradie) GC
PSG 5	• Local Government Governance • Provincial Government Governance • Service Interface • Integrated Management • Broadband GC • Digital competitiveness GC	• Local Government Governance • Provincial Government Governance and Service Interface • Community Engagement • Integrated Management	• Local Government Governance • Provincial Government Governance and Service Interface • Community Engagement Pilot • Integrated Planning, Policy and Delivery • Service Interface

The shifts in working groups over the term are indicative of two things relevant to the effectiveness of the PTMS, both positive and negative. The positive indication is that the working groups are themselves adaptive and responsive to shifts within the broader WCG environment, particularly where working groups have moved between PSGs or where a working group was combined to derive efficiencies. The negative indication is that, in some instances, the working groups were themselves not particularly well-conceptualised in terms of their relationship and contribution to the overall PSG and/or they failed to address their focus area transversally and have ceased to function as per their intended purpose. The decline in the number of working groups and lack of clarity around whether some working groups were game changers or not (e.g. Digital competitiveness) indicate that their initial design and conceptualisation may have hamstrung their functioning from the outset.

One of the other findings that emerges is that there is a differentiation in the kinds of working groups as vehicles for implementation. This kind of differentiation also assists in understanding why some working groups make more effective use of tools such as BizProjects or may benefit more from governance structure feedback in problem-solving in terms of course-correction. Table 9 reflects the emerging working group differentiation arising from the assessment, which may also help to better understand the implications of directives at an operational level.

Table 9: Emerging WG differentiation

Project-driven WGs	*Large programme WGs*	*System/ policy approach WGs*
Narrow project focus Simple, clear outputs Defined scope of sites of engagement, not reflective of outcomes at provincial scale Success requires some interdepartmental, intergovernmental OR external collaboration	Broad focus encompassing a range of initiatives Differentiated and varied outputs with contributing relationships to broader outcomes at provincial scale Success requires collaboration interdepartmentally, intergovernmentally AND externally	Focus is on system/policy change Outputs are often system inputs to guide/inform new behaviour starting in WCG Stronger knowledge and information sharing benefits Success requires interdepartmental collaboration as a sequential enabler of broader partnership and results
Example WGs: Early Childhood Development, Better Living Conradie GC	Example WGs: Project Khulisa, After-school GC, PTRMCC/Road Safety	Example WGs: Integrated Policy and Delivery, WoSA, and Climate Change Response

Respondents have also stated that besides the SOP and the working group implementation plans, there is no common document or guidance such as a ToR that sets out how the working group should be constituted, the appropriate number of members, as well as how often each working group should meet. This speaks to the level of independence and autonomy WCG senior staff have been given in refence to working group formulation, as well as an intentional provision for adaptive management (I81). However, this lack of clarity related to issues of working group design may also contribute to breakdowns in the line of sight between the PSG outcomes and the rationale for transversality. When that occurs, there is the inevitable tendency to re-fashion the structure for departmental purposes, as the following quote captures this risk:

"I don't know how we were established. We originally aligned what the work of the working group would have to be in line with the framework. We abandoned it mid-way because – what the working group could do vs the expectation was supposed to do did not align…We have reinvented it to be in line with the general need of the department," (FG1).

While the adaptation of the working group is also a form of responsiveness, it is not necessarily transversal in keeping with the intentions of the PTMS in this term as since adjustments appear to have tended towards concentrating a de.

5.1.4 Main objectives

The last sub-assessment area of this criterion refers to the realisation of the main objectives of the PTMS. Given the scope and foci of the other criteria, this sub-assessment area does not comprehensively deal with all of the main objectives of the PTMS, but instead confines itself to addressing whether the PTMS has improved transversal oversight and contributed to improved policy implementation.

The following set of graphs present SMS responses in relation to transversal oversight and policy implementation.

Oversight of PSG implementation has improved during the 2014-2019 term in comparison to the 2009-2014 term

PSG	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
PSG1 (n=23)	17%	26%	22%	17%	4%	13%
PSG2 (n=18)	28%	39%	11%			22%
PSG3 (n=19)	32%	26%	11%	11%	5%	16%
PSG4 (n=33)	9%	39%	30%	9%	3%	9%
PSG5 (n=22)	14%	45%	27%		5%	9%

Figure 21. Improvement of oversight of PSG implementation during the 2014-2019 term in comparison to the 2009-2014 term across the PSGs

Figure 21 presents SMS level of agreement on whether there has been improved oversight of the PSG implementation during the 2014-2019 term in comparison to the 2009-2014 term. The responses have been disaggregated across the five PSGs. The highest levels of agreement with the statement are reflected among respondents that serve in PSG 2, where 67% agreed or strongly agreed. This was followed by a total of 59% of the respondents that serve in PSG 5 who agreed that the level of oversight of PSG implementation has improved during the 2014-2019 term in comparison to the 2009-2014 term. In qualitative engagements these improvements in oversight can be credited to the reduced priority focus (from twelve to five PSGs), the increased depth of engagement of HODs on strategic priorities (e.g. game changers and representation on some working groups) and supply of progress reporting.

Staff are accountable for poor performance in relation to Working Group agreed outputs and deliverables (n=115)

Figure 22. Staff are accountable for poor performance in relation to Working Group agreed outputs and deliverables across the PSGs

SMS were further surveyed on their levels of agreement of staff accountability for poor performance in relation to agreed working group outputs and deliverables across the PSGs. Accountability for poor performance is considered indicative of the exercise of oversight. Figure 22 indicates that PSG 2 and 5 reflect the highest levels of agreement with 67% and 55% agreeing (agreed or strongly agreed) respectively. There also appears to be stronger disagreement regarding accountability for poor performance, particularly in PSG 1 (34% disagreed or strongly disagreed) and PSG 4 (30% disagreed or strongly disagreed). This would appear to indicate that oversight for performance could stand to be most improved in PSG 1 and PSG 4, whereas PSG 2 and PSG 5 fare better in this regard.

My department is likely to meet its responsibilities in relation to the PSGs for this term (n=115)

Figure 23. SMS response to their departments' likelihood to meet its responsibilities in relation to the PSGs for this term

Crucially, when looking at whether staff believe they are likely to meet their responsibilities in relation to the PSGs this term, there is near overwhelming agreement among SMS across PSGs, with only PSG 1 and PSG 4 reflecting any

disagreement regarding meeting these responsibilities. This would appear indicative of sufficient oversight to ensure the fulfilment of transversal responsibilities.

Figure 24. SMS level of agreement to their departments likelihood to achieve the targets of the PSG outcomes they contribute to

Taking the question one step further, whether fulfilment of responsibilities is likely to translate into the achievement of the PSG outcome targets they contribute to, Figure 24 highlights again that, across all PSGs, there is mostly agreement that this is the case, while noting approximately 10% of all respondents indicated that achievement of these targets are unlikely and between 9-23% were neutral across the PSGs. The graph reveals that relative to the high levels of confidence and agreement illustrated in Figure 23 on departmental responsibilities, there is a slight inconsistency on responses to the likelihood of departments achieving the targets of the PSG outcomes in Figure 24. One would expect some consistency between levels of agreement on departments achieving their responsibilities and the likelihood to achieve the targets of the PSG outcomes as departmental responsibilities are largely informed by these targets and outcomes in line with posited the intervention theory. However, Figure 24 illustrates a higher proportion of respondents that are neutral, disagree or do not know relative to the responses presented in Figure 23, suggestive that there remains some doubt between what staff do as part of their official responsibilities in relation to the PTMS and the outcomes that are intended to be achieved. Nevertheless, these results bode well for the WCG and suggests that the intended results of the PTMS are likely to be achieved. [9]

However, these survey responses appear to contrast with the MTR 2017 which found that "most outcomes and indicators are long term and will not be realised in the current term of office" (Department of the Premier, 2017: 8). This suggests either a significant improvement in performance or a relaxing of the expectations

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[9] This analysis would further benefit from the hard data on target realisation as a means of corroborating the effectiveness of the PTMS, but it rests outside the scope of this work. This information is considered within the scope of the EOTR 2019 in the other section of the review undertaken internally by the WCG as agreed at the inception phase.

and targets set for the WCG. Based on the qualitative data obtained, it is more likely the latter than a result of a significant improvement in transversal policy implementation and achievement of strategic targets in the term.

One of the explanations for this, and something that arose from the interviews, was that PSG reports to the Cabinet Bosberaad are not the most effective and efficient way to review progress with the implementation of the PSG. The MTR 2017 suggests that the Cabinet Bosberaad should focus on strategic issues and leave the detailed monitoring and review to the Steering Committees and Executive Committees (Department of the Premier, 2017b). Particularly when considering the concerns expressed in focus groups over the manner in which the RAG system was applied and up to the ministerial level (FG65 and FG80), it would appear that effectiveness of the PTMS in this regard has been overstated via the survey response.

This finding resonates with accounts of the reporting burden placed on departments by the PTMS in both of the preceding reviews and among qualitative respondents, particularly those at SMS level. Although all PSP projects were registered on departmental systems or Bizprojects, not all projects have migrated to BizProjects and a number of respondents indicated they do not intend or cannot do so (I46). With over 300 M&E systems in existence in the WCG, it has been a challenge streamlining and making systems compatible, and duplication and waste of resources persist. Among the surveyed respondents of the PTMS, officials have highlighted shortcomings related to BizProjects that detract from the role it was intended to play.

5.1.5 Synthesis

The PTMS has been partly effective in achieving its main objectives of improved transversal oversight and policy implementation on the basis of the data assessed.

Cabinet embarked on the strategic prioritisation of five PSGs in the PSP of 2014-2019, seeking to create the conditions for better strategic management in the WCG. The revised PTMS went beyond vertical management of organisational silos with a deliberate approach to strategy as holistic 'horizontal phenomenon' (Lundqvist, 2014) across the thirteen provincial departments, collectively focused upon five priority goals (PSGs). The reconfigured PTMS has supported the strategically managed implementation of the PSP across the political-strategic, tactical/interpretive and operational levels of public sector (McBain & Smith, 2005). However, the intentions of the PTMS to effectively and efficiently deliver these goals were initially challenged by ambiguities arising from the PTMS SOP, the formulation and name of which is itself at odds with the adaptive approach sought by actors within the PTMS, and the complexity it has sought to manage.

The timeframes for developing the PSP prevented a clear linear sequencing and alignment of the PSP with departmental strategic and annual performance plans. Alignment to national policy imperatives was achieved and demonstrated from the outset, while annual planning cycles have resulted in a process of iterative engagement and incremental enhancements in alignment, consistent with an adaptive management approach (Carey & Matthews, 2016), in this case advanced through the assessment of departmental performance plans and resource prioritisation as part of annual MTEC processes. The PTMS has fulfilled its role as a platform for policy analysis and alignment to national frameworks even while it has encountered tension from departments, some of whose core

business was interpreted as falling outside the scope of the PSP with its emphasis on transversality.

The emphasis on transversality, coupled with the disruptive approach of the game changers and their dedicated technical support in the DSU, gave rise to what became three lines of public service delivery and accountability, each with varying degrees of intersection (or lack thereof) with the PTMS and its governance structures. The lack of clarity regarding the positioning and expression of the game changers in relation to the PTMS in practice created the impression of a closed, exclusive approach, even while the initiatives necessitated working laterally across departments. The effectiveness of the PTMS has been hampered by a lack of coherence, particularly at the operational level, where managers and operational staff have not enjoyed the benefit of lateral platforms and feedback from political-strategic and tactical/interpretive levels, as intended. Nevertheless, the PSP has proved a meaningful strategic document around which to organise interdepartmentally and inform intergovernmental engagements, particularly at local government level.

The PTMS has fallen short of Favoreu et al's (2016) description of collaborative strategic management in that the consultation process around the PSP was focused around Cabinet (as was its prerogative) and high-level stakeholders, even while its formulation was informed by a period of review work and technical input arising from the previous PTMS. This has hindered the extent to which the PSP was viewed collaboratively and owned beyond centralised, high-level role-players at the start of the term. Nevertheless, the PSP has provided a valuable implementation frame for the PTMS and associated governance structures, and given impetus to pursuing more collaborative management practices via WOSA and through intergovernmental partnerships, particularly with local government. The PTMS governance structures were established and operational even while the assumptions of the Theory of Change that the strategic planning process would more directly consider departmental input and align to their planning processes did not hold.

Consistent with the WCG's desire to move away from the linearity of typical bureaucratic structures and institutionalise a level of adaptability and flexibility (Nutt & Backoff, 1993), the PTMS has sought to review and refine planning through periodic feedback and strategic guidance. However, the ability of the WCG to review and respond accordingly has been variable across PSGs, owing in part to a predisposition towards accountability over strategy and problem-solving. The statutory requirements of HODs favour vertical management lines and accounting upward, rather than pragmatic problem-solving of dynamic challenges and the depth of reflection envisioned through a pragmatic complexity approach (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003b). Although the PTMS has made use of the MTR of the PSP to learn from and adapt some aspects of its planning, it has been less successful institutionalising lessons learnt transversally, both because of the vast differences in the kind of lessons and experiences arising from the working groups, as well as the lack of clarity around how these lessons can best inform practice going forward. The adaptive management and learning cycles described by Carey & Matthews (2016) and Glicksman (2011) have not yet been embedded beyond the political-strategic level of the PTMS, and have yet to effectively cascade to the operational level where policy implementation occurs. Thus, while there are strong indications of transversal oversight and perceptions among SMS that most PSG-related responsibilities will be fulfilled and outcome targets achieved, documentary evidence suggests that these estimations of policy implementation are optimistic at best, and unrealistic according to previous reviews.

The PTMS has certainly proved a useful system for providing political-strategic oversight of transversal management and PSG implementation, albeit more effectively in some PSGs than others. There remain considerable differences in both the nature of the reporting, the extent to which staff are accountable for achievements of their deliverables, and the quality of feedback and the oversight of the different PSGs due to the difference in the working group foci and their varying approaches. While this kind of flexibility lends itself to adaptive responses among stakeholders with some agency in the public service, namely at the political-strategic and tactical/interpretive levels, there needs to be a recognition of the competing accountability demands and limitations that implementing staff face. There is a need to better secure their buy-in, understanding and support of transversal work through more consultative, collaborative planning processes. Establishing a foothold among decision-makers provides a foundation from which to further drive institutionalization with better communication and shifts in organizational culture.

DRAFT

5.2 Collaboration

Improvements to political/strategic collaboration and operational collaboration are intended outcomes of the PTMS. In applying a customised evaluation criterion, this section seeks to answer: "Has the PTMS contributed to improved collaboration in the Western Cape Government?"

In terms of unpacking the criterion, the findings address whether the PTMS has improved inter-departmental collaboration, increased collaboration between the different spheres of government, and included external stakeholders in the design, planning, budgeting and implementation of transversal projects and programmes. The collaborative intentions of the PTMS are viewed through the prism of the strategic collaborative management approach proposed by Favoreu, Carassus & Maurel (2016) described in the literature review.

### 5.2.1 Inter-departmental collaboration

Determining whether inter-departmental collaboration has improved under the current PTMS is foundational to assessing collaboration in the WCG. From the previous term into the 2014-2019 term the PSOs and subsequently, the five PSGs, were envisaged as the catalyst to foster this multisectoral collaboration, as they were conceptualised as transversal in nature.

However, in order for effective inter-departmental collaboration to occur, it is only a logical pre-condition that departments within the WCG function effectively themselves, intra-departmentally. Departments which are effective and fulfil their own mandates, are better positioned to be reliable collaborators with other departments when working together on transversal projects and when accountability is shared between different departments. The PTMS and its associated structures benefit from effective intra-departmental collaboration through enabling organisational culture(s) that supports multiple lines of oversight, reporting and monitoring, although this is not an intended outcome of the PTMS. Nevertheless, the PTMS creates formal, vertical structures, which may create opportunities for intra-departmental interactions and lateral engagement. This intra-departmental collaboration is an assumed capability in the Theory of Change, and was mentioned as a pre-requisite by some of the staff members interviewed:

"It's impossible to collaborate if a department is not doing what it is supposed to be doing," (FG70).

"There needs to be an understanding that integration starts at home. You can't work with somebody else if [your own] system isn't working," (I46).

Both qualitative engagements and the survey provide indications that intra-departmental collaboration itself has room for improvement, as per Figure 25 below.

Collaboration levels with departmental staff

Figure 25. Levels of collaboration across departmental staff

Understanding collaboration as occurring across a spectrum beginning with communication, progressing to co-ordination, moving to co-operation and ultimately, achieving collaboration, Figure 25 displays SMS responses to the perceived levels of collaboration of departmental staff within their own department, and staff with other departments. The graph above illustrates that intra-departmentally, 39% of SMS in working groups believe they go beyond co-operation and collaborate with their peers. This drops to 33% among non-WG participants. Staff in working groups agree that co-ordination (25%) or co-operation (20%) with colleagues is a more appropriate description of how they work together. Among Non-WG participants, this is less for co-ordination (11%) but more for co-operation (31%). Perceived levels of intra-departmental collaboration are higher for staff members who serve on working groups, than those who do not serve on working groups. This indicates that participation in working groups appears to be associated with higher levels of intra-departmental collaboration.

When inter-departmental collaboration is considered, a similar distribution of responses follows with working group respondents, although noting that collaboration is considered less common (30%) inter-departmentally, than it is intra-departmentally (39%). However, inter-departmental co-operation increases for both working group respondents (28%) and Non-working group respondents (37%) relative to intra-departmental co-operation. Non-WG participants expressed higher levels of inter-departmental co-operation (37%) compared to working group participants (28%), while they both characterised working with staff in other departments as 'co-ordination' the same amount (22%). These findings indicate that both intra-departmentally and inter-departmentally, working group participants are more likely to characterise their working relationships as 'collaborative'. However, Non-WG participants describe their working relationships intra-departmentally and inter-departmentally as being characterised by 'co-operation' in greater proportions (31% and 37% respectively). This suggests that SMS respondents that do not participate

working groups themselves retain a significant degree of the foundational relations necessary to achieve collaboration across the WCG.

At the political-strategic level, the PTMS encourages collaboration between ministers during the Cabinet Bosberade and when they meet as part of the formal PTMS governance structures. This collaboration is vital for the functioning of the PTMS structures in relation to that PSG, as one minister stated that "if all of the ministers involved in a PSG do not work [well together], the Steering Committee won't work" (I17). And from evidence already presented in Figure 15 in the previous section on effectiveness, this is further confirmed. SMS respondents who agreed or strongly agreed were in the majority in all PSGs. Only a small percentage of respondents in PSG1 (9%) and PSG4 (3%) expressed disagreement regarding ministers working better together.

Similarly, at the tactical/interpretative level, the relationship between HODs who work together in the different PSGs is also crucial to the functioning of the PSG. If the HODs understand the transversal nature of the PTMS and the projects and programmes which are to be implemented, then it is more likely that the PSG will be successful. Figure 17, presented in the previous section on effectiveness, also illustrates that among SMS survey respondents, there is also majority agreement that HODs work better together across departments now compared to the start of the term in all PSGs. The notable difference compared to ministerial work is that the levels of disagreement are much higher, notably for PSG1 (22%) and PSG5 (14%). While this suggests that collaboration has not improved evenly in all cases or across all departments, it clearly indicates that a strong perception that ministers and HODs have improved how they work together over the course of the term in all five PSGs.

Qualitative responses clearly supported the survey findings and provided some explanation:

"[An] element contributing to success is the five HODs in PSG4 and PSG5, because they work well together and there is mutual respect. It was another key ingredient, which meant good leadership and good team work. I consider that to be a key element to [the PSG] succeeding," (I50).

"There are also HODs seeing value of collaborating with HODs and greater value in working together and that realisation is coming from them, and they are kind of taking the lead and I think there the conditions are riper now and to have a better PTMS and better designed PSP," (FG35).

In general, there is clear improvement in the working relationships between HODs during the current term of office. The MTR 2017 also corroborates that "the PTMS is also seen as useful for cooperation among HODs, information sharing and increasing the awareness of work happening in different departments," (Department of the Premier, 2017b: 21).

However, consistent with the findings from the survey, although this collaborative relationship between HODs is important, it does not happen consistently in the different PSGs:

"The conversation [on transversality] is not happening among the government and among HODs" (I9) and "[The PSG] has had a bit of a challenge with communication [between HODs]," (I92).

The political-administrative interface occurs between the HODs and the appointed ministers. As part of the PTMS, this is managed through the Steering Committees and via the Cabinet Bosberade. A respondent affirmed that the relationships between Ministers and HODs are generally positive and supportive of the vertical functioning of the PTMS: "The level of cooperation between the Ministers and the HODs is very good," (I17).

This relationship needs to be carefully maintained, as there was a perception that the ministers may risk overstepping their boundaries and interfere in the administrative and managerial roles of the HODs. Among working group participants, there was nevertheless a sense that working relationships were generally cooperative and their boundaries respected:

"When instructed by the minister, the business as usual is that when there is a ministerial instruction, there is a strong level of cooperation," (FG73).

The level of collaboration between departments through the PTMS governance structure can also be understood in terms of inter-PSG collaboration, as well as how well the different working groups within each of the PSGs work collaboratively.

While collaboration has clearly improved within PSGs, this has not played out in linkages between the PSGs themselves, particularly at the tactical/interpretive level. Respondents highlighted that there is limited information sharing across the PSGs, with only Cabinet and Cabinet Bosberaad serving as the platforms to support this. Qualitative engagements highlighted that if one does not serve in a structure of that PSG, then one does not know or have any insight into what that specific PSG does. This finding was also evident in the MTR 2017, although this is not elaborated upon. This is exemplified in the quotation below:

"one of the weaknesses of those five PSGs [is that they] became a different way of silo-ing and [departments] only looked at their PSG and don't really discuss impacts their PSG has on other PSGs, or what other PSGs impact on their PSG." (FG100)

There are perceptions from staff interviewed that the PSG Steering Committees and working groups are focused on achieving the outcomes of their respective PSGs and do not spend time sharing information across PSGs. Because reporting to the Cabinet Bosberaad is on a PSG and Game Changer basis, there is limited reflection on the PSGs collectively, extracting the common themes and issues for strategic discussion at the Cabinet Bosberaad. Although its role was undefined, this is something that PTM could also be doing that it currently is not.

Cabinet, with the benefit of PTM's strategic vetting, was identified as the platform that should be fulfilling this inter-PSG oversight function in the MTR 2017 and it was acknowledged that this had not occurred as intended (Department of the Premier, 2017d). Additionally, as there are no criteria to identify what can be raised at Cabinet level arising from the PTMS, it becomes particularly difficult for groups within PSGs to know when an issue should be escalated and this affects how the emphasis and depth of strategic engagmeent. An interviewee identified this point in relation to the escalation of issues from PSGs:

"I would say Cabinet is somewhat functional only, because there is a lot of core business that should come to Cabinet but doesn't, because of the silos. We have no criteria [for what can be sent] to Cabinet," (I101).

It becomes apparent, that in order for one PSG to know what another is doing, the lead or executive of that PSG has to take the initiative to find out what is

happening as the structures do not make provision for this type of information sharing. Another respondent explains:

"If you are sitting in PSG1 and you are looking at how to grow the economy and where the blockages are, the engagement with PSG2 is not really there, and you should be engaging with them. To have an economically sound, competitive and growing province, you need to have an education system that is delivering effective education, you need to have a health system that is keeping the population healthy. And so there still seem to be gaps about how we overlap those," (I94).

The evaluation found that collaboration challenges were most acute between the working groups within the PSGs. The different working groups within the PSGs have emerged as streams working in parallel with one another, as opposed to working in a coordinated manner to ensure alignment to achieve outcomes set for the specific PSG under which they have been located. Sequencing, coordinating and managing relationships between the work of the working groups is particularly relevant in terms of the intervention logic supporting the achievement of the outcome areas within each PSG. Interviewees who are involved in working groups reflected on this by noting that unless one serves or represents their department on more than one working group, there is limited information sharing on the work done in other working groups (FG2, I45 and FG73). Lateral information sharing through the PTMS is only designed to occur at the Executive Committee and Steering Committee levels, and not horizontally through the staff who are active in the working groups. This information sharing is therefore limited to HODs and MECs almost exclusively, with only limited sharing within SMS. A respondent confirmed as much in a focus group by stating that: "[information sharing between working groups in a PSG] does [happen] but within a limited scope," (FG76).

Another interviewee stated that, within the working groups, "the feedback mechanism was missing, departments did things on their own but they never fed back into the forum [the working group]," (FG66).

The consequence has been limited knowledge sharing and consequently limited institutional learning about the implementation of transversal projects and programmes beyond those immediately involved. The MTR 2017 found that the current iteration of the PTMS had made significant progress in breaking down silos within the WCG and fostering better coordination between departments on transversal matters, but not yet as a one government. Like the EOTR 2014, the MTR 2017 found that the PTMS was seen as a useful mechanism for fostering cooperation among HODs, sharing information, and getting to know what other departments were doing. However, there was still insufficient communication from the Executive and PTM to the rest of the administration at the formulation stage, particularly as it relates to technical input in relation to the monitoring and evaluation framework. Consultation processes on the PSP were more centralised, and this affected ownership by staff at the lower levels, who are largely the implementers of the projects and programmes (Department of the Premier, 2017b). These findings still ring mostly true based on the primary data obtained. However, interviewees' reflections on the evolution from the PSOs to the current PSGs acknowledged that the current PTMS structure has enabled departments to work together more, whereas previously the twelve PSOs practically operated and mirrored departmental mandates.

5.2.2 Inter-governmental collaboration

Collaboration in the WCG does not only occur between departments. In assessing collaboration, inter-governmental collaboration with local and national government is a critical component to the success of the PSP.

Local government

In December 2015, in pursuit of improved coordination, planning and budgeting, a working group was established to develop the Integrated Work Plan (IWP) to outline a planning and budgeting framework between local and provincial government. The process sought to place an emphasis on integrating provincial and municipal engagements through a joint agreement, review and feedback between provincial and municipal processes. The first attempt at this process was introduced in 2016 which at the time focused on institutionalising integrated management between the province and municipalities. The resulting framework was titled the "*Integrated Work Plan (IWP) for Provincial and Municipal Planning, Budgeting and Implementation in the Western Cape*" (Integrated Management Work Group, 2018). The IWP seeks to align the planning, budgeting and implementation of provincial and local government, for greater service delivery impact within municipalities.

The IWP, through its use of an integrated management approach, seeks to contribute to the optimal use of resources and avoid duplication of services within the province by integrating the work of local and provincial spheres of government within a common systemic framework. It also aims to facilitate interaction between the WCG and national departments on national government competencies that impact service delivery in municipalities within the province. The development was a collaborative process that included officials from both the WCG and municipalities, and the IWP was approved by PTM and Municipal Managers respectively (Integrated Management Work Group, 2018).

The IWP was further refined in 2017, building on the 2016 iteration that identified four key strategic areas that form the foundation for integration between the WCG and municipalities, namely; planning, budgeting, implementation and performance against set targets, and governance. See the example excerpt of the IWP planning, budgeting and reporting cycles across local, provincial and national government in Table 10, noting in particular the "Joint Integrated" row with a series of annual engagements between local and provincial government.

The Integrated Implementation Plan (IIP) for Provincial and Municipal Planning, Budgeting and Implementation in the Western Cape (2018/19) and the IWP are outputs of the Integrated Planning, Policy and Delivery/Integrated Management Work Group, so represent an output of the PTMS.

The IIP is an annual plan that outlines the approach, processes and activities required, as well as stakeholders to be involved in executing the IWP. As it is an annual plan, it takes into account the prevailing context at the time of the planning and seeks to use the latest understanding of the current context to inform the integrated planning decisions.

Table 10: Integrated Workplan 2018/19 (Integrated Management Work Group, 2018)

The Integrated Workplan 2018/19

Sphere	Quarter	1			2			3			4		
	Month	July	August	September	October	November	December	January	February	March	April	May	June
Municipal	Previous FY		Submission of AFS to AG			Audit Outcomes released		Tabling of Annual Report (AR)		Adoption of AR			
	Current FY	s71 report	s71 report	s71 report	s71 report	s71 report	s71 report	S72 report	1) Adjusted Budget 2) s71 Report	s71 report	s71 report	s71 report	s71 report
	New FY		Schedule of key deadlines & IDP Process Plans							Tabling of Municipal IDPs & Budgets	Public Participation	Adoption of Municipal IDP & Budget	Approval of SDBIP
Joint/ Integrated			Integrated Project Alignment Engagement	Joint Public Participation	Strategic Integrated Municipal Engagements				Technical Integrated Municipal Engagements		Strategic Integrated Municipal Budgeting Engagements (incl. draft IDP & draft Budget Assessment Engagements)		
Provincial		Provincial Strategic Planning Engagement	1st Draft Budgets, Strategic Plans & APPs	Release of Provincial Development Planning Intelligence, MERO & PERO	PGMTEC 1	MTBPS & Adjustment Estimates	2nd Draft Budgets, SPs & APPs	PGMTEC 2		Tabling of Provincial Budget			
National					MTBPS & Adjustment Estimates				Tabling of National Budget				
Sphere	Month	July	August	September	October	November	December	January	February	March	April	May	June
	Quarter				3			4			1		

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Observations about the IWP and IIP

The Integrated Management approach as reflected in the IWP and IIP takes the form of structured engagements between the WCG and municipalities in the province, most of which are already part of the annual planning cycle owing to the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IGRFA). Furthermore, these engagements are informed by the latest available intelligence and evidence to inform deliberations and decision-making. The IWP is primarily concerned with the alignment of planning, budgeting and implementation within a geographical space (municipality), and therefore incorporates a spatial dimension (alignment to the Municipal Spatial Development Framework and the Provincial Spatial Development Framework).

The entity (either provincial or municipal) which leads the particular engagement depends on the nature of the engagement. This suggests a more collaborative approach than would be the case if all engagements were led by the WCG. There are indications of joint efforts – in the analysis of intelligence and evidence, joint learning, joint assessments of projects/programmes, among others. The engagements, in particular, the Strategic Integrated Municipal Engagement and the Integrated Project Alignment Engagement in Table 10, involve transversal adjustments to Provincial and Municipal plans in a particular geographic area. In this way, the province and the municipalities adjust their plans in order to ensure that there is alignment between the different spheres of government. It is through this process that the PSP and the PSGs find expression in the plans of the municipalities, as confirmed later in this section in Figure 27. The extent to which this process affects and informs departmental APPs is unclear, although the intention is clear for the benefit of mutual co-ordination.

The IWP and IIP have the stated intention of a WOSA approach, seeking to involve and partner with non-state actors (civil society and the private sector), particularly through the public participation engagements led by municipalities, which coincide with their IDP processes. Here the support of the Western Cape's Economic Development Partnership (EDP) to the province and municipalities has proved a beneficial addition (I35).

The IWP primarily concerns the WCG and the municipalities which fall within the province. Although there is stated intention and recognition about the potential of the IWP as a vehicle for the integration and alignment of provincial and municipal plans with national departments that have a service delivery function, the evaluation has not assessed the extent to which this is taking place in the IWP process.

Inter-governmental collaboration

Figure 26 presents the SMS perception of their departments' level of collaboration with local government, presented for both staff who serve on working groups and those that do not. This disaggregation reveals that respondents share similar perspectives on perceived collaboration levels with local government, whether directly involved in PTMS structures or not. There is a slight (4%) difference between the collaboration levels, with staff who do not serve in working groups reporting both higher levels of co-operation and collaboration. The major difference expressed is on the level of coordination, where 24% of SMS serving in working groups indicated that their department coordinates with local government in terms of transversal programme implementation whereas only 15% of those that do not serve in working groups indicated that there is

coordination with local government. This finding would suggest that the benefits of inter-governmental collaboration at municipal level are not necessarily the credit of the PTMS' alone.

Collaboration levels with local government

Figure 26. SMS Levels of collaboration with local government

Qualitative engagements with respondents across the various departments suggest that the relationship with municipalities has improved during the current government term. Joint planning initiatives established through the IWP and leveraging the structures of the IGRFA have been noted as playing a key role in improving this relationship. Respondents (I98, FG53 and I29) have further referred to unintended benefits including 'speed dating and meet and greet' sessions between the MECs and Mayors which took place on 28 November 2016 and has reportedly fostered an informal relationship (which did not exist prior) where the mayors and the MECs can contact each other to discuss issues.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements:
(n=18)

Figure 27. The municipal perspective on the interface of the municipal and the provincial strategic and planning processes

16 of the 18 municipalities surveyed indicated that the PSP serves as a meaningful strategic document and that it informs the municipal IDP. 16 of the municipalities also strongly agree or agree with the statement that the municipal planning and budgeting is informed by the PSGs, a testament to the communication and exchange of information through platforms set out in the IWP. However, at the operational level, provincial working group implementation plans do not enjoy the same salience. The implication of the responses is that the PSP relates better to the municipalities at the political-strategic, rather than the operational level, even while there are operational relationships in place.

While the IWP attempted to create a connection and link between planning, budgeting and implementation of municipalities and the WCG, local government and provincial government are bound by different planning prescripts. Despite improvements, there are still areas of disjuncture between the provincial and municipal planning processes. In particular, joint planning and budgeting between the province and municipalities is an area of potential improvement. As part of the IWP, there is a focus on streamlining and restricting the current IDP, Mid-year, MGRO and LG MTEC engagements (Integrated Management Work Group, 2018).

The IDPs of municipalities are intended to align with higher order national and provincial plans and strategies. Figure 28 below reveals that 12 of the 18 municipalities surveyed either strongly agree or agree that their IDP and the PSP share common outcome intention statements. Half of the municipalities surveyed stated that they strongly agree or agree with the statement that they are contributing towards the achievement of the outcome indicator targets that the province is intending to achieve.

How well or poorly does the latest update of your Integrated Development Plan align with the Provincial Strategic Plan 2014-2019 in terms of: (n=18)

Figure 28. Municipalities' perspective of the alignment of their IDP with the PSP 2014-2019

Figure 28 reveals that half of the municipalities claimed the latest update of their IDP to reflect their responsibilities for jointly implemented programmes with the province very well or well. Half of the municipalities also indicated that their IDP reflects the shared programme budgeting responsibilities. However, five of the municipalities perceived the alignment of their IDP with the PSP in terms of shared programme budgeting responsibilities to be either poor, very poor, or they did not know. Even at a project specific level, the implementation of provincial projects and programmes may not involve all of the stakeholders as efficiently as possible. A local government stakeholder involved with the Conradie Hospital Site stated that there are very low levels of engagement with local government on this project. Due to this, it is largely being developed outside of their planning and budgeting cycles, which leads to delays and the external stakeholders feeling like an "impediment" (I55) to the development at times.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements: (n=18)

Figure 29. Municipalities' perspective on the extent to which the WCG facilitates opportunities for interactions between provincial and local government

The municipalities surveyed also indicated that the WCG facilitates opportunities for municipalities to work with it to plan (13 agree), budget (14 agree) and implement (11 agree) projects with the WCG. Municipalities largely strongly agree or agree with the statements that the WCG facilitates interactions, data sharing, and shared programme budgeting and planning between provincial and local government. These findings indicate that there are some successes which are emerging consistent with the intentions of the IWP.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements: (n=18)

Figure 30. Municipalities' perspective on the shared implementation arrangements between WCG and local government

15 local municipalities either strongly agree or agree with the statement that that there is some shared implementation between the WCG and local municipalities, with 16 municipalities either agreeing strongly with, or agreeing with the statement that the staff from WCG work closely with the staff from the local municipality to implement transversal programmes and projects. 11 responding municipalities agree that the feedback received from the WCG assists with their understanding of what works and what does not work. Only one municipality indicated that it does not implement any projects jointly with staff from the WCG. Two municipalities suggest that they are not benefitting from lessons learnt working with the WCG during this term.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements: (n=18)

**Figure 31. Municipalities' perspective on whether or not there is value derived from working with WCG and their understanding of what works and what does not**

11 municipalities either strongly agree or agree with the statement that the WCG convened meetings that are beneficial to creating a better understanding of how to implement projects which require intergovernmental coordination. Similarly, 11 of the municipalities agree with the statement that the feedback received from the WCG on intergovernmental programme and project implementation has improved their understanding of what works and what does not. Ten municipalities either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement that their municipality is not benefitting from working with the WCG in this term, which suggests that the intergovernmental projects and programmes which are currently being implemented are valued by the municipalities in which they are being implemented.

Collaboration levels between municipal staff and provincial government (n=18)

| No communication | Communication | Co-ordination |
| Co-operation | Collaboration | Not applicable |

Figure 32. Collaboration levels between municipalities and provincial government staff

Seven of the municipalities characterise their interactions with provincial government as collaboration which is the highest level possible for interactions. Six of the municipalities rate the interactions as co-operation, the next closest level on a collaborative scale. In contrast, recall in Figure 26, that 25% of staff in working groups regard their interactions with local government as collaboration (29% for non-working groups) and 24% regard this as communication (15% for those not in a working group). This indicates that the select local government respondents have a higher perceived level of collaboration with provincial government than individual SMS.

Several respondents in the WCG cited the tension between the City of Cape Town and the WCG as one of the factors that have affected the WCG's level of collaboration with the Metro, which is a weakness in an otherwise positive picture of the WCG's work with local government. It should be noted that the City of Cape Town represents a strategic partner owing to its disproportionate contribution to the province's population and economy, and thus enjoys a focus in terms of PSG project implementation and the results intended to be achieved within its municipal area. The Metro stands out among the local government stakeholders for the challenges experienced in the working relationship and project implementation between them. Respondents (I91, I20 and I96) have suggested that the recent change in the political leadership of the Metro may see an improvement in the relationship between the WCG and the Metro, and better collaboration going forward.

National government

The PTMS was envisioned as a model that would facilitate co-operative governance across the three spheres of government. Figure 33 below displays SMS's responses to the perceived level of collaboration with national government in terms of transversal implementation. There is a discernible difference between the levels of collaboration scored by both SMS serving in working groups (20%) and those who are not (28%). It is also worth recalling Figure 26 where collaboration levels across the spectrum are generally higher compared to that of national government.

Collaboration levels with national government

Figure 33. Collaboration levels with national government

Based on the qualitative engagements, the intergovernmental relations with national government varied by department. While some departments expressed a relatively stable relationship with their national counterpart, the majority of the provincial departments reflected on the strained relationship with national departments. Problems identified include claims of limited administrative competency in the national department, unstable relationships with the national department, and in some cases political misalignment between provincial and national departments. The following quote captures the sentiment:

"Nationally there are major hindrances. Some departments are worse than others," (I12).

One respondent's description of the relationship bordered on hyperbole, but can be contrasted with a more specific reflection:

"Our national departments are in chaos, which makes it challenging for joint delivery and focus," (I106).

"There are good relationships on an administration level but on a political level we could improve. We work with DWS and DCOG, and because of the recent drought we had to work with DWS. They are not organised," (I24).

Further challenges identified included the high staff turnover rate which has been cited as a key challenge which limits the continuity of projects and programmes. Of particular concern is the turnover of national ministers and Directors-General.

While there are also IGRFA designated structures between national and provincial government, these appear to be used far less effectively by national government and the province with regards to the PTMS structures.

The MTR (2017b) found that, where there is policy convergence between national government and the WCG, this creates an opportunity for improved collaboration between the different spheres. However, policy convergence did not guarantee collaboration, as there were reportedly instances (I94, I9 and I17) where the WCG was unable to obtain support from the national government or SOEs. This despite the policy alignment between national and provincial provided for and achieved via the PTMS, suggesting breakdowns in leadership at the political-strategic level.

On the evidence available, the PTMS has neither directly contributed to nor facilitated improved inter-governmental relations with national government, even while it has played its primary function of being a platform for analysis and interpretation. The underlying assumption of the Theory of Change that the political environment is conducive to such collaboration should be borne in mind in light of the role that strategic leadership could play.

5.2.3 External partnerships

The extent to which cross-sector partnerships and partnering solutions with business, civil society and academia have been built is another important area of collaboration under assessment.

The EOTR (2014) was critical about the WCG paying lip service to WOSA, and the MTR 2017 was equally critical. Of the nearly 400 Working Group participants identified in the course of this evaluation, only 35 individual respondents were identified outside of the thirteen provincial departments. Less than 1 in 10 working group participants is external to the provincial departments, and the majority of those are from local government or state entities. This is not an indication of the quality of partnerships that exist, but certainly participation within the structures around which tactical and operational decisions and planning occurs is a leading indicator of meaningful buy-in and ownership, particularly in terms of a collaborative strategic management approach. Without adequate consultation, getting external partners to buy into the PSP and participate in the PTMS is a challenge. The MTR (2017b: 17) raised the important point that the WCG would need to demonstrate a deep commitment to working collaboratively with others – "The WCG must hear and be heard".

Collaboration levels with external stakeholders

Figure 34. SMS levels of collaboration with external stakeholders

Figure 34 shows the WCG's perceived level of collaboration with external stakeholders. Similar to the collaboration levels in Figure 29, SMS from outside of working groups characterised their relationships with business stakeholders, academia and civil society all as more collaborative than working group participants. The same applies to co-operation, with academia being the only exception. This is a particularly interesting group of findings because it would seem to suggest that working groups, and by extension the PTMS, do not serve as the primary interface for external partnerships.

The qualitative engagements which were conducted as a component of this evaluation, provide a description of a relatively functional relationship with external stakeholders. The WCG's relationship with the EDP has been commonly cited as a key partnership that has facilitated improved interaction and engagements with external stakeholders. An additional benefit that has been cited from the positive relationship with the EDP is that the partnership has assisted the WCG in getting a better understanding of the power dynamics between government and external stakeholders. Cognisance of these power dynamics allows government to collaborate better with the public through their partnership with EDP. The quotes below capture this sentiment:

 "There is always conflict in the relationship between the government and the people due to differential power dynamics, EDP knows this best and use it for engagement … this creates joint research and creates cooperative, not competitive governance," (I14).

"in terms of this [current term of the] WCG and [their relationship with] external stakeholders, [it] is phenomenal and when the EDP sits here we view them as an equal partner," (FG113).

Instances of collaboration seem to occur largely between the individual departments themselves and external stakeholders. These partnerships appear to have been developed through the department's implementation of its core mandate in conjunction with local government and external stakeholders. When questioned about the nature of these partnerships, the departments referred to a range of external stakeholders (I60, I99 and I38), and referenced a variety of approaches, including; direct collaborative approaches, signed agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU).

A few challenges have been raised with regard to external stakeholder collaboration and partnerships. The first is the difficulty associated with aligning varying external stakeholder interests and provincial government priorities. Secondly, the compliance and requirements associated with the procurement and supply chain processes have additionally been cited as a key barrier to securing and establishing partnerships with external stakeholders (I43).

Thirdly, the WCG does not have a common approach to their interactions with external stakeholders. The approach to relationships with external stakeholders, although relatively functional, is inconsistent and varies across the different departments and PSGs and tends to be contextually driven. The absence of any common platform or database listing the external stakeholders that the province has previously worked or currently engages with further hampers understanding and insights in this regard.

Eleven of the 35 possible external respondents participated in an electronic survey regarding their work with the WCG.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements:
(n=10)

Figure 35. External stakeholders' perspective on the opportunities provided to them to interact meaningfully with the WCG

Five external stakeholders agree with the statement that the WCG provides opportunities for external stakeholders to work with the WCG for planning purposes. This figure decreases to one when asked the same question about the opportunity to interact regarding budgeting, which is appropriate considering the

potential conflict of interest that could arise, particularly in the case of business. Seven stakeholders either strongly agree or agree with the statement that the WCG facilitates opportunities for external stakeholders to be involved in the implementation of programmes and projects. Eight external stakeholders either strongly agree or agree with the statement that the WCG facilitates opportunities to draw on the expertise of external stakeholders. This is consistent with qualitative engagements whereby respondents expressed an appreciation for the recognition they were given for their expertise, while noting differences in time management in the public sector.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements:
(n=10)

Figure 36. External stakeholders' perspective on their involvement in the working groups and the learning made in these interactions

External stakeholders interact with the PTMS in the working groups and seem to derive benefit from their participation in these working groups. Five external stakeholders either strongly agree or agree with the statement that the they have developed a better understanding of how to implement transversal programmes and projects from their involvement with the WCG. Five external stakeholders agree with the statement that progress reports from the Working Groups have improved their understanding of what works and what does not work. Seven external stakeholders state that they believe the Working Groups have benefitted from their involvement therein.

The MTR presented at the 2017 February Bosberaad found that the lack of external buy-in and ownership adversely affects the implementation of the PSP and game changers (Department of the Premier, 2017d). The review further found that the WCG and PTMS have not leveraged external resources and partnerships and that the model is still too internally focused, which contradicts the WOSA. Some sectors are better engaged than others, with a particularly fraught relationship noted with civil society (FG117). But despite this acknowledgement, there has been a lack of leadership giving direction on this:

"Cabinet has remained fairly ambiguous about how it wants to interact with the public. There hasn't been a strong drive from politicians to engage with the

public. WOSA recognises that they need everyone else to be on the journey with them, and that this had to be managed from bottom up," (FG81).

The external government stakeholders state that it is easy to agree to collaborate with WCG around something such as the PSP in principle, as it is a sound and reasonable document, but the collaboration around actual projects becomes more challenging due to the different planning cycles and priorities. Nevertheless, external stakeholders did acknowledge that there is value in the partnerships that have been fostered with the WCG:

"One of the important things is that [WCG has] extremely knowledgeable people and a professional approach," (I39).

External stakeholders echoed the sentiments of WCG SMS regarding the number of meetings that have to be attended as part of the PTMS. Due to the number of meetings, external stakeholders are reluctant to participate and attend all meetings. This also resonates with WCG staff members, who have also raised the excessive meetings as problematic (which will be discussed in further detail in Section 5.3). Lack of trust also emerged as a deterrent from doing work with government stakeholders:

"Part of the challenge with government is that their ability to trust other partners and the process is often not as strong as it should be, and I think it is with good reason too, there's a lot of corruption going on, there's a lot of let down and there's a lot of fudging going on… [Government] will speak to NGOs they've always spoken to and civil society groups they've always spoken to, that is their safe space. They won't go where it is deeply uncomfortable for them to be, to engage there," (I42).

One of the key thrusts which emerged from the qualitative engagements was that, in order to partner across the whole of government, partnering must 'begin at home', within departments and the working groups, within PSGs, and within the WCG. Once these relationships have been developed, the relationships with external stakeholders can be built and sustained.

WOSA

The WCG is promoting a whole of government approach to achieving the objectives set out in the PSP. WOSA emerged from the implementing service delivery programme, which became Better Spaces, which ultimately formed a working group under PSG3. The Department of Health is largely the driving force behind WOSA, partly due to the World Health Organisation's acknowledgement of the interrelationships between health outcomes and society, and their use of the term "Whole-of-Society Approach" . There are pilot sites for WCG-led WOSA activities, Saldanha (reportedly the most advanced of the sites), Drakenstein, Manenberg, Hanover Park and Khayelitsha, and the importance of the relationship with the City of Cape Town reflects in that three of the five pilot areas necessitate a strong working relationship with the metro. These municipalities and sites have been specifically selected, as the municipalities have a level of capacity which will be able to complement the WCG's activities in that municipality. One focus group pointed out:

"[The WCG] can't work in a municipality which is dysfunctional," (FG70).

Although this was not investigated at depth, the implementation of the WOSA approach has been described as effective in these sites by working group respondents, as the WCG has adopted a slow and methodical implementation in these sites (FG6). WOSA is a governance and management approach, and not a

project or programme. As an important principle informing this approach, the following advice was given in terms of sequencing WOSA engagements:

"Before you do anything, approach the municipality to see if they are interested, then; First get WCG to talk to each other, across 13 departments before entering the municipality. Second is the Whole of Government, where the Municipality and the WCG starts to work together (then including SAPS, national, etc.) Third is WoSA, getting business and communities together with the whole of government," (FG6).

The location of WOSA as a working group driving what was introduced as a WCG approach in the PSP, raises questions and confuses some stakeholders. Its location in PSG3, and not PSG5, which was conceptualised as serving as a cross-cutting transversal support pillar across PSGs 1-4, compounds the questions related to whether it is actually intended to be a WCG approach. There are acknowledged processes in place to align the activities of other working groups and the WOSA work group, but this remains an area in need of clarity.

The WCG's adoption of WOSA, where the conceptualisation of WOSA is still in its formative phase, is a process best applied systematically. The conceptual framework, with its associated implementation plan and change management processes, has implications across government to ensure buy-in from all levels of staff.

5.2.4 Synthesis

Over the course of this term inter-departmental collaboration in the WCG has improved at the political-strategic and tactical/interpretive levels of transversal management, even while noting operational collaboration is uneven and has further room for improvement. By leveraging existing intergovernmental structures, particularly at the local government level, the PTMS has built a strong platform for collaboration among decision-makers at the political-administrative interface across the sub-national spheres of government.

The PTMS was designed to compel inter-departmental collaboration and ensure effective transversal programme implementation for the realisation of the PSP, to serve as a coordinating mechanism among the thirteen provincial departments. At the political-strategic and tactical/interpretive levels of transversal management, collaboration is strongest among Ministers and HODs-the role-players with the most agency and platforms available to them for lateral engagement. Ministers and HODs are generally working well together and collaborating towards shared outcomes via structures such as Cabinet Bosberaad and Steering Committees, even while the content and subject of those engagements could times be more strategic. However, the extent to which strategic leadership (Gumede & Dipholo, 2014) has been exercised to vertically transmit this approach to transversal work to the operational level, where staff have more circumscribed and narrow implementation responsibilities, is lacking. This is consistent with the findings on effectiveness. It is at the operational level where collaboration is weakest between departments and this has implications for the PTMS' ability to implement transversal policy. There is variability in departmental experiences due to the differences within departments, within the PSGs and with regards to the role of the lead departments. Although there is evidence of improved inter-departmental collaboration compared to the previous term, pre-existing intra-departmental conditions conducive to collaboration remain a key determinant of whether this can be sustained and the PTMS has made no provision for addressing this. This is as much an issue of organisational culture and communication within departments and the WCG as it is an outcome of the PTMS.

The current iteration of the PTMS is particularly focused on inter-governmental collaboration. Relationships with local government are strong with regards to the integration of planning processes and have benefitted from effective use of the structures of the IGRFA for communication, co-ordination, and co-operation at the political-strategic and tactical/interpretive levels. There is evidence of positive inter-governmental relations between provincial and local government with municipalities well-aligned to the strategic intentions of the PSP and positive about the co-operative relationship that exists. This assumption of the Theory of Change holds at the level of local government more generally. However, the relationship with national government is strained where it exists, and where it does not exist, policies are nevertheless aligned and implemented despite the limitations of national government support. This tends to result in a vertical flow of 'aligned' policy influence where the WCG has not seen the benefit of improved relations or support for its provincial initiatives, particularly with regards to SOEs. Thus, there is both the scope and need for WCG role-players to adapt pragmatically to the context and exercise upward leadership, insofar as possible, to understand and remedy the working relationships to build co-operative and collaborative partnerships in support of the strategic intentions of the province.

One of the main differences between the inter-governmental relations at local and national level is that the WCG has made effective use of the IGRFA structures already in place to improve communication and co-ordination in support of its provincial strategic agenda, to draw-in local government actors in a co-operative manner. This reflects in mostly positive accounts of collaborative partnership between local government and the WCG, notwithstanding some of the challenges with the City of Cape Town, which carry a disproportionate risk to the effectiveness of the realisation of the PSGs. This contrasts with the national platforms where relations are less constructive and stagnant, even while the WCG has accepted its role in delivering upon national policy imperatives.

The PSP was ambitious in its adoption of a WOSA involving external stakeholders to crowd-in, leverage and work with the WCG as part of the PTMS. While the working groups were intended to be one platform through which this occurs, participation and representation within the PTMS leaves much to be desired if the intentions of the PSP are to be realized. There is little evidence that the working groups provide a platform for meaningful external partnership, with "external" representation mostly comprised of actors from local government and state entities. When considered with the finding that SMS who do not participate in PTMS structures described more or equally collaborative relationships across a range of external stakeholders compared with those who do, this reinforces that the PTMS is not the most appropriate platform for managing external partnerships or collaboration. Within the PTMS, there appears to be little emphasis on the inclusion of civil society, academia and business stakeholders meaningfully, even while those external stakeholders who do participate acknowledge the efforts of the WCG to involve them. The lack of representation and emphasis on the involvement of these stakeholders via PTMS platforms is inconsistent with the WOSA approach adopted in the PSP. The involvement of the EDP has provided conceptual leadership on the partnership process, and has facilitated useful relationships supportive of the transversal implementation of some projects and programmes, although less so through PTMS structures.

It is telling that WCG staff who do not participate in working groups have a more positive view of collaboration with external stakeholders. This highlights the shortcoming of PSP development in terms of consultation and collaborative strategic management. This can be contrasted with the otherwise embedded, but not necessarily better integrated or more strategic approach, of SMS who partner

and collaborate in the course of executing their departmental mandates, outside the immediate purview of the PTMS. Most departmental actors surveyed already have relationships with external stakeholders as part of executing their core business and these relations have arisen over time and from necessity, rather than as part of a concerted effort related to improved transversal management. If the PTMS exists to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of the PSP, it needs to more appropriately draw on and leverage the existing relationships and work of departments through which historic, nascent and pre-existing relationships can then buy into, own and collaborate towards the achievement of the PSGs. While the work with local government has the benefit of more concentrated and prescribed platforms through which to co-ordinate these partnerships, external actors will inevitably be more diffuse and idiosyncratic, necessitating more contextual-informed and adaptive engagement.

The pooling of ideas, resources, and knowledge is seen to play a major role in developing external stakeholder relationships and collaboration according to Favoreu (2016); however, what has emerged from the findings is that, given some of the challenges the PTMS faces in terms of the efficient allocation of resources to transversal initiatives (see Efficiency findings), they may not be the best starting points from which to build these relationships. Unless PTMS structures play more of a coordinating role (Hansel at al. 2013) when it comes to relationships with external stakeholders from the outset, these collaborative intentions with external stakeholders will be better served through pre-existing platforms and relationships.

Considering the challenges and variability of experience across stakeholders, the PTMS is more in a state of co-ordination and co-operation than collaboration. It is still establishing functional co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms with external actors and national government, where it has more co-operative and collaborative elements at the political-strategic level with local government. However, within the WCG co-operation and collaboration have yet to filter through departments and working groups adequately at the operational level.

DRAFT

5.3   **Efficiency**

For the criterion of efficiency, the PTMS is assessed in terms of the extent to which the WCG has created an enabling environment for the efficient implementation of the PTMS. This criterion is reflected in terms of KEQ3. Has the WCG created an enabling environment for the efficient implementation of the PTMS?

This evaluation question and criterion is then addressed through sub-assessment areas that unpack the criterion. The first sub-assessment area sets out the functionality of key components of the PTMS system, building on the findings of Section 5.1.2 Key outputs. The capability of the WCG is then assessed in terms of the extent to which it possesses the requisite cultural, talent and functional capacity. The next sub-assessment area looks at the tools and innovations supportive of the PTMS. This is followed by a distillation of the lessons learnt from the successes and weaknesses of the PTMS. The efficiency findings then conclude with a synthesis of the findings in relation to KEQ3.

5.3.1   System functionality

The PTMS is comprised of constituent structures, actors, processes and responsibilities that are expected to work together seamlessly in order to ensure the efficient implementation of the PTMS towards the realisation of the PSP. Thus, identifying which components of the system are functioning well and which are not, and under which circumstances, assists in this determination.

One of the first design features of the PTMS 2014-2019 that contributed to improved system functionality compared to the previous term was the reduction of PSOs into five PSGs, and the clear alignment of the PTMS to each PSG. This has contributed to a more enabling environment for transversality by setting a manageable focus and compelling interdepartmental relations by grouping multiple departments together. The potential benefit of this design shift was highlighted in the EOTR 2014, affirmed by various respondents (I105, I101 and I100) has been set out in the preceding findings.

The PTMS SOP for the term introduced five governance structures which are central to the operation and functionality of the PTMS (Department of the Premier, 2015a). As mentioned earlier, in Section 5.1.2 (effectiveness findings on outputs), all the levels of PTMS governance structures conceptualised in the SOP have been established and are operational as per the output. Further, structures at all levels meet periodically, although there is considerable variability in terms of functionality at the lowest level in the 26 working groups.

The conceptualisation and illustration of these governance structures on the PTMS SOP diagram assumes a natural cascading of decisions and information from the political-strategic level (Cabinet and Steering Committees) to the operational implementation level (Executive Committees and working groups), noting that each structure has its own unique mandate, role, functions and responsibilities. The effectiveness of the PTMS as a whole is therefore largely dependent on information flowing up into the system and decisions cascading between the two levels. However, the extent to which this has occurred efficiently in practice has varied. The 2017 internal audit notes the SOP's silence on reporting requirements and the flow of information between the different governance structures as an area in need of attention (Department of the Premier, 2017a). This is inclusive of the game changers and is considered necessary to ensure that there is accurate and timely reporting and that this feeds into decision-making.

A respondent states "the biggest challenge is communication down to the lowest level, [it] might happen strategically, but how does it filter down? Especially in bigger departments," (FG4).

The strongest criticism of the PTMS advanced by respondents (FG112, FG77 and I44) of upper structures has been the intense focus on monitoring and reporting, leaving limited time to discuss and reflect on the strategic impact and effectiveness of the PTMS and transversal initiatives in line with the intentions of the PSP. Thus, the implication is that in an effort to account and secure efficient processing of everything within the ambit of the PTMS working groups, the opportunity to give effective responses as part of the governance function may be jeopardised.

Cabinet and Cabinet Bosberaad

Cabinet is expected to provide political direction and is the nucleus of policy decision-making in the WGC as a whole. Cabinet's responsibility for the PTMS has flowed from its own decisions around the PSP and the setting of PSGs, game changers and their formulation in relation to roles and responsibilities for line ministries. While Cabinet has generally been functional across the term, with Ministers self-rating it as functional or high-functioning in qualitative engagements, it did come in for some critique for insufficient time on Cabinet's agenda to reflect on the feedback presented by Steering Committees on the PSGs. In addition, there are no clear criteria on what is presented to cabinet. "There is not enough agenda time of the Cabinet to reflect on the feedback from the Steering Committees. This only happens three times a year at the Bosberaad. This is a major weakness/failure of the PTMS," (I14). Despite this limited critique, it has been functional with regards to its PTMS role, if not initially efficient, considering the timeframes for adopting and publishing the PSP concurrent to other planning processes.

In addition to Cabinet meetings, the Cabinet Bosberaad functions as an extended Cabinet engagement inclusive of departmental HODs and is meant to integrate and coordinate strategic engagements to produce directives that guide transversal implementation. The purpose of Cabinet Bosberaad is to ensure synergy and relevant co-ordination and alignment in terms of policy application and the tactical rollout of transversal programme plans (Department of the Premier, 2015a).

One weakness is that PSG reports are presented at the Bosberaad as part of reviewing progress on the implementation of the PSP; this however is not the most effective use of the time. Bosberaads, as per the SOP, are intended to function as strategic nodal points, so the reporting back type of approach that the Bosberaad has taken in practice has been utilised as a mechanistic monitoring and reporting structure. Respondents identified the Cabinet Bosberaad as a potential symposium type of platform that was intended to provide time and space for reflective oversight on the PSGs, but this not been realised in practice, as the following quote reflects:

"The Bosberaad looks at what are we doing, are we on target, as opposed to taking a step back and looking at whether there is room for something else. The Bosberaad could be more reflective," (I9).

Therefore, while Cabinet is active and functional in terms of regular meetings for processing PTMS related reporting and presentations, the structure's functioning in relation to strategic reflection could be improved. This finding resonates with the 2017 internal audit finding that there is no transversal content sharing at the

Bosberaad on the implementation of the PSP. This lack of transversal information and content sharing means that Cabinet has limited insight or a holistic view on the implementation of programmes and projects across the five PSGs, transversal challenges and lessons learned outside of what is presented to it (Department of the Premier, 2017a).

Steering Committees

Five Steering Committees have been established in relation to each of the five PSGs and are responsible for referring matters to relevant working groups. The structure has been used as a platform to ensure that political principals are up to date with the operations of the PSG at a working group level so that they can provide strategic guidance where necessary. In most instances, these committees were rated as functional or high-functioning by the executive, with some notable exceptions related to PSG 2 and PSG3 where motivations for partial functionality indicated these Steering Committees could be doing more in the way of facilitating an enabling environment for transversal collaboration between departments.

An interviewee states "it is still very much a department driven approach rather than a collective approach. It's not debated because of the way budget allocations work and they drive the delivery," (I12).

As captured in Section 5.1.4 on Responsiveness, the feedback required from the Steering Committees to the working groups has reportedly been insufficient in some cases. In cases where feedback has been provided, the process is described as more of a tick box exercise where BizProjects' RAG system is used as a monitoring tool to check whether projects are on track as opposed to whether working groups are making progress towards the overarching PSGs and outcome targets (FG1, FG78 and FG111). One of the weaknesses of the Steering Committee structure has therefore also been the amount of time spent on reporting up from the working groups according to templates compared to the amount of feedback and strategic direction that has been provided in this regard.

The Steering Committees have generally been regarded as a key structure in the PTMS in terms of landing information from the operational level at the political-strategic level of decision-making and evidence suggests they've been relatively efficient in this regard, while acknowledging that there are still challenges with the kind of performance information (or lack thereof) that is available to be shared. However, this efficiency may be at the expense of the effectiveness as it has led to more time on processing reporting, rather than reflecting on its implications.

Executive Committees

Executive Committees are appointed by Steering Committees and comprise of the relevant HODs in the same arrangement to that of Steering Committees. The difference is that Executive Committees operate across the political-strategic level and take tactical/interpretive decisions that are implemented at the operational level where HODs serve as the accounting officers for departments. Executive Committees are responsible for establishing working groups as deemed necessary by the directive of Steering Committees. By October 2015 the working groups were established and activated (Department of the Premier, 2015c) by HODs across all PSGs. However, part of the adaptive approach employed by the WCG Cabinet reflected in the resolution of the February 2015 Bosberaad that

"PSGs SteerComs and Excos could be collapsed into one meeting" (Cabinet of the Western Cape, 2015), which has been applied differently across the PSGs.

Qualitative engagements suggest that the Executive Committees function relatively well as intended and are self-rated as functional or high-functioning in all instances, with the exception of the PSG1 Executive Committee which was self-rated as partially functional by HODs. The structures meet regularly and there is reportedly more time for feedback in relation to monitoring progress reports than in the Steering Committees, with the exception of specific PSGs where some meetings have been collapsed with the Steering Committee engagements. Executive Committees are however mostly used for reporting, and some respondents specifically highlighted the redundancy of this structure as merely providing a "test-run" for presenting the same information with the Ministers present (FG62 and FG77) in Steering Committees. In qualitative engagements, some respondents for PSG1 and PSG5 both expressed a view that there was a degree of duplication between the meetings that impedes the efficient functioning of the PTMS, particularly where HODs also serve on working groups or the game changer equivalents. In two PSGs this has been used to justify a decision to process working group reports directly via the Steering Committee without the Executive Committee sitting, as per Cabinet's initial resolution. Where this occurred in PSG5, this was reportedly a more efficient means of processing the information.

Where the Executive Committees have been most effective, they have provided a platform for HODs to process transversal issues and consolidate the required information before it is presented to Steering Committees, a process that itself may impede PTMS efficiency if the inputs have already been occurred via working groups. In comparison to Steering Committees, respondents have identified this platform as beneficial for HOD engagements, but also supportive of interdepartmental solutions that can be resolved at the tactical/interpretive level of public administration. The Executive Committee model has been described as a space that allows for more flexible and free conversations which have reportedly been a contributing factor to the relationships built amongst the various heads of departments (FG78, I106 and I10). The project reporting that occurs at Executive Committee level also supports HODs to identify possible areas of duplication. Executive Committees have further been credited as structures that deal with issues that cannot be resolved at a working group level.

Although Executive Committees fulfil their progress report processing function, the structure has assumed more of an advisory role as opposed to a decision-making body. Respondents identified a tension and trade-off between the Executive Committee structure and the normal role of HODs in their capacities as department accounting officers. Thus, Executive Committees allow for reflection and advice, but it is at the expense of some of the decision-making agency that HODs normally have when it comes to line department projects in APPs. HODs are therefore regarded as having more decision-making power in that regard within organisational silos, which can contribute to efficiency. Where there is greater alignment between transversal projects and departmental APPs, the Executive Committee structure fulfils a role more than an advisory body.

A respondent explains "they [the Executive Committees] are effective, I think the meetings and engagements take place in good spirit, so I think they are reasonably effective. There are cases where the impact is limited," (I24).

Working Groups

As previously noted under Section 5.1.3 on Responsiveness, the working groups are responsible for developing and implementing the medium-term implementation plans through to execution. As such, working groups are integral to the success of the PSP and serve as a lynchpin between the tactical/interpretive and operational. As operational governance structures the working groups are active and generally functional, while noting some exceptions that reflect in the shifts in titles, amalgamations and removal of working groups captured in Table 8. Working groups are further required to develop and adopt group project implementation plans that detail the projects, activities and budgets. These plans are developed to track whether PSG constituent outputs and outcome targets are achieved. The evaluation finds that not all of the working groups have updated project implementation plans and that the linkage between some of the activities of the working groups and the outcomes to which they are said to contribute is tenuous, particularly relative to the core business of the departments (FG35, FG113, and FG80).

An implementation plan template was developed and circulated to all the working groups. Considering the variation in the focus of the working groups (as presented in Table 9), the standardised template was judged as not accommodating the differences across these working groups and hence was found to not be user friendly. In response to this, some of the working groups abandoned the template and created their own suitable plans.

An interviewee explains "For me, the implementation plan was not the determining factor of achieving deliverables and outcomes they are working towards. It was a rigid structure and couldn't really hold people accountable," (FG53).

Another states "It [implementation plan] is taken from the very first plan called the business plan and annexure C. It was a horrendous template," (FG7).

However, respondents across the qualitative engagements criticised any emphasis on judging the functionality of working groups, describing the risk of a tick box exercise. There was a strong sentiment in the qualitative data that working groups should be judged on their effectiveness and impact of transversal projects, not through submitting reports. This resonates with the recommendations of the MTR 2017, the February 2017 Cabinet Bosberaad and respondents (I33 and I44) to make better use of evaluations as determinations of progress. This concern has been partly addressed, as described in the findings on effectiveness in Section 5.1.2, with this evaluation also considered a reflection of this approach.

Where the working group structure has been most successful, they have served as platforms fostering transversality through facilitating coordination between departments. Since this operational level is where most of the work takes place, working groups have contributed to breaking down silos creating a space where departmental role-players can periodically meet, but particularly when well-prepared and it is necessary. While the platform has been created, a weakness that has emerged from these working groups has been the translation of projects into part and parcel of the department's core business. Lead departments appear to have dominated projects that have landed within the working groups space, thereby leading to a tendency for a particular departmental mandate to dominate and risk losing its transversality. However, in some cases this may allow for greater efficiency in implementation as departments may have more agency and scope to act within their mandate more quickly, as compared to when they need to coordinate and work with actors from other departments who may have varying degrees of authority to act. This experience also reflected in a number of working groups during data collection whereby representatives from a single

department were available to provide an account of the working group. So, while working groups have provided a transversal platform, the joint implementation of transversal projects and programmes by the working groups is still an area for improvement.

Section 5.1.3 on Responsiveness introduces and notes the differences in the working group dynamics in relation to the varying nature of their work, focus and implementing responsibilities. This dynamic has therefore resulted in customised approaches that have been adopted by some of the working groups. The evaluation finds that there is limited guidance with regards to the differentiated scope and complexity of the interventions and projects implemented by the various working groups. This detracts from common understandings of the working groups which may also limit different tactical approaches in converting directives and feedback into action at the operational level.

In light of the various levels of functionality of the different governance structures within the PTMS, the three streams as discussed earlier in the report under Section 5.1 Effectiveness have emerged at the operational level in relation the working group structure. The tendency for departments to view the PSP as exclusively transversal and revert to departmental mandated core functions is considered an inefficiency in the system as these actions may occur devoid of a "line of sight" to the provincial policy imperatives to which they are, or could be, contributing. The MTR 2017 also highlights that, although alignment between the PSP and APP has increased over the years, some key departmental strategies, programmes and projects remain disconnected from the PSP and this prevents the optimal functioning of the PTMS (Department of the Premier, 2017b).

As a third implementation stream and something of an exception, the game changers do not attempt to conform to the PTMS given their unique approach and the comparatively focused capabilities of their support structure, the DSU. At the same time, they do intersect with the PTMS platforms, via Steering Committees and Cabinet Bosberaad for transversal engagement, beyond the work of the DSU with operational delivery teams. Although this arrangement has limited the extent to which the game changers identify with the PTMS and see themselves as part of it, it nevertheless affords them certain efficiencies in terms of the governance arrangements because they are more streamlined, focused and continuous than working groups. This creates efficiencies in terms of implementation, but misses the opportunity to share lessons and co-ordinate via transversal institutional platforms, such as the PTMS. Although the game changers follow fairly intensive processes that are not intended to be replicable at scale owing to time and resource considerations, there is clearly an intention within the WCG to better integrate and co-ordinate with them via the transversal platforms provided by the PTMS (Department of the Premier, 2017b) that has not yet been adequately addressed.

Although the PTMS SOP makes provision for Executive Committees to appoint secretariats for each of the five PSGs, the PSG Secretariats' Forum structure is not something that was originally envisioned. It has nevertheless served as an important structure assisting to coordinate and ensure a common transversal approach across the respective PSGs.

PSG Secretariats' Forum

The PSG Secretariats' Forum was established in April 2016 at the initiative of the PSG 5 Secretariat, itself mandated by the Executive Committee of PSG 5. The forum was established as a platform that would provide the various PSG

secretariats an opportunity to share their experiences, to note similarities and differences as a way of ensuring consistency.

The main aims of the forum are to:

- Perform the function of a coordinating body.
- Ensure that all PSGs work as a collective –although they are operationally independent of each other.
- Ensure members know what needs to be done and is expected of them.
- Ensure possible gaps in the system/ operations are quickly identified and addressed. Share good practices.
- Achieve alignment and maintain synergy.

During the inaugural PSG secretariat forum meeting in April 2016, it was decided that the various PSG secretariats would be key linkages between the forum and the PSGs, serving a coordinating function beyond that of classic secretariat duties. The secretariats were to report back to their principals and provide feedback to the forum. It was further decided that departments should be represented by two members to ensure continuity in cases of unavailability (PSG Secretariat Forum, 2016).

The PSG Secretariats' Forum has supported a degree of system coherence that was otherwise deemed to have been lacking, but its influence within the transversal space has been limited by the lack of a formal role for it and because it is yet another forum on top of the existing work and responsibilities of its members. The forum did not find expression in the original conception of the PTMS for the term as support structure and this has remained a source of concern (FG62 and FG35).

In addition, beyond the regular PSG Secretariat reports submitted to Executive Committees on a monthly basis, there is no other transversal linkage between the PTMS and the PSG Secretariats' Forum, such as via PTM or possibly as part of PSG5. Certainly, the transversal coordination function across PSGs that PSG5 as a cross cutting PSG is expected to fulfil would benefit from a closer working relationship to ensure that all PSGs work as a collective.

The PSG Secretariats' Forum has also been identified as a response to the gap that has emanated from PSG 5's envisioned role. It has been described as a useful platform that may benefit from an elevation of its role within the PTMS and this is discussed in detail under Section 5.3.4 Lessons Learnt.

PSG5's cross-cutting role

In the PSPs only PSG5 is identified as a cross-cutting goal expected to facilitate broader transversal and intergovernmental conditions supportive of the four other PSGs. PSG5's strategic objective of embedding good governance and integrated service delivery through partnerships and spatial alignment has de facto made it a crucial linkage that impacts on all the PSGs. The PSG was envisioned as an enabler, facilitator, integrator and supporter towards the attainment of other PSGs, outcomes and outputs (Department of the Premier, 2015d). As part of its strategic objective, it was therefore deemed appropriate that PSG5 focus on targeting intergovernmental coordination and collaboration between local and provincial government among others, as well as integrated planning and budgeting within the WCG. This resulted in the introduction of an "Integrated Management" outcome subsequent to the adoption of the PSP, which has been largely driven by the work of WG4- Integrated management (also referred to as Integrated Planning, Policy and Delivery).

As noted earlier in the report, the IWP and the Partnering framework established under PSG5 have served as key enabling factors in fostering engagements between the province and municipalities with broader implications across all PSGs. However, despite this, the extent to which this work was referred to and informed the work of other PSGs appeared limited, suggesting that the outputs of PSG5 are not adequately disseminating across the PTMS to create a more conducive environment for transversality and the realisation of the PSP as intended. In practice, the PSG5's role as a cross-cutting PSG has not been fully realised and this affects the broader transversal environment. The following quotes below capture these findings:

"PSG5 was supposed to run through. But it operated as a silo, and [it] didn't do enough in providing the guidance and influence other PSGs…" (FG77).

"We have no direct connection to PSG5. A lot of the stuff was brought into PTM meetings, but it did not create the logical link. Conceptually, it is supposed to run across all PSGs but there is no PSG strategy, so in practice that has not been the case," (I25).

This limitation has partly been attributed to a lack of capacity as staff in the PSG5 working groups appear stretched thin. Although there is a potential efficiency to be derived by combining the custodianship role for the PTMS that rests with the Branch: Provincial Strategic Management with SMS representation via PSG5 working groups, there appears to be a concentration of coordination, implementation and support functions in a small number of centre of government staff, whereas the scope and strategic importance of the PTMS would benefit from dedicated custodial capacity distinct from other coordinating and implementation functions. The lack of full-time human resources supporting the PTMS appears to have limited PSG5's ability to fulfill its cross-cutting function.

Resource allocation

A critical determinant of system functionality is whether there are the resources necessary to support the PTMS, more especially the transversal initiatives it gives rise to. From early in the term of government, it was recognised that the existing departmental MTEC process risked perpetuating siloed resource allocations with little incentive towards transversality. Through the introduction of PSG MTECs as a precursor to departmental MTEC processes, the PTMS has sought to facilitate more transversal budgeting. This integrated budgeting process is intended to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources towards achieving the PSGs. Allocations are also provided to the game changers as part of this process. The Fiscal Policy seminar then informs the following year's MTEF priorities. After discussions with PTM and political leadership, the following year's MTBPS, adjusted estimates and the preliminary MTEF allocations from Provincial Treasury are released (Provincial Treasury, 2018).

Departments who are involved in a given PSG are expected to contribute towards the budget of the PSG. As an example, the contributions of the departments who contribute to PSG 1 are shown in Table 11.

Table 11: PSG 1 contributing departments (Source: Provincial Treasury, 2018)

Department (R'000)	2014/15 Audited	2015/16 Audited	2016/17 Audited	2017/18 Audited	2018/19 Adjusted Estimate	2019/20 2nd Draft Budget	2014/15 - 2019/20
Economic Development and Tourism	469 906	393 874	559 385	399 303	428 942	521 085	2 772 495
Agriculture	855 436	750 633	807 792	866 869	1 120 674	913 460	5 314 864
Transport and Public Works	5 770 808	6 668 395	7 028 708	7 503 620	7 869 021	7 979 310	42 819 862
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning	457 181	502 648	537 950	546 028	585 536	637 847	3 267 190
TOTAL	7 553 331	8 315 550	8 933 835	9 315 820	10 004 173	10 051 702	54 174 411

In PSG 1, the largest contributor is not the lead department, it is the Department of Transport and Public Works. The game changers located in PSG 1 also receive contributions from all of the departments in the PSG that the game changer is located in. For instance, in the case of the Energy Security game changer, located in PSG 1, the largest contribution comes from the Department of Economic Development and Tourism, which is the lead department in PSG 1. This arrangement varies between PSGs, and is informed by the MTEC processes, political imperatives, and the finalised allocation of revenue from Provincial Treasury.

The 2017 MTR states that, often, the lead departments spend a disproportionate amount of time and resources on achieving the PSGs in relation to the other departments involved in the PSG. The budgeting and resource allocation process appears to duplicate some processes for departments. At times, there was reportedly no feedback from Provincial Treasury on the MTEC process and budgets were just allocated (FG62) and stakeholders were left to draw their own conclusions. Some respondents believe that this has favoured certain departments or created duplicative processes.

"The WCG is only now considering how to do better resource allocations, by using the PSG MTECs. But this is wrong because the … Department go and ask for money as [the department] at the MTEC, and again as [the PSG] at PSG MTEC," (FG6).

Some interviewees expressed a level of cynicism for the budgeting processes which are currently in place. It was expressed that the PSG MTEC process is largely a high-level exercise, which does not provide the level of detail required to make budgetary decisions, unless specific, large initiatives are focussed on with a direct link to policy priorities, and budget is requested for these initiatives. Even in these cases, though, the funding for these projects is not guaranteed (FG78) and SMS stakeholders have expressed frustration at shortcomings of the process when it comes to strong motivations as per the templates provided that are disregarded (Provincial Treasury, n.d.).

The funding for such projects will still come from a lead department, as the pooling of funds jointly between departments is technically prevented by the PFMA. However, DOTP has tested at least one case where it financed an initiative and departments subsequently claimed back. With the benefit of this experience and others like it, some key stakeholders are of the opinion that there is scope for further creativity within the limitations of the PFMA (I34 and I31).

The 2017 MTR acknowledges that the extent to which departments are able to embed the PSG initiatives in to their APPs, budgets and day to day operations is crucial to the successful implementation of the PSP and the PSGs. The MTR also

reflects that the APPs and budgets of departments are still "heavily geared towards 'business as usual' and driven by the constitutional mandates."

Where the PSG MTECs were credited with facilitating more transversal resource allocation was mainly in relation to the game changers. There is a perception that the game changers, due to their strategic importance, take priority over the other functions of the department:

"My experience is that, if you are aligned to the game Changer, then you got the budget. If you got on the radar of the game changer, then you got money and HR capacity," (FG1).

However, this perception is also contrasted with data from BizProjects (reflecting only a sub-set of transversal projects). As will be presented in Section 5.3.3, the number of transversal projects captured on BizProjects has declined but the resource allocations to transversal projects had been increasing from 2014/15-2016/17. While the BizProjects data presents an incomplete picture of transversal resource allocation, it would support the finding that, even while the PTMS has introduced the PSG MTEC process which has led to a prioritisation of funds for transversal initiatives, these actions have not yet facilitated an environment where the PTMS is efficiently implemented as intended, excepting resource allocations for large, priority initiatives.

PTMS planning, monitoring and evaluation processes

For the PTMS to be implemented efficiently, simple and integrated implementation planning, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes need to support the functioning of the system. With over 300 M&E systems across the various departments in the province from which to draw information into the PTMS (Department of the Premier, 2017b), providing a common transversal point of departure was imperative.

The PSP set out clear PSGs, and provided outcome areas with indicators to be tracked longitudinally to inform medium-term targets. Due to issues of timing and sequencing, and a pressure to finalise the PSP, the formulation of the indicators and setting of the targets occurred without the benefit of more extensive consultation or the unpacking of WCG's initiatives that drive the realisation of those indicator targets. The MTR 2017 found the PSG indicators were developed in isolation of inputs from key departmental role-players and M&E officials (Department of the Premier, 2017b), and this issue still persists as an area of concern (I105 and I33).

The outcome formulation and target setting has had implications for how working groups have been conceived and tasked with developing implementation plans against which they account for the delivery of specific outputs that contribute to the outcome areas and the targets set for them. However, the intervention logic between the outcomes and the products or outputs of the working groups does not necessarily hold in some instances. All working groups have been expected to develop implementation plans setting out their work as a basis for monitoring and reporting their progress to upper structures. Despite this common expectation, and recognising the differentiation of the working groups themselves, some working groups have found there has been a disjuncture between the expectations set for them and what they believe is actually achievable, particularly in light of the austere fiscal environment. This has contributed to a situation whereby working group outputs are tracked and accounted for via the PSG structures, but the value and importance of these outputs in relation to the policy goals is not sufficiently interrogated (I106). This

is also a product of processing efficiencies and the extensive reporting that needs to be covered by these structures.

One of the original outputs for PSG5 was a province-wide M&E system with intergovernmental reporting, of which the PTMS is inclusive. While there has been some progress in terms of the development of a Data Governance Framework to and the institutionalisation of evaluation planning, this has not been effectively leveraged via PSG5 as part of its transversal support function. The institutional link and lack of buy-in of some key role-players in has resulted in gaps between the PTMS and the output it is expected to drive. Even while the PTMS has incorporated BizProjects as part of the utilisation of BizSuite, the use of BizProjects for project monitoring purposes appears to have also placed a distorted emphasis on the system, as reflects in the later findings in this section. The evaluation therefore finds that the current planning, monitoring & evaluation processes of the PTMS are not yet sufficiently integrated with established departmental planning, monitoring and reporting systems and this has led to inefficiencies, beginning with departmental planning, and having implications for the efficient execution of the PTMS system.

Meeting fatigue

Another area impairing the functioning of the PTMS is the extent to which it requires time spent in meetings. The regular holding of meetings may itself be an indication that a structure is functional but the compound effects of convening engagements for a management system that runs in some respects as another governance and implementation stream can be significant where responsibilities concentrate. The current PTMS structure, although acknowledged for its improvements relative to last term, has been strongly criticised for the number of meetings required for the various governance structures, particularly for the demand this places on key SMS and HODs. Meeting fatigue has been highlighted as a common critique against the current model and a source of inefficiency.

The current structure has been characterised by meetings, most of which are focused on reporting and progress tracking and, as a result, this has both occupied time and consumed otherwise valuable opportunities that could be sessions dedicated to reflective and strategic thinking. The following quote explains:

"Part of problem is too many meetings. No time to reflect, sometimes the agenda is cramped…" (I28).

This has further added an administrative burden associated with the PTMS meetings in addition to department required reporting. The MTR 2017 found that a significant amount of time was spent preparing reports and reporting to meetings could be better spent identifying issues and implementing planned projects, a point that resonated with a number of respondents. The burden is reinforced by the fact that there are different reporting requirements and formats for the various PTMS and departmental submissions, and that this is something within the purview of PSG5.

The regular reporting and time lag associated with the required reporting between the different PSG structures has also been another source of frustration; as, in some cases, there is not much to report on or no difference or visible change in the short term (Department of the Premier, 2017b). These additional reporting requirements negatively affect the support and buy-in for the PTMS, which speaks to the organisational environments in which it is implemented.

5.3.2 Capability

PTMS implementation is constrained or enabled by the latent capabilities of the organisations it seeks to create transversal platforms between. Capability is referred to as an institution's readiness to perform its business activities. The Western Cape Government identifies three primary defining elements of capability as distinct capacities (Department of the Premier, 2018c). The extent to which departments possess these capacities therefore informs the assessment of whether an enabling environment is in place for the PTMS.

Figure 37 illustrates how the three capacities factor into the work of the WCG. The following definitions should be noted as informing this section of analysis:

Functional capacity: The combined organisational, structural and technical systems required to create and implement policies in response to the needs of the public, (Department of the Premier, 2018c: 1).

Talent capacity: Fit for purpose mastery of the competencies (both organisational and employee) required to perform the work activities needed to meet the work-related responsibilities associated with developing, implementing and maintaining the processes and procedures of the organisational structural and technical systems (Department of the Premier, 2018c: 2).

Cultural capacity: The observable aspect of the underlying norms, values and beliefs that guide organisational behaviours (e.g. work activities, decision making etc.), that is strongly influenced by history, leadership practices (past and present), customs and work practices. Figure 37 illustrates the capability elements and how they translate into service delivery (results), (Department of the Premier, 2018c: 2).

Figure 37. Capability as defined by the WCG (Department of the Premier, 2018c)

The WCG capability framework (Department of the Premier, 2018c) consists of Foundational, Core and Strategic capabilities, which are informed by the PSP and should ultimately lead to enhanced service delivery (provided that adequate M&E

is also present). Seeing as the WCG objectives are guided by the PSP, the capability framework is driven by strategic capabilities, which are identified as:

- Adaptive governance
- Integrated planning, delivery and reporting
- Organisation agility
- Citizen- centricity/community engagement
- Partnering
- Data governance
- Digital transformation
- Leadership (ability to hold and shape the above)

What is important to note is that most of these aforementioned capabilities are aspirational or emergent at best, thus they haven't been embedded in the organisational culture or a transformed government culture across departments. This is particularly observed in the implementation of the PTMS, where the three salient capability elements for the purpose of the assessment are examined below.

When considering functional capacity, it can be seen that the WCG has the capacity to create and implement policies of a transversal nature. The organisation is geared towards PTMS implementation, which can be seen through the reviews from the previous term into the development and commitment to the PSP, as well as the governance structures that have been established and are operational. Figure 38 below presents SMS' level of agreement regarding the functional capacity within their department to implement transversal programmes and in relation to other departments.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statement

Figure 38. SMS level of agreement with departmental functional capacity to implement transversal programmes with other departments

65% of SMS agreed or strongly agreed that their department has the functional capacity to implement transversal projects. However, 20% disagreed that their department has the functional capacity, while only 10% were neutral. This suggests that functional capacity may be an issue in some departments. When it comes to judging other departments, only 29% of SMS contradicted the statement that other departments lacked the functional capacity to implement transversal programmes, whereas 35% agreed or strongly agreed that other departments lacked the functional capacity to implement transversal

programmes. This is indicative of a slightly higher perception on the part of SMS that other departments lack the capacity, whereas their department possesses it. It is also noted that there is a high number (29%) of participants who were neutral and did not express an opinion on the functional capacity of other departments, which may also be a reflection that some departments possess the capacity while others lack it and thus the perception is neutral. It is unclear as to why this is the case; however, structural and technical challenges such as sufficient human resources were raised as inhibiters of the WCG realising its full functional capability.

An interviewee (I47) explains "Some of the depts and units have had extra burden placed on them because they were not resourced sufficiently."

In referring to technical challenges experienced, another participant (I118) states "we've ended up all running here and a large amount of it is original [data] collection and not something that can just be pulled up on the data front…they have no data capacity."

Talent capability

There is a level of agreement amongst SMS regarding the requisite talent capacity to implement transversal programmes with other departments. Figure 39 displays that 64% of SMS agree or strongly agree that there is requisite talent capacity. When asked about other departments, 26% of SMS agreed or strongly agreed that other departments lacked talent capaciy, whilst 29% disagreed. It should be noted that more SMS (35%) were neutral in their response. It is unclear as to why this is the case; however, participants have raised that issues are not related to competencies of staff, but rather the ability to work together, which affects the outcome of a good work climate with employee engagement that is envisaged by the WCG.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statement


Figure 39. SMS level of agreement with departmental talent capacity to implement transversal programmes with other departments

An interviewee explains "the capability is there, the organising of the people to work in an integrative way, it isn't there," (I33). Thus, it can be seen that talent capacity is heavily influenced by cultural capacity factors.

Cultural capacity

Another interviewee has suggested that an issue influencing talent capacity is lack of buy-in, which also negatively affects the outcome of a good work climate, a reflection on organisational culture. A participant states "the big challenge, for this model to be sustainable you need to actually buy into and [make it] understood lower into the hierarchy in the organisation. High [positions] will influence culture change," (I117).

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statement

Figure 40. SMS level of agreement with departmental cultural capacity to implement transversal programmes with other departments

Figure 40 presents SMS' level of agreement as to whether their department has the requisite cultural capacity to implement transversal programmes. Over half of the respondents agreed that their departments possess the requisite cultural capacity to implement transversal programmes with other departments. However, this perception should be understood with recognition of the position of SMS in institutional hierarchies and in light of the preceding concern related to the level at which those cultural capacities exist. Only 28% of the 141 surveyed respondents indicated that other departments possessed the requisite cultural capacity to implement transversal programmes, whereas the plurality were neutral (38%). Several interview and focus group participants have explained that their organisational culture is not conducive to working transversally, which suggests cultural capacity is more of a factor in terms of capability than talent and functional capacity. However, the survey responses across all of these paint a similar picture.

Another factor influencing cultural capacity raised in interviews, is leadership, which the success of PTMS structures has heavily relied on. An interviewee (I29) states "the feeling is that each working group and Steering Committee takes on the specific style of people sitting on it. You can't separate people from systems. It's one of the things we need to look at. Is it a system problem or people problem?"

Another interviewee explains "HODs do not see themselves as leaders of government but of departments. They do not help, it's more of a competition and there is no reward. It's all about getting the HODs to understand that they are leaders of government and they need to take responsibility to guide and help one another. They need to share knowledge and expertise…they are not seeing the bigger picture," (FG52).

Participants have stated that in order to change the organisational culture and

leadership, change management is necessary. Change management not only facilitates buy in, but also provides an understanding and creates an enabling environment that enables staff at all levels to engage and contribute.

A focus group participant states that "we are always in a hurry to do things and we don't go through change management, we are just bad at it. Change management is not about letting people know what is coming but how we can input into the process,"(FG36).

An interviewee also explains "in all new initiatives, change management is always a challenge. I don't know if government is not resourcing change management enough or is it that people aren't embracing change or the structure that doesn't allow you to change,"(FG51).

 It is apparent that, for the PTMS to prove an effective and efficient system for managing the implementation of the PSP, the challenges surrounding talent, cultural and functional capacity will all have to be improved in order for these to work seamlessly and in a complementary fashion. Among these, cultural capacity stood out among interview and focus group respondents as the capacity in greatest need of attention, particularly when considering some of the preceding findings regarding the tendency to revert to department specific mandates and business.

5.3.3   Enabling tools

Creating an environment conducive to the efficient implementation of the PTMS is supported by the provision of tools and mechanisms to assist participants in accessing, engaging and extracting information from the system. The extent to which tools have contributed to an enabling environment for PTMS implementation is therefore an area of sub-assessment.

Chief among the tools identified to support the implementation of the PTMS is BizProjects. The PTMS SOP identified BizProjects as the main governance support tool of the PTMS. According to the SOP, BizProjects was envisioned to function as an electronic programme and project management information system for the executive and all provincial departments (Department of the Premier, 2015a). Although BizProjects was initially expected to be uniformly applied across the PTMS, in practice this has not been the case (Department of the Premier, 2017a).

Usage

Figure 41 shows that of the 146 surveyed SMS in the working groups and outside of them, nearly 1 in 3 working group participants have never used BizProjects and more than half of those outside of the working groups have never made use of the tool. As could be anticipated owing to it being compulsory requirement of the PTMS, SMS who participate in working groups were more likely than those who do not participate to use BizProjects weekly (6% to 1%), monthly (31% to 18%) and quarterly (23% to 16%). More than half of all working group participants use BizProjects at least quarterly (61%), suggesting it is a widely used tool across the PTMS. However, respondents were not surveyed on whether they used BizProjects for transversal projects or for their departmental projects. It is therefore important to note that the graph merely presents SMS responses to the overall use of BizProjects as a tool, this is not specific to departmental and PSG-related projects, even as use is more common among working group participants. Another consideration is that of positioning, the likelihood of an SMS

member using BizProjects compared to a middle manager tasked with implementation, who may be capturing management information in real time.

HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU MAKE USE OF BIZPROJECTS FOR YOUR WORK?
(N=146)

Figure 41. Frequency of use of BizProjects

Of the SMS that indicated they do make use of BizProjects, 46% of the respondents use it for project monitoring and reporting as displayed in Figure 42 below. Programme monitoring and reporting (30%) and project planning (30%) were the second most frequent uses of BizProjects followed by project management (29%). The graph therefore displays that BizProjects is commonly used for monitoring and reporting purposes, both at a project and programme level.

Please indicate for which purposes you make use of BizProjects (select all that apply): (n=108)

**Figure 42. Purpose of BizProjects use**

Qualitative engagements revealed that respondents that use other tools use a range of alternative tools including MS projects, MS Excel spreadsheets, IPSS and other forms of internal departmental project management tools. Others cited

alternative tools such as internal project meetings and custom reports as useful alternatives.

It is clear from graphs Figure 41 and Figure 42 that ownership of BizProjects as a project management tool within the PTMS governance supporting structure is not as ubiquitous as the PTMS SOP would suggest. Considering the findings related to the consultation process, this is one explanation that resonates with the MTR 2017, which notes the absence of key stakeholders from engagements during the initial introduction of BizProjects (Department of the Premier, 2017b) as well as the findings of the internal audit report (Department of the Premier, 2017a).

Figure 43 below provides additional insight into the use of BizProjects for transversal or "PSG projects" only. The graph reveals that the number of projects registered on BizProjects has declined by more than half over the four-year period from the 2015/16 financial year to the 2018/19 financial year. From 142 projects registered on BizProjects in 2015/16, only 67 projects were registered for 2018/19. Interestingly, although the number of projects registered on BizProjects decreased over the years, the budget allocated to BizProjects has increased or remained relatively consistent through the 2017/18 year, but began to drop for the 2018/19 financial years. One possible explanation of this is the consolidation of multiple initiatives under a smaller number of pooled projects, but the steady decline suggests a reduction in application of the tool over time.

Figure 43. Budget value and number of transversal projects registered on BizProjects (2015/16 - 2018/19 fy)

This decline has been driven primarily by reduction in use for PSGs 1 and 5, and specifically a reduction in use by DEDAT and DOTP. DEDAT in 2015/16 had 28 projects registered on BizProjects compared to 3 in 2018/19, and DOTP registered 33 projects in 2015/16, compared to 12 in 2018/19. PSGs 3 and 4 also had reductions in use over the period, but to a lesser extent. PSG 2 saw a small increase in use from 2015/16 to 2018/19 but off a comparatively lower base of projects.

Project completion rates of projects registered on BizProjects have risen throughout the period. This suggests that either continued use of the tool assists in the completion of projects, or that working groups are increasingly selective about which projects they choose to register on the tool, registering those that they are more likely to complete.

This is in contrast to departmental use of BizProjects which has seen an increased usage in the 2018/19 financial year (251 projects), compared to the 2017/18 financial year (131 projects). The main driver of this was an increase in projects from DOTP, who registered 26 in 2017/18 and 193 in 2018/19 and DEDAT, who registered 15 in 2017/18 and 39 in 2018/19. An outlier here is DLG, which registered 54 projects in 2017/18, but none in 2018/19.

Budget

In terms of budget for PSG projects registered on BizProjects, the total budget of projects registered on the system rose in the first three years of implementation, before dropping off in 2018/19. This was driven by smaller project budgets in PSG 1 and PSG 3. For PSG 1, this is in line with the reduction in projects registered on BizProjects for the 2018/19 financial year.

Figure 44. BizProjects PSG project budgets

Looking at budget spend per PSG as recorded by BizProjects, projects in PSG4 have consistently spent their budget through the 2015/16 to 2017/18 period (at the time of writing the 2018/19 financial year is not yet complete), but also consistently had the smallest project budgets registered on BizProjects.

For all other PSGs, project budgets have been increasingly underspent over the period, with PSG 1 and PSG2 spending their project budgets in 2015/16 and PSG 3 and PSG 5 overspending; whereas, in 2017/18, all five PSGs had underspent.

Figure 45. BizProjects PSG project budget actual cost differential

While BizProjects is being used, there are strong reservations about its usefulness. Firstly, there is no clear understanding of what BizProject as a project management tool is intended to do in relation to the PTMS. The SOP refers to BizProjects as a project management tool; however, in practice, the tool is ambiguously used as both a project management system and M&E tool. Interestingly, the comparisons between the qualitative engagements and survey data reveal that there is a better understanding of BizProjects' use at a senior management level. Most SMS seemingly comprehend that the tool is designed for project management. However, at a middle to lower management level, the general perception is that the tool is being utilised by senior managers as a monitoring tool. This may be partly due to the SOP's lack of clear guidance to the relevant users of the system (Department of the Premier, 2017a), or a reflection on the historical evolution of project management systems and their use for accountability purposes within the WCG.

The 2017 internal audit report (Department of the Premier, 2017a) found that the PTMS does not articulate the detailed requirements with regards to the BizProjects system as the information management system in relation to the delivery of the PSP. The SOP provides the high level purpose of the system, but does not detail how the system needs to function to efficiently achieve its intended purpose. The report further notes that the SOP has been silent on how the information extracted from BizProjects will be analysed, consolidated and reported to the different PTMS governance structures (Department of the Premier, 2017a).

Secondly, the actual functionality of the system itself has also been heavily criticised. The system has been described as slow, not user friendly and adding an administrative burden, specifically with regards to uploading the required data on the system. Issues associated with the functionality of the system have disincentivised people from using BizProjects. Respondents that indicated that they do not use the system both during the qualitative engagement and electronic survey cited the system functionality as one of the reasons for limited usage.

Thirdly, respondents have also noted the inconsistencies between the language used during planning and the information required to capture projects into BizProjects. This has presented challenges in linking the planning process and reporting. One respondent noted that "That implementation plan was asking for outcomes and needed to put something in BizProjects. How you move from that into project space, the language used in planning and M&E is also part of the issue in terms of making connections," (FG53). The MTR 2017 re-iterates this inconsistency, explaining that the PSP was written in "policy" language and hence moving from the policy and planning space onto BizProjects is highlighted as a challenge as BizProjects is not appropriate for outcome level monitoring (Department of the Premier, 2017b).

Red, Amber and Green dashboard

The RAG dashboard associated with BizProjects has emerged as the most common critique against the tool for the manner in which it has been used. This dashboard system has been mainly utilised as a performance measurement tool and indicates the status of projects' schedule and budgets using a colour-coded red, amber and green system. From a project management perspective, this was envisioned as a way for improved project governance by providing an evidence train and indication of project progress against plan. In practice, the system has been described as more of a monitoring tool scrutinised by upper structures of the PTMS.

This can partly be attributed to the ambiguity of the intended use of BizProjects. The RAG system is perceived as a monitoring tool, whereas the SOP conceptualised BizProjects firstly as a project management tool to assist implementers. The colour coded system has been criticised for its inability to provide context into the project progress and transversality. The RAG dashboard has been critiqued as a stick that often conforms to the compliance driven environment and can give rise to perverse incentives. This approach has rendered the tool vulnerable to manipulation which compromises the integrity and reliability of the data captured into BizProjects (FG113). This emerged as a key finding from the qualitative engagements. One respondent noted that "Having to report back with the dashboard, people will run around to make things green. It is a built-in mechanism," (I31). On one hand, this is part of the purpose of the tool, to support the management of projects to ensure they progress according to plan (i.e. are green). On the other hand, the capturer using the tool can reflect whatever degree of progress based on a project managers' subjective assessment. Building controls into the system, such as the compulsory uploading of substantiating documents as suggested in the internal audit report of 2017 (Department of the Premier, 2017a), would further drive a compliance culture.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements

Figure 46. SMS level of agreement with use of BizProjects

Figure 46 illustrates that, among SMS, there was greater agreement that BizProjects was a useful tool for project management purposes (38%) than that it was preferred for project level monitoring and reporting (24%). In fact, more respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed (35%) that BizProjects was preferred, while 25% were neutral and 16% did not know. However, in light of the SOP's conceptualisation of BizProjects as a management tool firstly, the number of SMS that were either neutral (21%) or disagreed (25%) is an indication that BizProjects has been conflated across all of these purposes.

Please indicate whether you Agree or Disagree with the following statements

Figure 47. SMS level of agreement with use of BizProjects as a project and programme level monitoring tool

When respondents were asked to indicate whether they use other tools for project-level monitoring and reporting, more than half (54%) of the respondents agreed that they use other tools for project level monitoring and reporting, while only 14% disagreed. The relatively high number of respondents that use other tools for project level monitoring and reporting reflects the reservations about BizProjects' usefulness. Respondents were more evenly split on the utility for project level monitoring, with 29% indicating BizProjects was not useful for this purpose, 27% disagreeing, 25% neutral and 19% unsure.

The PTMS SOP prescribed BizProjects as a project management system that would provide governance support for project progress. Applying the ToC, a key underlying assumption on the use of BizProjects was that it was the most appropriate tool to feed project level data into PSG monitoring, but this has clearly not been the case, as there is a strong preference and experience with other monitoring systems. Furthermore, the use of the RAG system has at times given rise to perverse incentives, mostly in the absence of a common useful alternative for monitoring and reporting purposes.

5.3.4 Lessons learnt

Institutions that are able to incorporate lessons from their failures and build upon good practices support an enabling environment for complex system implementation. By determining which lessons have been learnt from those areas of both excellence and failure in the current PTMS, this sub-assessment area both judges strengths of the PTMS and its weaknesses reflexively and with an acknowledged utilisation-focus, consistent with *Standards for evaluation in government.* The extent to which lessons have been learnt from both good practice and poor implementation is an indication of the environment the WCG has created for PTMS implementation.

A key output of the PTMS is that learning is achieved as part of periodic review of the PSP. Preliminary findings addressing the importance and lessons learnt from the formal reviews reflect in Section 5.1.2 Key outputs. When looking at successes that have arisen out of the PTMS as conceived at the outset of the term, three clusters of lessons regarding good practice emerge:

- Improved interdepartmental collaboration; and

- Leveraging existing intergovernmental structures; and

- Benefits and limitations of the game changer approach.

Improved interdepartmental collaboration

A success that has arisen from the PTMS is that as the 2014-2019 term of government has progressed, SMS in departments have learnt to collaborate better, even while operational collaboration can still improve. Through a range of processes cascading across PTMS structures, interdepartmental collaboration has certainly improved from the point of planning (via the MTEC process) through to implementation via the working groups. A participant states "the main value that the working group is bringing is because it is a multi-departmental working group. It allows for strengthened integration. Previously there was a silo approach…Better improved understanding, quality of indicators, and difference of perspectives," (FG111).

There are various reasons as to why there has been greater collaboration in the 2014 – 2019 term compared to the previous term. Firstly, this begins with the example set at the political-strategic level where the challenges encountered in 2009-2014 led to a refocusing of the WCG from 12 PSOs to 5 PSGs. This lesson from the previous term, even while many of the same executives remained, was itself indicative of learning at the political-strategic level based on internal review. It demonstrated a commitment from ministers to cooperate and for the administration to follow from that example.

This term of government has also benefitted from the realisation among role-players at the political-strategic level that, in order to achieve policy objectives in an austere financial environment, transversality can yield efficiencies (especially at the Executive level) and departments are beginning to adopt a culture of working together, even while it remains a priority area for capacity

development. However, there is a competing argument that suggests that in an austere financial environment, departmental core business must take precedence, as there are statutory obligations to fulfil and transversality is a "nice to have". While this position has merits, it is not simply a trade-off of one or the other, but a creeping realisation that these are potentially mutually inclusive and beneficial where established platforms are used appropriately.

An interviewee explained that "there is a much greater sense of working transversally, if I look back it's something, they used to be, there has been greater encouragement to do so. It has become something that is accepted as a part of government…Structures must just lend themselves to that," FG68.

However, that is not to say that, even with encouragement, the conditions are yet in place for integrated, transversal collaboration, as the following quote explains "although we are collaborating, there is still room for improvement… there are no tangible outcomes, as this does not translate to co-implementation of projects and sharing of resources," (I12). This sentiment is consistent with the finding in the MTR 2017 which questioned the extent to which partnership itself produced benefits and proposed determinations of the outcomes thereof (Department of the Premier, 2017b).

Another example of adopting lessons into the PTMS in order to improve its functioning is the PSG Secretariats' Forum, which formed as a response to the need to coordinate transversally across the PSGs, particularly between the tactical/interpretive and operational levels. The PSG Secretariats' Forum has the potential to fulfil a coordinating role within the PTMS, provide a line of sight across the key PTMS interface points and act as a central repository of information at an operational level accessible to SMS and working group participants. As the PTMS has adapted and responded to this need, the feedback has been positive in this regard:

"The secretariat forum was a good structure to put in place. When people wanted information, they came to the secretariat because they had access to information and get it sooner," (FG78).

Although it has been beneficial to have the PSG Secretariats' Forum, it is important to note that the forum finds no expression in the PTMS SOP and would benefit from definitional clarity and formal recognition in system documentation.

Another example of where the PTMS has proven adaptive to learning lessons for improved departmental collaboration has been in relation to the specific contextual and environmental developments that have necessitated the WCG work transversally. For example, the conditions presented during the drought period over the last three years prompted various departments, as well as external stakeholders to come together and find joint solutions to resolving issues associated with the drought. Cabinet Bosberaads in August and October of 2017 were specifically used to coordinate and plan responses to the water scarcity. A respondent explains:

"What we worked out with this drought that we have had since 2015, I think for the first time we all sat around the table, local, national and provincial government, and NGOs, like Agri Western Cape, we sat around the table and started managing the crisis with the core competency of everyone around the table without duplicating, with everyone talking to one another as a team and not as separate silos, and the results we got out that is basically, a corporation, that is highly effective, started working," (I61).

Another interviewee states "the drought created a positive outcome out of a negative situation. Ultimate success was we averted day zero through collective

learning, and collegial relationships that enabled us to respond to that emergency," (I50). By incorporating this response and making use of PTMS structures to coordinate, some of these lessons have filtered into the system and remain salient among role-players even while the PTMS may have benefited from a dedicated reflection and documenting of those lessons for broader dissemination and uptake.

The PTMS has shown itself responsive to incorporating lessons from its successes of interdepartmental collaboration, even while it has not formally documented these. As the custodianship and support roles for the PTMS are formalised going into the next term, specifying the responsibilities for this can support broader uptake and dissemination.

Leveraging intergovernmental structures

One of the key lessons learnt within the PTMS in this term is that when it comes to intergovernmental platforms and structures, there is no need to reinvent what is already there. Although the PTMS led to the establishment of new transversal structures across the WCG, it did not seek to do this at the municipal level, instead opting to make use of the existing intergovernmental platforms already in place. Data from municipal respondents suggests that these structures have been used to good effect to facilitate understanding, buy-in of the provincial strategic agenda and build upon existing platforms for coordination and cooperation while creating new opportunities for operational cooperation at the working group level.

PSG5 working groups have worked towards improved intergovernmental and relational structures, even while seeking to support interdepartmental processes. WG4's work, which has resulted in a framework for an IWP between the WCG and Western Cape municipalities, is aimed at aligning policy, planning and budgeting of province and local government. It has evolved over the term and itself represents a form of institutional learning around the need to coordinate and clearly set out planning cycles and timelines between the key intergovernmental role-players. The work plan's intention to deliver "a framework which provides clarity on the required planning and budgeting processes, the purpose of the respective engagements, the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders and the required level of seniority required at each engagement," (Integrated Management Work Group, 2018) captures and documents how the existing structures can be used to derive efficiencies. This has been supported by more regular communication and feedback between province and local government which has fostered a degree of commonality.

An interviewee (I98) explains "what has happened is where there are IGR structures, we have strengthened relationships and trust of those involved…It has now allowed for people to pick up a phone and call. Before it was a distinction of "us" and "them". There was some friction and tension but that has improved significantly."

Another participant states "being in local government for 28 years and in our working group, it's the first time I ever feel a sense of shared knowledge and shared responsibility. You can pick-up the phone and call these people for assistance. Their professionalism and their approach is very complementary," (I39).

It should be noted that this lesson of leveraging existing structures appears to have been applied at local government more generally (excepting relations with the City of Cape Town) and not in the case of national government, where this lesson at the municipal level holds value for developing relationships with national government.

Benefits and limitations of the game changer approach

Even while the game changers have operated in a detached or intersecting manner to the PTMS, there has remained a continued effort to understand and learn what about the game changers is working, and how this can potentially be incorporated into the PTMS. The game changers have illustrated that a disruptive approach can yield efficiencies in implementation with the requisite technical expertise and capacity. Furthermore, PTMS structures such as Cabinet Bosberaad and Steering Committees have also served as opportunities for review of progress and wider engagement. It has further illustrated how, with support and the engagement of the executive, namely the Premier, and responsive resourcing, data can be generated to allow for continuous monitoring and course correction. This has contributed to an appreciation of monitoring and measurement which is central to the methodology, as seen through the stocktakes. While there remain mixed opinions about the selection of the game changers and the role of the DSU, many of the respondents that have worked directly as part of the game changers acknowledge the benefits of the methodology for fast tracking strategic projects and delivery.

An interviewee explains "the game changers taught us methodological, tools, instruments and practices that we can use in the departments…they have brought in the methodology of stock taking, where you are with the performance," (I88).

There are clearly time and resource limitations to the replicability of the approach and it has been critiqued for paying little regard to institutionalisation. Tension has arisen over concerns related to mandates and there is acknowledgement that, in some instances, the game changers were perceived to have undermined the work of working groups or cut across priorities (I23).

A respondent explains "the risk that exists with game changers being brought in when they were is that you end up with conflicting priority areas and conflicting needs, and you end up tapping into the same people with different layers of demand and end up with resistance, you are not getting the transversal collaboration because the time frames of the two are completely disjunct," (FG78).

By seeking to include the game changers within the scope of the PTMS, they have been considered in relation to it in the MTR 2017 and subject to broader transversal oversight mechanisms which has allowed for a degree of learning from both the strengths and limitations of the approach. This has proven indicative of an environment supportive of learning, even while the prospects of "mainstreaming the game changers approach" are acknowledged as unintended (I104) and/or impractical (FG35).

Along with the aforementioned lessons from the strengths of the PTMS, there are some weaknesses that have yet to be learnt from and limit the efficient functioning of the PTMS. These weaknesses include:

- PTMS scope and alignment of departmental core business;
- Limited change management to support the system;
- Indicator development and knowledge sharing;
- PTM's role and oversight; and
- Incorporating lessons from external partnerships.

PTMS scope and alignment of departmental core business

When considering the planning of the PSP as setting the parameters for the PTMS, one of the key lessons that has yet to be addressed and remains a weakness is related to the conceptualisation of the PSP, and therefore the PTMS, as inclusive of both the strategic transversal priorities and functional mandates of departments. Despite the PSP serving as the apex strategic planning, there are established legislative provisions and a culture of compliance which militate against this and this tension has been acknowledged, if not fully resolved. The PTMS has yet to find the right balance in terms of transversality and the following quote reflects:

"A general challenge is that the PSP process battles with the relationship between functional mandates and strategic cross-cutting issues. It put a lot of stress in the system. If you had HODs as accounting officers and APPs operating in an audited based compliance environment, that becomes a priority as opposed to blending resources, taking a few risks and experimenting. The former usually triumphs the latter. That is why it's not easy to talk about transversal management," (FG77).

The lack of an integrated approach between cross-cutting and departmental focus areas is potentially most apparent in relation to the budgeting process. PSG MTECs have been a clear step in the right direction and reflect a responsiveness on the part of the PTMS, but the system has yet to make most efficient use of the process to affect budgeting transversally. The PFMA is often cited as an impediment (I12). Despite this, there is a recognition among stakeholders that what can be done planning and budgeting transversally within the limitations of the PFMA has not been tested and there are boundaries that can be pushed (I105, I52 and FG4).

The sequencing of the PSP and departmental Strategic Plans has also been critiqued as working against this transversal intention and the prospect for budgeting alignment. While the national planning cycle and terms of government are beyond the scope of this assessment, it is clear that the PTMS needs to be able to adapt an iterative process and provide a degree of certainty, insofar as possible, as to how it seeks to frame its strategic priorities so that the necessary preliminary discussions can be held in anticipation of the PSP, informing the departmental strategic plans.

Limited change management

A key weakness that has been noted throughout the PTMS is the limited change management that has occurred. The lack of consultation, beyond the high level, has affected buy-in and ownership particularly at an operational level in departments. The PTMS SOP is silent on change management and neglects to acknowledge the kind of organisational culture, capabilities and capacities required to achieve it, a finding that has been further raised by the 2017 internal audit review (Department of the Premier, 2017a). Nevertheless, some departments have learnt and adapted how they work, even while other departments appear not to have had the benefit of the leadership to address this. The following quote reflects: "Some departments adapted and bedded down very quickly, it required a change management and culture shift, and that had to happen very consciously…" (I50). In the absence of responsibility for change management, departmental leadership has been a key determinant of whether departments have adapted to the PTMS. A more enabling environment could be created if there was a common, resourced and sustained effort in this regard.

Without consultation around the development of a new PSP (even in advance of a new term of government) and a sustained transversal change management

process with continued promotion of the PTMS, full ownership and buy-in of the PTMS is not likely to be realised.

Indicator development and knowledge sharing

Indicator development and knowledge sharing (especially when it comes to the game changers) are other weaknesses that the PTMS could benefit learning lessons from. With the PSP indicators determined in isolation of key role-players in DOTP, working groups, SMS and departmental experts in departments responsible for the APP, monitoring and evaluation, there have been critiques of their formulation, selection and the supporting project and output indicators advanced by a range of stakeholders.

The PTMS SOP makes reference to BizBrain and BizProjects as a project management information system, but is silent on the process of indicator development and the accountability implications thereof. The absence of outcome level indicators and the roles and responsibilities of PTMS structures relating to indicator development, planning, monitoring and reporting were also the subject of findings in the internal audit report (Department of the Premier, 2017a). Furthermore, as an SOP, the title implies that some considerations around the frequency of sourcing, collecting, reporting and reviewing indicators would be included as an integral component of the PTMS. However, this has not occurred and this has resulted in a PSP and indicators that:

- Lacked outcome definitions, indicators and data sources for some PSGs;
- Had not consulted the working groups tasked with driving the achievement of outcomes on the most appropriate measures for the intended outcomes and goals;
- Evolved in isolation of key planning, M&E officials in departments responsible for the APPs and other reporting requirements;
- Produced indicators with performance targets, but lacked baselines and clear rationales for their selection; and
- Were selected in the absence of common sourcing, data collection and measurement methodologies among stakeholders (Department of the Premier, 2017b).

Due to these weaknesses and the related accountability implications of statutory planning, some managers have been reluctant to align and include such indicators in departmental strategic plans and their APPs.

In relation to the experience of an outcome indicator that was negatively at odds (a qualified audit opinion) with comprising output indicators (achievement of a number of controls) a respondent stated: "It is a clear indicator that we chose the wrong indicators…Our indicator at the top is not linked to the outputs we have...This is something we have identified as a limitation," (I31). Such a situation may be avoided where working groups and technical experts have the benefit of unpacking the logic driving the achievement of the outcome targets.

It is also apparent from the qualitative data that the development of indicators without the benefit of the inputs from departments can create duplication and a disjuncture between information systems, contributing to reporting fatigue. An interviewee shares this sentiment by explaining:

"what is exhausting is the different ways of reporting. [I] find it hard to do different reporting memos, [I am] used to doing monthly reports but now all the

other offline things is exhausting. These little add-ons are tiring, and things need to be clear and aligned within departments and politically," (FG80).

Due to where the game changers sit in the PTMS and the direct reporting to the Premier via stocktakes, there has been an exclusiveness in terms of the level of information sharing when it comes to the game changers (outside of the Steering Committees and Cabinet Bosberade), which limits the prospects of applying the replicable aspects of the methodology and sharing lessons at an operational level in particular. A stark difference between the game changers and the working groups is the collection and analysis of regular, accurate & reliable data, and using evidence-based data, which is what guides the game changer methodology. The working groups by contrast have reporting responsibilities for accountability purposes more so than using evidence-based data to fast track implementation.

A respondent states "there is a whole lot of stuff happening with game changers and we are doing integrated management and WOSA and M&E. We could learn from each other, but we are not engaging. The stocktake was an important element, but excluded a number of people…it became its own thing, it was a missed opportunity for learning," (FG53).

Thus, it becomes apparent that, at the operational level in particular, transversal learning only appears to be happening in small pockets between certain groups. This is true for the game changers as well as the learnings that are coming out of WOSA, such as their learning networks (Integrated Management Stocktake reports, n.d.). An interviewee highlights this issue by stating:

"There is limited engagement with or communicating with middle management regarding planning processes. There is also limited engagement regarding optimisation of implementation processes, learnings, and best practises that can be utilised," (SURV 121).

Another respondent states "none of these things are static, work groups are evolving but there is not dedicated communication functions that tells people this is what is happening. There is no system in place to keep everyone involved. As [a] government official if you have no insight of what is happening then you are not optimal," (FG112).

Linking back to the scope and parameters of the PTMS, if the PSP is to be a whole of government planning framework, then the PTMS and related communications should also benefit from and work more closely with the corporate communication function in terms of information sharing and dissemination.

PTM's role and oversight

As mentioned previously in the findings, the role of PTM in relation to the PTMS is ambiguous and requires definition and clarification. Despite the MTR 2017 making recommendations that PTM play a more proactive role in coordinating the PTMS and providing oversight of the working groups across the five PSGs (Department of the Premier, 2017b), these changes have not been meaningfully effected. One of the issues that appears to contribute to this is the sequencing and scheduling of related engagements, particularly that of working groups (which some HODs sit on), Executive Committees, PTM, Steering Committees, Cabinet and Cabinet Bosberade. Giving more meaningful effect to PTM's role and oversight may also arise with

Lessons learnt from external partnerships

Considering the comparably positive levels of collaboration that non-WG SMS provided to working with external stakeholders, it would appear that the PTMS would benefit from the lessons learnt by staff with existing partnerships within their departments who do not actively contribute via working group structures. Among some of the lessons from external partnerships documented by the EDP that the PTMS would stand to benefit from are the following: That partnership in and of itself does not substitute the responsibilities of the individual partners themselves. The roles and responsibilities of all partners involved need to be clearly defined. The second lesson is that trust must be built and maintained. Partners must fulfil their part of expected agreements, whether these expectations are explicit (preferably) or implicit. The third lesson is that in order for a partnership to succeed, the 'right' people need to be involved. The people and departments in the room should share around decision-making ability based on legitimacy brought about by the 'right' people being involved, and not organisational hierarchy or mandates. Finally, the partners in a partnership should understand that partnerships change and develop over time. All partnerships have a lifecycle associated with them. Partnerships must be able to adapt to the contexts in which they find themselves.

The PTMS has contributed to increasing the collaboration with external stakeholders. However, external stakeholders indicate that there is scope for further, more meaningful collaboration. This finding echoes the sentiments expressed in the 2017 MTR.

5.3.5   Synthesis

The extent to which the WCG has created an enabling environment for the efficient implementation of the PTMS has been variable across different system components, processes, tools and capabilities. The WCG requires more enabling conditions to achieve the efficient implementation of the PTMS, while recognising that some of the needs for a more effective PTMS (e.g. consultation and collaborative strategic management) may detract from system efficiency.

From a system design perspective, the consolidation of the 12 PSOs into 5 PSGs has improved system functioning and contributed to a more enabling environment by creating clear alignment of the PTMS to each PSG, developing a manageable focus and compelling interdepartmental relations by grouping multiple departments together. Although all of the governance structures central to the operation and functionality of the PTMS have been established, the flow of information up into the system to the political-strategic level does not yield commensurate input and influence back down to the operational level, nor do sufficiently reflective engagements occur via these upper platforms. For a complex system such as the PTMS to derive strategic benefit for the WCG, there is a need for more collaborative 'sense making' (Allen, 2001), particularly where Ministers and HODs can play a more strategic role. This critique of the governance structures highlights limiations of the PTMS and poses a challenge to the filtering of transversality down to the operational level. The intensive monitoring and reporting within these structures for accountability purposes perpetuates the dominant hierarchical and transactional relationships within the public service which the PTMS was intended to mitigate some of the perverse consequences of through a more adapative and integrated approach. This has been noted as a key hindrance to effective responses as part of the governance function, where a concern with efficient processing may be detracting from the value of the platform. This critique has particularly been directed at the Cabinet Bosberaad, which is intended to function as a strategic nodal point.

The creation of the PSG Secretariats' Forum is both indicative of an environment conducive to responsive adaptation as well as a co-ordination gap that exists across PSGs at the operational level. This is a support function that may be well served by operational structures aligned to PSG5 or PTMS custodians, both of which are spread thin in terms of capacity given the demands of the current system. As both a goal of the PTMS and a pillar supporting the realisation of the four other PSGs, the objective of transversality is hampered by this systemic weakness related to co-ordination and communication. Given the complexities inherent in the system and its strategic importance, the identification of role-players responsible for supporting the communication and co-ordination functions of the PTMS in positions of leadership within departmental administrations can shifts in organisational culture (Avolio, Waldman, Yammarino, Bass, Barling, Slater, Kelloway, Stone, Russell & Patterson, 1991b), supportive of improved performance.

Among the various capacities which speak to the WCG's capability to implement the PTMS, cultural capacity and its relationship with organisational culture speaks directly to the challenges of communication, co-ordination and leadership at an operational level. Given the tendency of the public service to revert to more hierarchical, linear ways of working, a multi-faceted effort sustained across terms of government is required to enable the institutionalisation of transversality as a norm.

Similarly, the lack of an efficient resource allocation process has limited PTMS initiatives from being equipped with the intended resource incentives to drive collaborative strategic management within the WCG and outside of it. The game changers paint a stark comparison in this regard, as they appear to have benefitted disproportionately from PSG MTEC processes relative to working groups. The PSG MTECs do provide a common transversal resource allocation platform, but they have yet to support an efficient allocation of resources in this regard and are considered of comparatively limited influence to the more established departmental MTECs where the 'core' business of the department takes precedence over transversal initiatives. Relating this back to one of the key assumptions of the theory of change, the alignment of departmental budgets with transversal programmes and projects has not been sufficiently achieved in relation to the other implementation streams identified in the evaluation and the more austere fiscal environment has clearly been a limiting factor in this regard.

Accountability demands and shortcomings in the planning, monitoring and reporting processes have challenged reporting requirements and the value they present to the PTMS in some cases, particularly in relation to outcome attainment. This coupled with representation of key role-players across a number of governance structures, particularly among HODs serving across the political-strategic, tactical/interpretive and operational levels, has given way to a degree of meeting fatigue and a system more efficient at processing information up, rather than securing operational responses that advance the attainment of outcomes.

BizProjects was intended to be the PTMS' project management tool supportive of an environment conducive to the efficient implementation of the PTMS. It was envisaged to function as an electronic programme and project management information system for the executive and all departments, which could be utilised for oversight purposes. However, reservations have been raised about the tool's usefulness and applicability across the different categories of transversal interventions and WCG staff have expressed their preference with their feet

through a steady decline in the quantity of transversal initiatives captured on BizProjects. This is despite some consolidation of projects and increases in budget allocation per transversal project, on average. While BizProjects has proved useful as a project management tool in some circumstances, it has not been adequately and efficiently used within the PTMS to the extent originally intended, and its utilisation for accountability purposes by oversight structures within the PTMS appears to detract from the benefits of a more pragmatic, complex systems approach. Furthermore, it has highlighted a broader issue that the WCG faces with collecting, managing and analysing accurate and reliable implementation data, which is one of the areas where the game changers have accumulated considerable knowledge and insight.

The PTMS has actively worked on distilling lessons from transversal implementation and applying them to improving the system's functionality with some notable successes in terms of inter-departmental collaboration, the leveraging of existing intergovernmental structures and better understanding of the game changer approach. Despite these lessons, there are some weaknesses that have yet to be learnt from. The next term of government presents an opportunity to address these and create a more enabling environment for PTMS implementation.

Overall, the WCG has taken active steps over the term to create a more enabling environment for the efficient implementation of the PTMS, while noting that the drivers of efficiency may have consequences for effectiveness, and vice versa . However, if the PTMS is to be efficient, the processes and tools in place need to be improved upon and learning spread more widely through the PTMS through strong communication and co-ordination functions supported by strategic leadership within departments.

6 Conclusion

This implementation evaluation set out to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the PTMS in the development, implementation, governance and review of the PSP 2014-2019 at and between the three distinct management levels (political-strategic; tactical/interpretive and operational). Based on the methodology applied, it was found that the PTMS has been partly successful in achieving the aims stated above. It has been most effective in providing for governance arrangements supportive of more collaborative strategic management between departments at the political-strategic and tactical/interpretive levels of provincial government and has provided a framework for periodic review processes that are valuable informants to future strategic planning and management.

Has the PTMS been effective in achieving its objectives?

The political-strategic decision to streamline the PSP into five PSGs at the start of the term had a cascading effect on the design of structures of the PTMS, and demonstrated learning from the experience of its previous iteration even while not all of the lessons from the preceding review were internalised. This has resulted in a system of provincial transversal management that has proven adaptive to an extent, being mostly successful in achieving its intended outputs. It has delivered a PSP that is aligned to national policy imperatives, even while departmental planning has had to incrementally and, in some cases, retrospectively align. The governance structures of the PTMS are functional, although the relationships and scope of the PTMS in relation to the game changers and departmental core mandates has not been clear to key stakeholders. The PTMS has been less successful in delivering upon the intended outputs of consistently reviewed and refined tactical and operational plans, whereby strategic feedback and guidance has been lacking and refinements to implementation planning weak. As a result, learning has not been adequately achieved within the PTMS, especially at the operational level, even while there are institutionalised efforts to document and ensure lessons are learnt as part of broader review. The partial achievement of these outputs has limited the overall effectiveness of the PTMS.

Nevertheless, the PTMS has achieved an enhancement in transversal oversight and monitoring of PSG implementation. There have been weaknesses in the underlying logic and monitoring supportive of outcome attainment, but oversight clearly occurs and has improved. This, coupled with a strong sense of commitment to delivering upon transversal responsibilities among SMS, is indicative of perceived improvements in transversal policy implementation. Linking the reported results of transversal policy implementation across each of the PSGs to these improvements forms part of the broader strategic appraisal of the EOTR, and fall outside the scope of this evaluation.

Has the PTMS contributed to improved collaboration in the WCG?

The PTMS has contributed to improved collaboration inter-departmentally at the political-strategic and tactical/interpretive levels but there remains a need to move beyond co-ordination and co-operation at the operational level. Steering Committees and Executive Committees have proved important platforms for lateral engagement and co-operation, even while lead departments have carried greater responsibilities. Their relationship to working groups has been characterised by an emphasis on accountability, at times at the expense of deeper reflection on which a system such as the PTMS is premised. Working groups have had mixed experiences as sites of collaboration, reflecting

adaptations and shifts over the term of office. Some have proven more adaptive and maintained themselves as platforms for collaboration, whereas others have reverted to vertical ways of working and lost their transversal character. As these are the structures implementing PSP policy objectives on the ground, ensuring stronger formative input and interrogation between outcomes and the initiatives of working groups through sustained lateral engagements can support improvements at an operational level.

There is meaningful collaboration between provincial and local government, noting the linkage to pre-existing platforms and inter-governmental relationships that existed beyond the PTMS of this term. These platforms have been effectively leveraged as part of a complex interface between the PTMS and the intergovernmental system with tools such as the IWP supporting improvements in co-ordination. There remains a significant gap in collaboration with national government and this is an area necessitating pro-active engagement from the WCG going forward, particularly in light of the opportunities that a new term of government will present. Working with external stakeholders through the PTMS as a collaborative platform is not a strength of the WCG. Individual departments have pre-existing collaborative partnerships with sector stakeholders (e.g. health, social development) that are contextually informed and build on a history of engagement that is not necessarily tranversal in nature and so significant partnerships, and the accumulated institutional knowledge, have remained outside of the PTMS. WOSA is clearly on the agenda of the WCG, but there is a need to reach a common understanding of what this means in practice and plan for its systematic application in an appropriate manner given the range of functions and differences across departments.

Has the WCG created an enabling environment for the efficient implementation of the PTMS?

The WCG has contributed to a more enabling environment for the PTMS by creating clear alignment of the PTMS to each PSG, developing a manageable focus and compelling inter-departmental relations by grouping multiple departments together. The structures at a political-strategic and tactical/interpretive level have proved functional and adaptive over the term, even while the desired outputs of refined planning and lessons learnt have not always filtered down to an operational level. The transmission of information up from the operational level to the political-strategic occurs but the feedback and guidance provided in response can be improved, moving beyond report backs and accounting for outputs to more strategic 'sense-making'. Similarly, the lateral co-ordination mechanisms between PSGs within the PTMS, such as PTM and the PSG Secretariats' Forum can be strengthened as this was an acknowledged gap in this term.

The MTEC processes provide an avenue for shifting resource allocations in relation to transversal priorities but they have yet to achieve an appropriate balance in allocations across the multiple streams of implementation. While there has clearly been a shift in thinking about departmental budgets and resource allocations with more consideration given to transversal initiatives, this has not been commensurate with funding allocations given the intended strategic prioritisation of some working group initiatives.

Strategic leadership plays an important role in shaping organisational cultures and driving transversality as a norm. PTMS capability reflects foundational capacities in this regard, but the cultural capacity to shift hierarchical organisational cultures resistant to transversal management and drive lateral working relationships can be enhanced. More effective communication reinforced with supportive change management at an operational level is necessary.

Providing differentiated, user-friendly tools that can draw on the lessons of BizProjects will further contribute to an enabling environment across all types of transversal initiatives.

From the political-strategic level through to the operational level, the previously implicit theory underpinning the PTMS has displayed weaknesses and breakdowns in the posited course of actions that have hindered its effectiveness. A number of key assumptions in the PTMS theory of change have not held in practice, even while the system has itself proven responsive to some of these shortcomings as identified in the MTR 2017. Key results have been achieved to varying degrees, but there is evidence that the PTMS 2014-2019 has been an improvement upon the previous term. Nevertheless, the PTMS provides for an approach of pragmatic complexity that has yet to strike a balance between adaptive and flexible responses sought, with the regulated, vertical hierarchies within departments and the concentration of decision-making power and accountability mechanisms. There is an inherent tension that the PTMS cannot avoid, only mitigate and manage, and it has begun to do this between the political-administrative interface, but not yet effectively at the operational level.

Overall, there are positive indications of the effectiveness of the system and these provide a case for continuity that should be considered in relation to the broader review of progress towards achievement of the outcomes set in the PSP. The WCG should retain the PTMS, and address the shortcomings that have been identified in this evaluation. Effective coordination and collaboration in government are not achieved overnight, but through progressive improvements, based on critical reflection and learning. There were considerable shifts in the PTMS between the 2009-2014 and 2014-2019 terms of government, and the new term provides an opportunity to implement the lessons from this evaluation, in conjunction with those from the EOTR, to drive further improvements. The following section sets out recommendations for how to improve the PTMS moving forward.

7 Recommendations

The following are recommendations emerging from the draft evaluation report. The recommendations were revised following preliminary stakeholder input. The recommendations have been grouped according to common thematic areas and are a response to KEQ 4. How can the PTMS be improved upon moving forward?

7.1 Planning and strategy

The following recommendations refer to overarching planning and strategic considerations to inform the PTMS of the 2019-2024 term.

1. **The WCG Provincial Strategic Plan should retain a small number of goals with an emphasis on continuity between terms insofar as possible**

The change to fewer, transversal goals in this term compelled departments to work transversally. While the goals should reflect the mandate of the incoming government, continuity between terms would support institutionalisation of lessons learnt and build on the strengths of this term. The PSP should therefore retain a small number of goals covering those issues that require a transversal approach to policy implementation, but ensure a line of sight across core departmental functions.

2. **Cabinet Bosberaad should formulate the PSP as an apex strategic plan, cognisant of departmental mandates and core business which contribute to the realisation of the PSP**

The PSP should encourage line of sight between core departmental responsibilities and the PSGs, even while the PSP may only address the strategic priorities of the term. The PSP should acknowledge explicitly where there are distinct linkages between PSG related projects and programmes, and those that are core to the departments to support alignment between departmental strategic and annual performance planning.

3. **Departments should develop their strategic plans informed by the current strategic prioritisation, recognising the opportunity that annual planning reviews present for update, adjustment and alignment in relation to the PSP**

There are issues in the sequencing of the planning and budgeting processes which will not be resolved between terms. Departments should undertake strategic planning for the new term of government aware of the prospects for continuity and change between the current strategic prioritisation and that of the new term of government. The annual planning process should be utilised to make updates, adjustments and revisions to the departmental strategic plan to ensure alignment with the PSP and other forthcoming policy and strategic documents (e.g. the MTSF, National Department Strategic Plans, etc).

4. **Centre of government departments should strengthen the integration of PSG and departmental MTEC processes**

The current MTEC processes have been critiqued as insufficient to significantly shift resource allocations in support of the WCG's strategic agenda. Departmental MTEC and the PSG MTEC processes can be better integrated with each other through iterative engagements that strike an appropriate balance between the WCG's strategic agenda and that of departmental core business. A more

integrated process should facilitate opportunities for co-budgeting insofar as possible, within the limitations of the PFMA. Furthermore, these engagements provide a common platform for ensuring the application of lessons learnt and documenting the incremental shifts in institutional knowledge over time.

5. **A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to support transversal strategic planning between terms of government should be developed by DOTP**

The SOP should set out a standardised process for supporting the development of a PSP over the transition period between each new term of government. There should be clear roles, responsibilities and timeframes specified, so that the SOP informs a common transversal process, inclusive of the subsequent updating and alignment of departmental strategic and annual performance plans. The output of the transversal strategic planning process should inform the arrangement of the PTMS.

7.2 PTMS framework, roles and responsibilities

The following speaks to the development of a PTMS framework with clarification of the supporting roles and responsibilities.

6. **The Integrated Management Work Group should develop a PTMS framework informed by the PSP**

The PTMS SOP is ill-suited for its systemic use and the PTMS should operate under a framework that provides for responsive and differentiated structures, ad-hoc and issue-driven (e.g. water resilience) working groups. The structural arrangements should be flexible enough to allow for adaptability to new challenges and opportunities faced by the WCG, but bound by common parameters set out in the PSP. Concurrent to the finalisation of a PSP for the new term of government, the PTMS framework should be developed and widely circulated. Within the framework the following sub-recommendations should be addressed:

a. Clarify and formalise PTM's role in the PTMS

The role of the PTM in relation to the PTMS should be formalised as part of the PTMS framework as a strategic clearing house and platform for transversal oversight.

b. Clarify and formalise the PSG Secretariats' Forum role

The PSG Secretariats' Forum has played an important co-ordinating role at the operational level this term. Whereas co-ordinating structures exist at the political-strategic and tactical/interpretive levels of the PTMS, there is not a structure with these responsibilities at an operational level. The PTMS would benefit from the formalisation of this structure and the clarification of its role and responsibilities.

7. **DOTP should provide dedicated custodianship capacity for the PTMS**

If the WCG is serious about institutionalising a transversal approach, it should provide dedicated capacity to support the system and formally retain its acquired institutional knowledge. Dedicated custodial capacity should be buttressed with change management and communication support. The custodians, in close co-operation with the PSG Secretariats' Forum, should have responsibilities for knowledge management of the PTMS.

7.3 Collaboration and partnership

The following are recommendations addressing how to improve collaboration and partnership in relation to the PTMS.

8. Informed by the experience of the WOSA working group pilots, Cabinet Bosberaad should agree to a common understanding of WOSA and set guidelines for departments across the WCG

The WCG's adoption of WOSA, where the conceptualisation of WOSA is still in its formative phase, is a process which should occur systematically. The conceptual framework, with its associated implementation plan and change management processes, should be introduced based on a common understanding across government to ensure buy-in from all levels of staff. A common understanding of WOSA necessitates linkages to and integration with the strategic planning process of the PSP to avoid parallelism in the work of the WCG, particularly as it relates to consultation and the identification of common strategic priorities.

9. The WCG should clarify the PTMS' function in terms of the co-ordination of external stakeholder relationships

Significant external relationships pre-date the PTMS and interactions with external stakeholders commonly occur outside of the PTMS structures. As the transversal co-ordinating platform across the WCG, the PTMS' function should be clarified and guided by the WCG's approach to external partnerships (e.g. WOSA) to leverage these relationships towards the realisation of its strategic priorities.

10. Departments should continue to leverage municipal relationships to improve spatial implementation

The WCG made effective use of the existing IGR platforms at local government level to build and maintain constructive relationships over this term. This should continue and the IWP and the IIP should be periodically reviewed and expanded on to ensure alignment with the PSDF and the SDF.

11. WCG departments should diagnose the relationships between national and provincial departments to inform approaches to maximising co-ordination and co-operation for the new term of government

Given the identified challenges in the relationships with national departments, relationships with national government should be diagnosed to inform the development of co-operative strategies for the new term. DOTP should set a common framework for self-diagnosis of these relationships by departments to inform feedback to Cabinet. Strategies should be developed to improve working relationships with national government to support the achievement of the new PSP.

7.4 Tools and enabling environment

The following set out recommendations for tools and conditions to support an enabling environment for PTMS implementation.

12. DOTP should provide transversal change management support within and across departments

In order to develop the cultural capacity of staff for the transversal environment, revisions to the PTMS should be accompanied by change management processes to assist departments to adapt to new approaches to collaboration and partnerships. The change management unit in DOTP under the CD:

Organisational Design should assist and be supported by the Corporate Communications team.

13. The Integrated Management Work Group should develop a common appraisal tool for assessing alignment between national and provincial policy and departmental planning

As part of a more integrated set of MTEC processes, APP assessment reports would benefit from greater inter-rater reliability using a more structured assessment framework to enhance comparability and ensure common understanding of the issues and challenges at hand.

14. Informed by the PTMS framework, custodians should develop differentiated templates/tools for working groups

Working groups have different mandates, scope and relationships, and there is a need to provide differentiated planning, monitoring, reporting and evaluation tools to support them, while operating within a common framework. An updated PTMS framework should therefore inform the development of simple, flexible and differentiated tools for working groups or their equivalent.

15. Steering Committees should confirm the benefit and use of BizProjects as a project management tool in relation to the PTMS

There is a need to emphasise BizProjects as a project management tool, rather than an accountability tool, and specify the kind of projects where it is, and is not, compulsory for the PTMS. The intention is to ensure that the tool is utilised and fit-for-purpose rather than applied for compliance purposes.

16. Limit the number of PTMS specific meetings insofar as possible

Streamline meeting schedules and PSG responsibilities where appropriate and consider alternating or combining governance structures on a PSG by PSG basis. The dropping of Executive Committee meetings in one PSG proved an efficiency in one case, whereas Executive Committee meetings served their intended function in advance of Steering Committees in another. The system and structures should be responsive to a need and make effective use of the time of the represented stakeholder, rather than occur for perfunctory reasons.

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